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Abstract 
This dissertation comprises three empirical studies that aim to achieve a better 
understanding of financial crises, especially the most recent European sovereign 
debt crisis, and to contribute to the literature in the field. 
 
In the first empirical study, I review the lending behaviour of small and large 
banks in the Eurozone during the sovereign debt crisis. I find that relative to large 
banks, small banks in peripheral countries (1) barely substitute private loans with 
public debt and, as a result, are less likely to contribute to a credit crunch in the 
crisis and, (2) are less pro-cyclical in their lending behaviour. Such results support 
incentives embedded in new banking regulations that penalise bank size.  
 
In the second empirical study, I investigate how model-based capital regulations 
can be misused by European banks for capital saving purposes. I find that relative 
to banks from core countries, banks from peripheral countries (1) could greatly 
reduce the risk-weight associated with their assets by applying more model-based 
capital rules, and (2) that the default frequency of their assets is not reflected in their 
capital requirement calculations. These results indicate that banks from peripheral 
countries are more likely to abuse model-based capital rules. 
 
In the third empirical chapter, I examine how banks developed a home bias in 
their debt portfolios during the Eurozone crisis. I find that while state-owned banks 
have a greater home bias than private banks in their sovereign debt portfolios only 
when their domestic government faces considerable funding pressure, for private 
vi 
 
banks the home bias is always more pronounced in their retail and corporate 
portfolios. This new test supports the view that state-owned banks are more likely 
to be influenced by moral suasion, which may divert important sources of funding 
from the private sector.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
It has been a decade since the beginning of the Great Recession, which is 
regarded as the worst global recession since World War II (International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) 20091). The Great Recession is characterised by two consecutive crises, 
namely, the subprime crisis caused by the collapse of the US subprime mortgage 
market in 2007, and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis that spread 
across Europe. Unlike the subprime crisis, the effect of the European crisis appears 
to be very long lasting; some European countries are still struggling to recover. 
Various factors may have contributed to the European crisis, though the so-called 
‘diabolic loop’ or nexus between sovereigns and banks is certainly crucial. A 
distressed banking sector may exacerbate a solvency problem in the public sector 
because governments face higher potential bailout costs and lower taxation income 
due to reduced bank lending to the real economy (Acharya et al. 2015). In turn, 
increased sovereign credit risk weakens the banking sector as banks suffer losses in 
their government bond portfolios, and the implicit guarantee of future government 
support, if any, is less credible (Brunnermeier et al. 2016; Farhi and Tirole 2018). 
This dissertation aims to explore banking activity in the context of the European 
debt crisis, deepen our understanding of the interplay of sovereigns and banks, and 
offer insights on how to better control the corresponding risks.   
 
                                                          
1 "World Economic Outlook — April 2009: Crisis and Recovery" (PDF). Box 1.1 (page 11-14). IMF. 
April 24, 2009. Retrieved September 17, 2013. 
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The first empirical chapter of this dissertation explores the question of whether 
small banks were more resilient than large banks during the European crisis. I study 
this topic by focusing on one of the most important activities of banks: lending to 
the real economy (i.e. the non-financial private sector). A number of studies have 
demonstrated that a bank’s sovereign debt holdings have a negative impact on its 
lending to the private sector, what is referred to as the substitution effect (Gennaioli 
et al. 2014; Popov and Van Horen 2015; Acharya et al. 2015; De Marco 2017; 
Altavilla et al. 2017; Becker and Ivashina 2018). Reduced credit supply also 
significantly depressed real economic activity, such as investments and job creation 
(Acharya et al. 2015).  
 
In comparing the impact of banks’ sovereign exposure on lending to the private 
sector, I find that small banks do not substitute private loans with public debt, that 
is, they are not subject to the substitution effect while large banks are. Noteworthy 
is that the absence of this effect is not necessarily due to small banks’ low exposure 
to sovereign debt. I show that small banks from peripheral European countries have 
a much greater share of sovereign exposure in their portfolios than do large banks. 
I also show that small banks are less pro-cyclical in terms of lending, that is, they 
exhibit more stable lending behaviour during both good and bad times. Furthermore, 
small banks that have adequate capital and customers with high creditworthiness 
are more likely to increase both their sovereign bond exposure and their loans to 
the private sector. Such results suggest that new regulations that aim to increase 
banks’ capital ratios and lower leverage should not necessarily cause a contraction 
in lending as suggested by critics of the new rules. This is also in line with studies 
3 
 
that support a banking sector with more small banks, for example, Vallascas and 
Keasey (2012), Cotugno et al. (2013), Deyoung et al. (2015), and Berger et al. 
(2017). 
 
Banks from peripheral European countries were quite vulnerable during the 
crisis, and the second empirical chapter aims to find explanations for this. In 
particular, I focus on the model-based capital regulations used by large European 
banks. In order to increase the stability of the financial system and improve risk 
management in banks, model-based capital regulation, what is referred to the 
internal rating-based (IRB) approach, was introduced by the Basel II Accord. The 
IRB approach allows banks to design and calibrate their own risk models (subject 
to regulatory approval). Regulators believe that this approach can be more effective 
in capturing risk drivers and can motivate banks to improve internal risk 
management. However, it also provides banks with considerable incentive to apply 
strategic modelling to save capital for further investment – that is, regulatory capital 
arbitrage. A few studies have provided evidence of banks’ strategic modelling for 
capital-saving purposes (Vallascas and Hagendorff 2013; Mariathasan and 
Merrouche 2014; Behn et al. 2016; Ferri and Pesic 2017). I conduct the analysis in 
the context of the European debt crisis. After carefully addressing the endogeneity 
issue, I provide strong evidence that banks in peripheral countries are more 
associated with regulatory capital arbitrage by means of strategic IRB modelling 
than are banks from core countries. 
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Apart from strategic modelling, I provide evidence of another form of regulatory 
arbitrage – cherry-picking, that is, strategically choosing not to use the IRB 
approach for certain exposures. As required by the Basel Committee, if a bank 
applies the IRB approach to one part of its assets, it must take steps to implement it 
across all significant portfolios and business lines; the so-called ‘permanent partial 
use of IRB’ is only permitted for insignificant portfolios (BCBS 2001). In the 
second empirical chapter, I show that many banks from peripheral countries barely 
apply the IRB approach to their public-sector exposure and as a result, they can 
achieve unrealistically low risk-weights. At the same time, the IRB approach is 
widely used for private sector exposure. Hence, banks from peripheral countries 
appear to be abusing the IRB approach by means of not only strategic modelling 
but also cherry-picking. I do not find indications of a breach of rules regarding the 
implementation of the IRB approach among core country banks. Such results 
provide insightful explanations for why some peripheral banks were very 
vulnerable and suggest that not only should use of the IRB approach be carefully 
granted and closely supervised, but also that (permanent) partial use of the IRB 
should be limited. In this manner, both strategic IRB modelling and cherry-picking 
can be brought under control.    
 
As mentioned above, the sovereign–bank diabolic loop is one of the principal 
factors that has made the European sovereign debt crisis so widespread and long-
lasting. A key ingredient of the loop is the banks’ excessive holdings of domestic 
sovereign bonds, that is, the home bias in banks’ sovereign portfolios. The third 
empirical chapter examines the cause of such home bias. In a manner similar to 
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Crosignani (2017), I demonstrate that banks in the crisis-affected countries shifted 
their sovereign bond portfolios to other crisis countries. However, such behaviour 
is much less remarkable than how they reallocate their sovereign portfolios toward 
domestic debt. I also find that such home bias in sovereign debt investment does 
not necessarily affect non-bank institutions or individuals. Moreover, I provide 
evidence that state-owned banks and private banks have different types of home 
bias. State-owned banks have a stronger home bias in the sovereign debt portfolio 
than do private banks. Private banks, on the other hand, have a stronger home bias 
towards private debt. By means of these empirical findings, I argue that the home 
bias in banks’ sovereign debt portfolios can be best explained by the ‘moral suasion’ 
theory (Becker and Ivashina 2018). This theory states that financially distressed 
governments may (implicitly and/or explicitly) ask domestic large banks to absorb 
their new debt issuance in order to alleviate financing pressure. This result may also 
raise concerns for policymakers. As the government may influence the investment 
decisions of domestic banks through direct ownership, this may impede the 
integration of the European financial market. Indeed, one of the fundamental 
conditions for a fully integrated market is that all potential market participants are 
treated equally (ECB 2017). 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
In this chapter, I discuss the literature on the main topics covered in this 
dissertation. All the analysis of this dissertation is conducted in the context of the 
European sovereign debt crisis, in Section 2.1, I look at the interplay between 
sovereigns and banks. In Section 2.2, I discuss bank capital regulation and its 
implications. Lastly, I explore the differences between large and small banks, 
especially during crises.     
 
2.1 Risk Contagion between Sovereigns and Banks – The 
Diabolic Loop 
 
The following quote is from a 2012 speech by IMF Director Christine Lagarde: 
 
       We must also break the vicious cycle of banks hurting sovereigns and 
sovereigns hurting banks. This works both ways. Making banks stronger, 
including by restoring adequate capital levels, stops banks from hurting 
sovereigns through higher debt or contingent liabilities. And restoring 
confidence in sovereign debt helps banks, which are important holders of such 
debt and typically benefit from explicit or implicit guarantees from sovereigns2. 
 
                                                          
2 This entire speech by Christine Lagarde, Managing Director, IMF, is available at 
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp012312 
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Following the Greek sovereign debt default in 2011, the four largest Greek banks 
(Alpha Bank, Eurobank Ergasias, National Bank of Greece, and Piraeus Bank) 
suffered a total loss of more than 28 billion euros, which was equivalent to 13% of 
Greek gross domestic product (GDP). Such a loss is large enough to wipe out these 
four banks’ combined equity capital. In 2010, following the bailout of the banking 
system in Ireland, the Irish government accumulated an unprecedented budget 
deficit, equal to 32% of GDP. Since the banking sector’s losses had been 
nationalised, Ireland was forced to seek financial support from the IMF and the 
European Union. These are two typical examples of the so-called diabolic loop 
between sovereigns and banks 3 . In Greece, banks that were otherwise solvent 
became insolvent due to their holding defaulted domestic government debt. In 
contrast, the Irish government, which used to have one of the lowest debt-to-GDP 
ratios in Europe, suffered considerable funding problems in the sovereign bond 
market as investors became extremely concerned about the liability created by the 
bailout of the large and insolvent Irish banking system. For the other peripheral 
European countries, diabolic loops are less dramatic but still contribute to the 
ongoing tensions in sovereign and bank debt markets. 
 
Cooper and Nikolov (2013) argue that if the failure of the banking system 
involves significant costs for the real economy, then a bailout is always provided 
ex post by the government. Hence, banks do not need to be ‘self-insured’ ex ante 
through having issued equity. However, if a sovereign is powerful enough to 
                                                          
3 The term `diabolic loop' was coined by Markus Brunnermeier who used it in a presentation on the 
Euro Crisis at the July 2012 NBER Summer Institute Conference 
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commit the bailout ex ante, it would choose not to do so and would leave it to the 
banks to protect depositors through equity buffers. In other words, Cooper and 
Nikolov’s (2013) arguments explain why a bailout can create such a significant 
burden for governments. Pagano (2014) shows that, compared to the US and the 
UK, continental European governments are more willing to give assistance to the 
financial sector. Acharya et al. (2014) suggest that a potential bailout of the banking 
sector increases sovereign credit risk. They support this argument by proposing a 
model in which the government can finance a bailout through two channels, 
increasing taxation and/or diluting existing government debtholders. The bailout is 
beneficial because it relieves a distortion in the provision of financial services, that 
is, it ensures that important banks keep running. However, the corresponding 
financing is costly because higher taxation decreases investment incentives in the 
non-financial sector. Therefore, when the planned bailout is large, dilution becomes 
a relatively attractive option, although it will worsen the sovereign’s 
creditworthiness.  
 
If a bailout is the dominant ingredient for the transmission of risk from bank to 
government, the opposite transmission, from government to bank, can be built by 
banks’ holdings of sovereign debts, that is, the asset-holding channel. The theories 
proposed for banks’ holdings of sovereign debt can be grouped into three broad 
categories: (1) moral suasion theory, (2) risk-shifting theory, and (3) discrimination 
theory. Moral suasion theory suggests that when sovereign risk increases and 
government financing becomes costlier, governments may persuade the local 
financial sector (especially large domestic banks) to absorb more government debt. 
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Many empirical studies support this theory, including De Marco and Macchiavelli 
(2016), Ongena et al. (2016), and Becker and Ivashina (2018). Risk-shifting theory 
suggests that banks, especially those with low capital ratios, prefer risky assets, for 
example, the sovereign bonds of a distressed government. Hence, shareholders may 
benefit substantially if the government recovers, while the potential losses would 
be absorbed primarily by the banks’ debtholders (Acharya and Steffen 2015; 
Acharya et al. 2015; Horvath et al. 2015; Buch et al. 2016). The discrimination 
theory relies on selective sovereign defaulting on foreign creditors though not on 
domestic creditors. Consequently, domestic banks secure a higher return on 
domestic sovereign bonds than do foreign banks. This difference is greater in bad 
times when sovereign bond yields are high, which causes domestic banks to 
increase their holdings of domestic sovereign debt. Overall, with the rising credit 
risk of government bonds, losses in their sovereign portfolios weaken banks’ 
balance sheets and increase their riskiness (Altavilla et al. 2017). Further, Bolton 
and Jeanne (2011) consider international spillovers through cross-country 
sovereign debt holdings and Lucas et al. (2014) present evidence for such cross-
country spillovers. Apart from the asset-holding channel, there are a few more 
channels through which sovereign risk can be transmitted to banks, namely, the 
collateral channel, the rating channel, and the guarantee channel.  
 
First, the collateral channel. Sovereign securities are used extensively by banks 
as collateral to secure wholesale funding from central banks, private repo markets, 
and the issuance of covered bonds, and to back over-the-counter derivative 
positions. Increases in sovereign risk reduce the availability or eligibility of 
10 
 
sovereign collateral, and hence banks’ funding capacity (Trichet 2010; Davies and 
Ng 2011; Allen and Moessner 2012).  
 
Then, the rating channel. Owing to strong links between sovereigns and banks, 
sovereign downgrades often lead to downgrades for domestic banks. This may in 
turn affect banks’ funding costs and possibly worsen their access to the money 
market and deposit market. When the sovereign does not have a triple-A rating or 
closer, which is the high end of the scale, the ratings of the banks from that country 
will tend to suffer, regardless of their financial strength. This is because the 
sovereign rating usually acts as a ceiling for the rating of the banks (Peter and 
Grandes 2005; Borensztein et al. 2013). It is noteworthy that this correlation 
between changes in sovereign ratings and changes in bank ratings is significantly 
higher for rating downgrades than for upgrades (Ferri et al. 2001).  
 
Finally, the guarantee channel. Systemic banks have traditionally had an implicit 
government guarantee that has lowered the cost of debt funding. Following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, advanced economies also provide explicit guarantees 
to banks. However, government guarantees may lose value as a sovereign’s fiscal 
position worsens. In turn, it is more difficult for the financial sector to extract 
benefits from such guarantees. Systemic banks tend to enjoy an implicit 
government guarantee due to the adverse effects such banks’ bankruptcy would 
have on the economy. These additional guarantees can reduce funding costs for 
these banks (Grande et al. 2011; Correa et al. 2012). Due to sovereign risk tensions, 
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the value of these guarantees may be reduced in peripheral European countries 
(Schich and Lindh 2012; Gray and Malone 2012). 
 
This dissertation focuses primarily on the asset-holding channel. In Chapter 3, I 
discuss the impact of banks’ holdings of sovereign bonds on their lending to the 
private sector, and compare this impact in large and small European banks. In 
Chapter 4, part of the analysis involves exploring the riskiness of banks’ public-
sector exposure. In Chapter 5, I examine the home bias in banks’ sovereign debt 
portfolios.  
 
 
2.2. The Role of Capital 
Bank capital is the cornerstone of bank regulation and is considered a key 
determinant of a bank’s ability to withstand economic shocks. In the area of bank 
capital regulation, there is a wide debate on whether ‘more capital is better’ or ‘less 
capital is better’. For example, Admati et al. (2018) argue that banks should be 
financed with significantly more equity and that regulatory capital requirements 
should be set much higher than the levels proposed by the Basel Committee. On the 
other hand, DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) argue that high leverage is optimal for 
banks. 
 
Capital is closely related to the fate of banks. According to most theories, capital 
enhances a bank’s survival probability. First, one set of theories emphasises the role 
of capital as a buffer to absorb banks’ earning shocks. This is because, holding fixed 
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the bank’s assets and liabilities, more capital automatically implies a higher 
likelihood of survival (Repullo, 2004). Second, a set of theories focuses on 
monitoring incentives and capital. For example, Allen et al. (2011) suggest that it 
is optimal for banks to use more capital rather than charging higher loan rates to 
improve monitoring. This generates higher borrower surplus which indirectly 
increases the odds of survival of banks. Meharn and Thakor (2011) also indicate 
that a greater amount of capital will induce more monitoring, enhance the value of 
relationship lending, and increase the value of the bank. Third, another set of 
theories focuses on the asset-substitution moral hazard issue. For example, as 
suggested by Acharya et al. (2016), lower leverage can induce the bank’s 
shareholders to avoid assets with excessive risk, which reduces the risk-shifting 
incentive. In the model developed by Thakor (2012), more capital can reduce the 
attractiveness of innovative but risky products that increase the probability of 
financial crises. Freixas and Rochet (2008) also suggest that capital has a positive 
effect on the probability of survival. Similarly, in Calomiris and Kahn (1991), if 
bank insiders had more equity capital, a depositor-initiated run would be less likely, 
thereby promoting stability.  
 
However, some theories suggest that, under certain circumstances, increasing 
bank capital could be counterproductive. For example, Koehn and Santomero (1980) 
examine the impact on bank portfolio risk of an increase in the required minimum 
capital ratio and find that the dispersion of risk taking across the banking industry 
will expand accordingly. Specifically, with a higher minimum capital requirement, 
relatively conservative banks can offset capital restrictions. Meanwhile, banks 
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willing to take on higher levels of risk reshuffle the balance sheet towards risky 
assets to an even greater extent and hence increase the variance of the total risk for 
the entire industry. Besanko and Kanatas (1996) show that the equity value of an 
impaired bank might decrease when it is required to meet a capital standard. 
Regardless of the change in the bank’s equity value, however, its stock price will 
definitely fall in response to forced recapitalisation. They also argue that more 
capital may hurt bank safety. This is because the benefits of reduced asset risk could 
be more than offset by the cost of the lower effort exerted by insiders due to the 
dilution of their ownership. Diamond and Rajan (2001) also indicate that more 
capital may reduce a bank’s chance of survival. They find that capital reduces banks’ 
incentives to collect loan repayments and hence they tend to prefer more illiquid 
loans in their portfolios. Such findings imply that if there is a liquidity shock, more 
highly leveraged banks are more likely to survive as they can cope with such shocks 
more effectively by selling their liquid loans.   
 
Apart from survival, there are two concerns for banks managers: 
competitiveness and market share. A set of theories suggests that capital and bank 
competitiveness are positively related (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997; Allen and Gale 
2004; Allen, Carletti, and Marquez 2011; Mehran and Thakor 2011), as banks can 
derive a competitive advantage from more capital. These theoretical predictions are 
supported by much empirical evidence. For example, Calomiris and Powell (2000) 
find that capital had a positive impact on deposit supply in the Argentinian banking 
market during the 1990s. Calomiris and Mason (2003) show the same trend for the 
US market during the Great Depression. Looking at a sample of New York banks 
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during the Great Depression, Calomiris and Wilson (2004) find that banks with 
adequate capital are more competitive about risky loans because they are less 
exposed to the pressure of satisfying the preferences of low-risk depositors. 
However, the results of Kim, Kristiansen, and Vale (2005) imply that banks with 
higher capital ratios do not have a competitive advantage in terms of being able to 
charge higher interest rates to borrowers.   
 
Capital not only matters for banks; it also has a significant impact on the real 
economy. On one hand, there is a vast literature that criticises the capital adequacy 
requirement as it reinforces macroeconomic fluctuations (Blum and Hellwig 1995) 
and creates considerable social welfare costs (Van den Heuvel 2008). Diamond and 
Rajan (2000) and Gorton and Winton (2000) show that capital adequacy 
requirements may have an important social cost because they reduce a bank’s 
ability to create liquidity. Similarly, Diamond and Rajan (2001) suggest that the 
costs of illiquidity are avoided if the relationship lender is a bank with a fragile 
capital structure and is subject to runs. Fragility commits banks to creating liquidity, 
enabling depositors to withdraw when needed, while buffering borrowers from 
depositors’ liquidity needs.  
 
In contrast, many others argue that a greater amount of capital is important and 
beneficial. For example, Kashyap et al. (2008) argue that the main cause of credit 
crises is the fact that banks finance risky assets with short-term borrowing. In 
comparison, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) provide a comprehensive study of the 
influence of both bank- and country-level characteristics on bank performance 
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during the crisis. They document a positive impact of bank capital on the 
performance of banks during the crisis. Similarly, Garel and Petit-Romec (2017) 
find that the book-equity ratio, market-equity ratio and regulatory tier 1 capital ratio 
all have a positive impact on bank stock performance during the crisis. Admati et 
al. (2013) argue that bank equity is not socially expensive, and that high leverage 
(even if at the levels allowed by regulators) can make banking inefficient. In 
addition, better capitalised banks suffer fewer distortions in lending decisions and 
perform better. Gambacorta and Shin (2016) show that an increase in a bank’s 
equity ratio reduces the cost of debt financing and increases loan growth.   
 
This dissertation also discusses the role of capital, and capital regulation and 
implication. In Chapter 3, I consider the impact of capital adequacy on bank lending. 
In Chapter 4, I explore model-based capital regulation. In Chapter 5, the analysis is 
more broadly related to the composition of ownership (or the role of state-owned 
capital) as I assess the differences between state-owned banks and private banks in 
terms of asset reallocation during the European crisis. 
 
 
2.3 Small vs. Large Banks 
 
The relationship between the size of banks and financial stability has been 
debated for decades. Some studies (Diamond 1984; Marcus 1984; Besanko and 
Thakor 1993; Demsetz et al. 1996; Allen and Gale 2000; Hughes et al. 2001; 
Marquez 2002; Morgan et al. 2004; Stern and Feldman 2004; Stiroh 2006; Feng 
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and Serletis 2010; Martínez-Miera and Repullo 2010; Jiménez et al. 2013) support 
the idea that a greater number of  large banks can improve financial stability because 
they take fewer risks to protect their franchise value. Furthermore, they are more 
efficient in controlling operational costs, can extract higher informational rents and 
prevent informational dispersion, and are better at risk-diversification. On the other 
hand, others (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Boyd and De Nicoló 2005; Wheelock 2012) 
argue that the levels of moral hazard, risk-taking, and operational inefficiencies are 
higher for large banks. Vallascas and Keasey (2012) show that restricting the size 
of banks can reduce the default risk of individual banks as well as their contribution 
to systemic risk. Canova and De Nicoló (2003) and Uhdea and Heimeshoff (2009) 
also provide some empirical evidence to support such ideas and suggest that 
countries with a larger share of large banks are more likely to be associated with 
financial instability and more vulnerable to financial crises. 
 
In order to generate a clearer understanding of this debate, I can focus on a more 
specific question: ‘Does the geographical expansion of a bank’s activities reduce 
risk?’ According to textbook portfolio theory, geographical expansion will reduce 
a bank’s risk if the returns of the newly added assets are imperfectly correlated with 
those of the existing assets. In addition, Diamond (1984) and Boyd and Runkle 
(1993) argue that diversified banks are more cost-efficient, which improves stability. 
Furthermore, if diversification makes a bank too big or interconnected to fail, 
implicit or explicit government guarantees can lower the risk of investing in the 
bank (Gropp et al. 2011).  
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In contrast, other theories argue that expansion increases bank risk. Models 
based on agency theory (Jensen 1986; Berger and Ofek 1995; Servaes 1996; Denis 
et al. 1997) suggest that bankers might expand geographically to extract the private 
benefits of managing a larger ‘empire’ even if this lowers loan quality and increases 
bank fragility, the so-called ‘empire-building’ issue. In contrast, Goetz et al. (2016) 
argue that geographical expansion can significantly decrease risk and does not 
affect loan quality. Moreover, Brickley et al. (2003) and Berger et al. (2005) stress 
that distance reduces the ability of a bank’s headquarters to monitor its subsidiaries, 
which may have adverse effects on asset quality. Moreover, to the extent that 
diversification increases complexity, it may adversely affect loan monitoring and 
risk management (Winton 1999). Demsetz and Strahan (1997) and Chong (1991) 
find that geographically diversified bank holding companies (BHCs) hold less 
capital and choose riskier loans. Similarly, Acharya et al. (2006) find that as BHCs 
expand geographically, their loans become riskier. A comprehensive study by 
Meslier et al. (2016) incorporates the arguments from both sides. They investigate 
the US banking sector and find that, for small banks, only intrastate diversification 
enhances risk-adjusted returns and decreases the risk of default. Meanwhile, for 
very large banks, only interstate expansions are beneficial and only as regards 
default risk. More importantly, in all cases, the relationship is bell-shaped; that is, 
at some point the possible agency costs associated with banks’ geographical 
expansion outweigh the benefits. 
 
Small businesses are generally considered more financially constrained than 
large businesses. This is due to the fact that hard (quantitative) information on small 
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businesses, for example, financial ratios from audited financial statements or prices 
for publicly traded securities, is very limited. It is difficult for banks to make credit 
decisions regarding small business based on limited information (e.g. Petersen and 
Rajan 1994; Hubbard 1998). However, banks can alleviate the financial constraints 
of small business by means of relationship lending based on soft (qualitative) 
information, for example, knowledge of the character of the small-business owner 
(Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992; Boot and Thakor 2000). Small banks tend to be better 
at using soft information as such information is easier to communicate within a 
small organisation with few layers of management (e.g., Berger and Udell 2002; 
Stein 2002; Berger et al. 2005; Liberti and Mian 2009; Canales and Nanda 2012; 
Kysucky and Norden 2016). 
 
There is also a growing literature on the role of relationship lending during 
economic downturns and crises which argues that small banks’ comparative 
advantages may be greater when financial market conditions are adverse. Many 
papers support this idea by exploring the individual firm–bank relationship. 
Typically, by using loan or loan application data from credit registries of a particular 
country, these papers attempt to identify the impact of firm–bank relationships on 
access to credit. For Spain, Jiménez et al. (2012) show that during an economic 
downturn measured by low GDP growth, banks are more likely to provide 
continued credit to long-term clients. For Germany, Puri et al. (2011) find that 
savings banks began to reject more loan applications during the subprime crisis, but 
did so to a lesser extent for existing clients. For Portugal, Iyer et al. (2014) show 
that banks that showed greater reliance on interbank funding before crisis decreased 
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their credit supply more during the crisis. However, such a credit crunch is mostly 
irrelevant for firms with strong lending relationships. For Italy, Gobbi and Sette 
(2014) and Sette and Gobbi (2015) show that firms with more enduring lending 
relationships had easier access to credit, at a lower cost, following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. Taking a slightly different approach, Bolton et al.,(2016) find a 
similar trend: that Italian firms located closer to their bank’s headquarters (implying 
relationship, not transaction-based, lending) were offered better lending terms 
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers.  
 
Some papers attempt to explain the comparative advantage of small banks as 
relationship lenders by focusing on the characteristics of their balance sheets. Song 
and Thakor (2007) argue that the higher comparative advantage for small banks 
during downturns is due to the fact that during such periods wholesale funding used 
by large banks tends to dry up quickly. In contrast, core deposits used by small 
banks are more stable. In addition, Bolton et al. (2016) suggest that banks with more 
capital are able to perform their relationship banking role more effectively during a 
crisis. Aysun (2016) shows that larger banks’ lending is considerably more sensitive 
to the strength of their borrowers and their own balance sheets compared to smaller 
banks.  
 
According to the literature mentioned above, relationship lending alleviates 
credit constraints during crises. So, I may ask whether such a benefit comes at some 
expense, for example, greater constraints during a credit boom. Beck et al. (2018) 
find that relationship lending is not associated with credit constraints during a credit 
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boom; however, they concur that it alleviates constraints during crises. Moreover, 
such a positive effect of relationship lending is more pronounced for small and 
opaque firms and in regions that experience greater economic downturns. 
  
Similar evidence can be obtained from the perspective of borrowers. For 
example, based on a novel survey dataset of small business managers’ perceptions 
of financial constraints, which was then matched with information on local banks, 
Berger et al. (2017) suggest that small banks have comparative advantages in 
alleviating these constraints. More importantly, for those small business customers 
that are credit rationed by large banks (i.e. firms experiencing liquidity shocks) 
during financial crises, small banks also appear to have comparative advantages in 
providing liquidity insurance to them. 
 
Relationship lending may also have a critical impact on innovation. On this 
matter, Hombert and Matray (2017) studied how relationship lending determines 
the financing of innovation. By exploiting a negative shock to the bank–firm 
relationship, they show that it reduces the number of innovative firms, especially 
those that rely to a greater extent on relationship lending, for example, small and 
opaque firms. 
 
Notably, it is not necessary that all small banks be ‘relationship lenders’ and 
willing to alleviate credit constraints on small firms. Based on a sample of US 
community banks, DeYoung et al. (2015) define a sub-sample of banks, – those had 
a high share of small business lending in their loan portfolios before financial crises 
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– as relationship lenders. They find that while most community banks reduced their 
small business lending during the crisis, the relationship lenders did not. 
 
Overall, the literature mentioned above suggests that if more firms could be 
induced to seek a long-term relationship with banks, and if relationship-lending-
focused banks could be made to hold more capital in expectation of a crisis, the 
negative effects of crises on corporate investment and economic activity could be 
reduced. However, aggressive competition through capital savings and lower-cost 
transaction-based banking erodes access to relationship-based banking. Overall, 
more competition caused by transaction-based banks contributes to amplifying the 
pro-cyclical effect of banking on the economy.  
 
Given the benefits associated with small bank relationship lending, it is 
potentially concerning that the number of small banks has been decreasing over 
time. As indicated by Berger and Bouwman (2016, Table 8.1), from 1984 to 2014, 
in the US, the number of small banks – those with assets under $1 billion – 
decreased by more than 50% from 11,497 to 4,864. It is possible that something 
important is being lost in this process, for example, the ability to alleviate the 
financial constraints of small firms. 
 
In Chapter 3, I directly compare the lending behaviour of large and small 
European banks during the European sovereign debt crisis. My results support the 
idea that more small banks can reduce pro-cyclical banking and improve financial 
stability. In chapters 4 and 5, I explore two crucial issues that are more associated 
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with large banks, namely, regulatory capital arbitrage through applying 
sophisticated capital models and government moral suasion.   
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Chapter 3 Is Small Beautiful? The Resilience 
of Small Banks during the European Debt 
Crisis 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The European debt crisis erupted in the wake of the Great Recession in late 2009 
and was characterised by an environment of accelerating government debt levels 
and increasing government bond yields. One of the main causes of the debt crisis is 
that several European governments were forced to rescue troubled banks (Acharya 
et al. 2014). This led to a substantial increase in national debt burdens (IMF 2009). 
As banks absorbed higher levels of government debt, the balance in bank lending 
between private and public borrowers and the consequences of such allocations for 
economic growth became the subject of much debate. Two major hypotheses were 
developed to explain the relationship between banks’ sovereign debt holdings and 
loan growth. The moral-suasion channel documented by De Marco and Machiavelli 
(2016), Ongena et al. (2016) and Becker and Ivashina (2018) suggests that when 
sovereign risk increases and government financing becomes costlier, governments 
may persuade the local financial sector (especially large domestic banks) to absorb 
more government debt. If the financial sector cannot raise additional funds to 
purchase government debt, these purchases may be made at the expense of other 
investments, for example, retail and corporate loans. In contrast, as suggested by 
Acharya and Steffen (2015), Acharya et al. (2016), and Buch et al. (2016), the 
‘carry-trade’ and risk-shifting hypotheses can also explain this crowding-out effect. 
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Additionally, given the capital treatment of sovereign debt, banks may realise 
higher yields and benefit from lower regulatory capital by shifting from bank loans 
to risky government debt (Acharya and Steffen 2015). Banks willing to take on 
higher levels of risk may even take this risk-shifting strategy as a bet on their own 
survival (Diamond and Raja 2011; Broner et al. 2014; Acharya and Steffen 2015; 
Crosignani 2015; Drechsler et al. 2016). A further link between sovereign debt 
exposure and bank loans may arise as a result of the marking to market of 
government debt, as discussed by Altavilla et al. (2017) and De Marco (2017). 
Specifically, when sovereign bonds depreciate as credit spreads rise, banks suffer 
book losses that may further affect their ability to lend. 
 
This study contributes to the literature mainly in four ways. First, when studying 
the substitution of bank loans with sovereign debt, previous research mainly focuses 
on large banks. It is true that the overall market share of small banks may not be 
prominent4. Small banks are believed to play a critical role in the economy by 
financing small businesses, and their decentralized lending structure gives them an 
important advantage (Sapienza 2002; Berger et al. 2005; Mian 2008). Moreover, 
Cotugno et al. (2013) and Deyoung et al. (2015) suggest that pro-cyclical lending 
behaviour can be moderated if banks are strategically committed to relationship-
based small business lending. In addition, Vallascas and Keasey (2012) show that 
restricting the size of banks can reduce both the default risk of individual banks and 
their contribution to systemic risk. Moreover, a recent study by Berger et al. (2017) 
                                                          
4 In my sample, the aggregated loan provided by small banks is around 10% of the total, and 
aggregated sovereign debt exposure held by small banks is around 7%.   
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shows that small banks have a comparative advantage in alleviating the financial 
constraints of small business and that such an advantage tends to be greater during 
crisis periods. For these reasons, I broadened my sample to include small banks and 
to provide an extensive comparison of the determinants of banks’ lending to small 
and large institutions. This is particularly relevant in the light of new bank 
regulations that penalise large banks (i.e. through capital add-ons applied to 
systemically important institutions as well as by ring-fencing) and may lead to a 
more distributed banking system with fewer large players and more small-to-
medium ones5. So far, Albertazzi et al. (2014), with a sample of Italian banks, is the 
only paper I am aware of that compares large and small banks when looking at the 
interaction between sovereign risk and bank lending. They find that large banks are 
more affected by sovereign risk changes. My study differs from theirs in several 
respects: (1) while Albertazzi et al. (2014) focus solely on sovereign risk, I also take 
into account bank-specific exposure to sovereign debt from a rich database sourced 
from the European Banking Authority (EBA, for large banks) and Bureau van 
Dijk’s (BvD’s) Bankscope (for both large and small banks). This enables us to 
capture cross-sectional variations in sovereign exposure which I find to be highly 
significant in explaining bank lending patterns; (2) I extend the analysis beyond the 
Italian market to include a broad sample of Eurozone banks; (3) my sample period 
includes the peak of the sovereign debt crisis and the following recovery phase, 
which are characterised by a remarkable growth in small banks’ exposure to 
                                                          
5 Downsizing may also result in the forced segregation of trading from lending operations in banks. 
Provisions to ring-fence risky activities were included in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act in the US, the UK’s 2011 "Vickers Report" and the EU’s “Liikanen 
Report” on Bank Structural Reform.  
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sovereign debt, especially in peripheral countries (see Figure 3.1). This growth 
takes place from 2011, which is right after the sample period (1991–2011) covered 
by Albertazzi et al. (2014). It is conceivable that their conclusions may partly be 
driven by the fact that small banks were much less exposed to sovereign debt 
securities in their observation period. Instead, I show that small banks’ sovereign 
debt holdings may have a significant impact on their loan growth.   
 
Second, in addition to the substitution effect discussed in the literature 
(Gennaioli et al. 2014; Popov and Van Horen 2014; Abbassi et al. 2016; Altavilla 
et al. 2017; De Marco 2017; Becker and Ivashina 2018), I also find a 
complementarity effect where sovereign debt and bank loan growth are positively 
correlated6. I provide evidence that banks that have adequate funding and customers 
with high creditworthiness, and/or make substantial gains in the sovereign bond 
portfolio, are more likely to increase both their sovereign bond exposure and their 
loans to the private sector.  
 
Third, Popov and Van Horen (2014), Acharya et al. (2016), Altavilla et al. (2017), 
De Marco (2017) and Becker and Ivashina (2018) measure bank lending using data 
on syndicated loans (to large firms) or loans to non-financial corporations. By 
combining loan data from BvD’s Bankscope (bank-level) and the ECB Statistical 
Data Warehouse (country-level), I was able to measure bank lending as total loans 
to the non-financial private sector, which includes both non-financial corporations 
                                                          
6 The results of Altavilla et al. (2017) also observe a similar phenomenon when, in the recovery 
phase of the sovereign debt crisis decreasing bond yields generate capital gains in banks’ 
government bond portfolios which may help loan expansion. 
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and households. In this manner, I can comprehensively explore the relationship 
between banks’ sovereign bond exposure and their total lending.  
 
Fourth, I contribute to the literature that looks at the relation between regulatory 
capital and loan growth (Bridges et al. 2015; De Nicolo 2015; Deli and Hasan 2016; 
Gambacorta and Shin 2016). I observe that in peripheral countries small banks have 
substantially higher capital ratios than large banks, combined with lower leverage 
and lower default risk, as measured by loan loss provisions. I conjecture that this 
may explain why small banks tended to lend more than large banks during the 
sovereign debt crisis. In other words, a greater amount of capital may contribute to 
a bank’s resilience to crises and ensure stable financing of the real economy, a 
conclusion that has been much debated by regulators and bankers (see, for example, 
Admati et al. 2011).  
 
My work relates more broadly to the literature on the sovereign–bank ‘doom 
loop’, that is, the destabilising link generated by potential default risk spillovers 
between banks and sovereigns through banks’ government bond holdings (Cooper 
and Nikolov 2013; Farhi and Tirole 2014; Acharya et al. 2014, and Brunnermeier 
et al. 2016). I observe a dramatic increase in sovereign debt holdings in the banking 
sector, especially in small banks from the peripheral countries, which may 
exacerbate doom-loop effects. This may have serious implications for financial 
stability in cases of future shocks to sovereign debt yields.  
 
This chapter proceeds as outlined in what follows. In Section 3.2, I present the 
data and some stylised facts. In Section 3.3, I introduce the empirical model. In 
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Section 3.4, I discuss the results of the determinants of loan growth, paying 
particular attention to the impact of sovereign exposure and provide robustness tests. 
Section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
3.2 Data and Stylised Facts 
  
This section describes the data and presents some stylised facts about the 
relationship between sovereign debt holdings and loan growth in Eurozone banks. 
My sample covers core countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, and the 
Netherlands) and peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) 
in the Eurozone and the analysis is conducted for the period 2007–2015.  
 
Sovereign debt exposure data were collected from two data sources. First, I used 
a novel database of country-specific sovereign exposure for a sample of large 
European banks that participated in the stress tests and risk assessments conducted 
by the EBA during the period March 2010 to June 20157. The number of banks 
varies among the different tests, but according to the EBA, each test covers at least 
60% of total EU banking assets. These data constitute the ‘large bank’ sample in 
my analysis. A bank was included in the sample if it is from any of the ten countries 
mentioned above, participated at least twice in any of the EBA tests, and had an 
                                                          
7  Stress Test 2010 (March 2010), Stress Test 2011 (December 2010), Capital Exercise 2011 
(December 2011 and June 2012), Transparency Exercise 2013 (December 2012 and June 2013), 
Stress Test 2014 (December 2013) and Transparency Exercise 2015 (December 2014 and June 
2015). 
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average asset size of 20 billion euro over the sample period. This leaves us with 94 
banks. Then, I used end-of-year data for government bond exposure, which 
excludes loans and advances to governments8,9. In this way I could make the data 
more consistent with the other source for sovereign data, BvD Bankscope, which 
has only information on sovereign bond exposure.  
 
In order to include more banks and extend the sample period, I used the BvD 
Bankscope database as a second source for data on banks’ government bond 
exposure. However, the data from Bankscope is less detailed and, unlike the EBA 
database, only presents the total government debt of a bank with no counterparty 
breakdowns. I included all the banks from the 10 countries. I then split the sample 
into three sub-groups according to the size of the banks: large banks, as defined 
above; medium banks, with average assets between 2 billion and 20 billion euros; 
and small banks with average assets below 2 billion euros. For the large banks, 
disaggregated sovereign exposure by country of issue were sourced from the EBA. 
All other bank-level variables for large, medium, and small banks were sourced 
from BvD Bankscope. I also collected aggregated sovereign exposure for all banks 
from Bankscope. I used Bankscope aggregated sovereign data in most of the 
analyses where large and small banks are included. I employ EBA detailed 
                                                          
8 Since semi-annual financial statements are not very populated for those banks in the Bankscope 
database, I have to use annual data. Therefore, I extract data at end of year 2010, 2011 ,2012, 2013, 
2014 and apply linear extrapolation to the first observation – March 2010 – to match them with other 
end of year bank variables. Thus, I have 6 years of annual observations.     
9 Notably, the sovereign exposure in March 2010, i.e. the first test, does not distinguish between 
securities exposure and loan exposure. Thus, I approximate each banks securities exposure using 
country-level data from the ECB database. 
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sovereign data in robustness tests to distinguish between domestic and foreign 
government debt. 
 
Apart from banks’ sovereign debt exposure, there is another important variable 
- the annual growth rate of loans to the private, non-financial sector. The variable 
is obtained from ‘Gross Loan’ in the Bankscope database, which covers all loans 
provided to the non-financial sector but includes government loans (and excludes 
government bonds). Therefore, I needed to adjust this variable in order to obtain a 
measure of lending to the private sector. To do so, I used country-level data from 
the ECB to calculate the ratio, (loans to the nonfinancial private sector)/
(loans to the nonfinancial private sector + loans to governments )  for each 
year-country in the sample10. The ‘non-financial private sector’ includes loans to 
households and corporates. Then, I adjusted the original variable (Gross Loan) with 
this ratio to obtain loan growth to the private sector. This adjustment has a marginal 
effect on my regression results as government loans are a small proportion of the 
loans to the non-financial private sector (about 10%) and their aggregated amount 
does not fluctuate much over the sample period. 
 
Summary statistics of my data are reported in Table 3.1. I compare four bank 
groups: large core against small core banks and large peripheral against small 
peripheral banks. The sample period is divided into the 2007–2009 and the 2010–
2015 sub-periods, which denote the subprime crisis and the European sovereign 
                                                          
10 The assumption for such adjustment is that all the banks from the same country would have the 
same proportion of asset distributed between loans to the private sector and loans to the 
governments. 
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debt crisis, respectively. I can clearly observe that, relative to large banks, small 
banks exhibit more stable and less pro-cyclical lending behaviour (Panel A). This 
behaviour was characterised by weaker loan expansion relative to large banks 
during the subprime crisis with a statistically significant median difference of 4.6% 
and 2% in core and peripheral countries, respectively. During the sovereign crisis 
this trend is reversed, with small banks maintaining healthy loan growth as against 
sharp contractions in large banks, which even led to negative median growth in 
large peripheral banks (–2.1%). Again, the difference between the two groups of 
banks is statistically significant, with the median small bank exhibiting stronger 
growth of 3.3% (3.1%) than the median large bank in core (peripheral) countries. 
Figure 3.2 supports this conclusion. The first two years of the subprime crisis were 
characterised by strong expansion of lending in large European banks with a sharp 
contraction only in 2009, following Lehman’s default. For large banks, negative 
loan growth is then seen in the years of the sovereign debt crisis, especially in 
peripheral countries. On the other hand, the median small core bank exhibited 
steady loan growth throughout the observation period. The median small peripheral 
bank showed more variability over time but this was much less pronounced than 
for large peripheral banks, as it was only in 2013 and 2014 that there was a small 
loan contraction.  
 
A possible explanation for the ability of small banks to lend during the sovereign 
debt crisis is that they were expecting lower losses from their loan portfolios relative 
to large banks. This inference is supported by the lower amount of credit risk, as 
measured by loan loss provisions, in small banks during the crisis (Table 3.1, Panel 
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B). The median large core bank had 2.1% higher provisions than the median small 
core bank, while for peripheral banks there is a much more pronounced deviation 
of 6%. Both differences are highly statistically significant. The reason for the lower 
credit risk in small banks may follow from their relationship lending model 
(Albertazzi et al. 2014) and higher risk aversion (Deyoung et al. 2015). Smaller 
banks are also in a better position to support their customers in a crisis. This is the 
result of the soft information that small lenders can gather about their borrowers 
(Cotugno et al. 2013; Deyoung et al. 2015; Sette and Gobbi 2015).  
 
The conclusion that sovereign debt holdings crowded out lending to the private 
sector during the sovereign debt crisis finds strong support in the literature 
(Altavilla et al. 2017; De Marco 2017; Becker and Ivashina 2018). However, the 
analysis on which it is based is mostly limited to large banks. The results in Table 
3.1, panels A and D, suggest that the same conclusion might not hold for small 
peripheral banks. Government debt exposure relative to total assets were much 
higher for small peripheral banks than for their large peers, with a statistically 
significant median difference of 4.8% during the sovereign debt crisis. Yet, as 
reported above, small peripheral bank lending growth was much stronger (+3.1%) 
than that of large peripheral banks. Bank funding may provide some explanation 
for this pattern (see Table 3.1, panels E and F). For example, around 2011, small 
peripheral banks experienced a drop in retail deposits (Figure 3.3). This is probably 
due to sovereign risk and government bond yields reaching their highest level at 
that time. However, they were able to attract considerable wholesale funds that 
more than compensated for the contraction in deposits (Figure 3.4) and caused a 
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large increase in overall short-term funding (+21.4%)11. Such patterns likely reflect 
the fact that the ECB carried out the two largest long-term refinancing operations 
in December 2011 and March 2012 (Figure 3.5). Their size was 489 billion and 529 
billion euros and they extended to 523 and 800 banks, respectively, at a relatively 
inexpensive interest rate (1%) and a duration up to 3 years 12 , 13 . To prevent 
reputational damage, the ECB does not disclose the identities of the banks that 
borrowed. However, according to Van Rixtel and Gasperini (2013), around 60% of 
the Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) funds were borrowed by peripheral 
banks, particularly Italian and Spanish ones.  
 
Finally, one of the main objectives of new banking regulations introduced with 
Basel III following the crisis was to require banks to be better capitalised (BCBS 
2011). This was achieved through higher risk-adjusted capital ratios and a leverage 
cap. It is interesting to note that on both counts, smaller banks in crisis-hit peripheral 
countries did better than large banks. Specifically, small banks’ leverage was lower, 
with a 7% and 6% median difference in the subprime and sovereign debt crisis 
periods, respectively, and their median tier 1 capital ratio was 4.9% higher (Table 
3.1, panels C and H). 
 
                                                          
11 Wholesale funding in Bankscope includes wholesale deposits and any other short-term funding 
with a maturity up to 1 year.   
12 “For some banks, the ECB funding comes with interest rates more than three percentage points 
lower than they could obtain on the open market”. – The Guardian 
(https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/dec/21/eurozone-banks-loans-ecb ) 
13 The maturity of LTRO can be ranging from 3 months to 3 years, and those two largest LTRO with 
up to 3 years maturity has an early repayment option after 1 year. For more details: see 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_1.en.html 
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3.3 Regression model 
 
For the empirical analysis I employ the following regression: 
∆ ln(𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿 ∙ 𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝛾 ∙ 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝑉𝑖.𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (3.1) 
                    
The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of loans to the private, non-
financial sector. Also, I use four bank-level explanatory variables (denoted by X): 
log of total assets (SIZE), loan loss provision/total equity (LLP/TE), sovereign debt 
securities exposure/total asset (SOV), and the growth rate of funding sources that 
include retail deposits, and total short-term and wholesale funding (Δln(DEP&ST)) 
14. In addition, M is a vector of three country-level variables, GDP growth rate and 
CPI growth rate, as general control variables for macroeconomic conditions. GDP 
growth can be interpreted as a control for credit demand. I also added a more 
specific credit demand index (country-level) based on a quarterly bank lending 
survey conducted by the ECB since 2003. i and t indicate the bank and year of each 
observation respectively Average indices for core and peripheral countries are 
shown in Figure 3.6. Negative values indicate that demand decreased over the 
preceding quarter. The lowest levels are seen in 2008 in both core and peripheral 
                                                          
14 I consider the level of the sovereign debt rather than its growth because it is consistent with the 
literature (Ongena et al 2016; Becker and Ivashina 2018). Also, due to the large number of banks 
in the sample and the relatively short observation period, it is better to not to use growth rate 
which would make the sample even ‘shorter’ but ‘wider’. 
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countries. This is followed by a recovery and then further dips in 2011 and 2012. 
Further details on how I constructed the demand index can be found in Appendix 
A.1.  
 
Based on the stylised facts presented in the previous section and results from the 
literature, I expect that a higher level of sovereign debt exposure will lead to a 
decrease in loan growth. However, a significant negative coefficient of SOV can be 
associated with two scenarios and can convey different meanings: (1) higher 
sovereign debt may cause loan growth to fall (substitution effect that leads to a 
credit crunch), or (2) lower sovereign debt may cause loan growth to rise 
(substitution that leads to credit expansion). To separate these two effects, I add two 
variables: a dummy variable, Crunch, which equals 1 if loan growth is negative and 
0 otherwise, and Crunch interacted with (the lagged value of) SOV. The distribution 
of the proportion of banks with negative loan growth (i.e. the distribution of the 
Crunch dummy) is reported in Appendix A.2. I can clearly see that during the 
sovereign debt crisis, a much smaller proportion of small banks decreased lending 
relative to large banks in both core and peripheral countries.   
 
I estimate equation (1) using panel fixed-effects at the bank level and year fixed 
effects. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the 
bank level. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year and bank-specific 
variables are winsorised at the 2nd and 98th percentiles in each of the four bank 
groups15. 
                                                          
15 Similar results can also be obtained when winsorizing at 1%, 3% and 5%. 
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3.4 Results 
In this section, I discuss the results of my analysis of substitution and 
complementarity between private sector loans and government exposures. In the 
literature, the impact of sovereign debt holdings on loan growth is analysed by 
taking two distinct approaches. On one hand, researchers have focused on the 
‘balance sheet effects’ of sovereign debt holdings where the level of sovereign 
exposure is deemed to have an impact on lending (Popov and Van Horen 2014; 
Becker and Ivashina 2018). Another strand of research has focused on the return 
generated by sovereign exposure, rather than their level, and its influence on 
lending, which I call ‘profit and loss effects’ (Altavilla et al. 2017; De Marco 2017). 
Below, I explore both sets of effects. 
 
3.4.1 Balance sheet effects of sovereign debt on lending 
In Table 3.2 I present the baseline regression. The literature on the balance sheet 
effects of sovereign debt consistently reports substitution in large banks (Popov and 
Van Horen 2014; Becker and Ivashina 2018). However, when considering the 
overall sovereign exposure of a bank (SOV_ALL), I find that its relationship to loan 
growth is not statistically significant (Panel A). The coefficients of SOV_ALL and 
its interaction with Crunch were not significant in either the subprime crisis period 
or during the sovereign debt crisis. Wald tests reported at the bottom of Panel A 
confirm the absence of substitution in credit contraction periods (SOV_ALL 
(1+Crunch)). This important difference compared to previous studies could be 
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ascribed to the fact that I focus on lending to the entire non-financial sector. In 
contrast, Becker and Ivashina (2018) limited their analysis to loans to large firms 
that can issue commercial papers, and Popov and Van Horen (2014) investigated 
the syndicated loan market, which again involves large borrowers. As a 
consequence of a more comprehensive investigation of the credit market that 
includes small borrowers, as in my study, conclusions on lending contractions and 
expansions are bound to change. For instance, mortgages are typically longer-term 
contracts and, hence, represent a more stable asset base than corporate loans. I find 
that the results obtained for large banks also hold for medium-sized banks (Panel 
B). On the other hand, strongly significant complementarity effects were present in 
small peripheral banks in both sub-periods and during the credit crunch and credit 
expansion phases in those sub-periods (Panel C). Complementarity is also found in 
small core banks during lending expansions in the subprime crisis. At first sight, 
these results appear to contradict the trends reported in figures 3.1 and 3.2 that 
suggest a negative relationship between sovereign debt holdings and loan growth. 
In small peripheral banks in particular, I notice a sharp increase in sovereign 
exposure from 2011 and low or negative loan growth in the same period. However, 
my panel regressions are mostly driven by the cross-sectional relationships among 
the variables which, due to the large number of banks in the sample and the 
relatively short observation period, dominate the time series dimension. These 
results are interesting for two reasons: (1) it appears that lending growth in a large 
bank is not indiscriminately influenced by the bank’s overall government exposure. 
Substitution may still be present, but limited to specific types of government debt 
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(e.g. domestic vs. foreign, safe vs. risky). (2) Small banks do not appear to engage 
in aggressive portfolio selection strategies. Instead, it appears that they expand or 
contract their balance sheets by making same-direction adjustments across asset 
classes. I investigate these points in greater detail in later sections.  
 
The control variables in my baseline regression are not always significant. 
However, when they are significant, their behaviour agrees with my expectations. 
Specifically, all else being equal, larger banks in each size group tend to have lower 
loan growth, which is in line with Altunbas et al. (2009) and Ehrmann et al. (2001). 
Higher credit risk, as measured by loan loss provisions, is associated with lower 
loan growth. However, this relationship is never significant for large banks, while 
it is more robust for small banks. Higher short-term funding growth allows bank to 
expand their loan base. However, the statistical significance of this relationship 
across specifications does not follow a recognisable pattern. Finally, an increase in 
domestic credit demand is positively associated with loan growth, particularly in 
small banks16. 
 
I further explore the strong complementarity effects seen in small peripheral 
banks by comparing the characteristics of small peripheral institutions with high 
sovereign debt exposure to those with low exposure. The purpose here is to identify 
factors that may determine sustained levels of loan growth in a crisis, over and 
above those inferred from Table 3.1, when contrasting this group of banks with 
                                                          
16 I have tried different specifications of loan demand, e.g. by considering sector specific demands 
related to enterprises, mortgages and consumer credit, but without meaningful changes in my 
results.  
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larger banks. Hence, I split the sample of small peripheral banks into top and bottom 
sovereign exposure quartiles. The top quartile had a much higher proportion of 
average (median) sovereign debt over total assets during the sovereign debt crisis – 
33.8% (33.7%). This is 27% (27.9%) higher than for the bottom quartile. 
Furthermore, I observe that there are large and statistically significant differences 
in loan growth between the two quartiles. The top quartile exhibits a mean (median) 
growth of 24.5% (19.4%), which is 16.9% (16.5%) higher than the bottom quartile. 
This suggests substantial differences within the small peripheral banks where the 
complementary effect is much more sustained in institutions with higher sovereign 
debt exposure. This points to a strong expansion of the balance sheet in those banks 
during the sovereign crisis. As shown in Table 3.3, rapidly expanding banks are 
characterised by their smaller size, lower credit risk, lower leverage, and higher tier 
1 ratio. All these findings lend support to the provisions in new banking regulations 
that were designed to make banks more resilient and less prone to lending 
contractions in a crisis. Accordingly, the Basel 3 agreement introduced higher 
capital charges, additional capital charges for systemic banks that penalises size, 
and leverage restrictions (BCBS 2011). On the other hand, the greater reliance of 
small peripheral banks on short-term funding and their large sovereign debt 
exposure may pose financial stability concerns. Indeed, Basel 3 also introduced 
tighter liquidity requirements that aim to constrain banks’ dependence on short-
term funding unless it is compensated for by a commensurate level of short-term 
assets to absorb potential funding shocks (BCBS 2011). Regulators are also seeking 
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to reduce the doom-loop risks associated with high sovereign debt exposures in 
banks (ESRB 2015)17. 
 
3.4.2. Profit and loss effects of sovereign debt on lending 
I now consider the profit and loss effects of sovereign debt holdings on loan 
growth. I measure the profit and loss impacts of a bank’s sovereign debt portfolio 
by employing a marked-to-market loss definition, as in DeMarco (2017), which is 
detailed in Appendix A.4. Portfolio loss summary statistics are shown in Appendix 
A5. The idea is that an increase in the yield of sovereign debt holdings will cause a 
loss to the bank. Even though the bonds may be held to maturity, the unrealised 
marked-to-market losses may still have an impact on bank lending (De Marco 2017). 
As in Altavilla et al. (2017), I assume two alternative debt maturities, 5 years and 
10 years, and report results for each. My findings are shown in Table 3.4. As one 
would expect, profit and loss effects never lead to complementarity. Higher 
marked-to-market losses in the government bond portfolio cause banks to contract 
lending, while positive returns (i.e. negative losses) are associated with lending 
expansions. However, as shown in the Wald test in the table, these results for large 
banks are mostly not or only weakly statistically significant. Significance is found 
for peripheral countries when I use the 5-year maturity assumption, and is limited 
to the credit expansion phases of the sovereign debt crisis. On the other hand, in 
small peripheral banks, I consistently detect a negative (and weakly significant) 
                                                          
17 See “Hopes for European ‘safe’ bonds lean on pre-crisis techniques”, The Financial Times, 
August 15, 2017 
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relationship between bond portfolio losses and loan growth in the loan expansion 
phase of the crisis under both maturity assumptions. As I do not have a breakdown 
of sovereign exposure by country of issue for medium-sized and small banks, the 
results in panels C and D in Table 3.4 are estimated on the assumption that 
sovereign holdings wholly consist of domestic bonds. This appears to be an 
acceptable approximation considering the home bias observed in large banks, 
particularly in peripheral countries (Figure 3.7). I further explore profit and loss 
effects on sub-samples of the sovereign debt portfolios for large banks in Section 
4.6. 
 
3.4.3. Loan overhang effects 
Deyoung et al. (2015) find that a bank’s existing loan level can have a negative 
impact on future loan growth. This is because, due to regulatory capital 
requirements, larger loan books absorb equity capital. I aim to take this loan 
overhang effect into account and determine whether the loan-sovereign debt 
relationships reported in Table 3.2 still hold. However, the level of loans in the 
balance sheet is bound to be highly negatively correlated with the contemporaneous 
level of sovereign debt when both are measured as proportions of total assets (see 
Table 3.5). As the proportion of total assets (TA) captured by one asset class 
increases (e.g. from 30% to 40%), the proportion represented by the other asset 
classes will have to fall (from 70% to 60%). To avoid the interference of this 
mechanical relationship, I first orthogonalise loans/TA with respect to sovereign 
debt/TA. I also extend the orthogonalisation to all other explanatory variables to 
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prevent indirect feedback effects on the sovereign exposure coefficients. The results 
are reported in Table 3.6. As loan/TA is orthogonalised, the coefficients of all other 
variables will not change relative to Table 3.2. However, their significance might. 
I see that changes in significance are very minor (e.g. SIZE loses some in model 1, 
and SOV_ALL(1+Crunch) becomes mildly significant in model 1). Thus, my 
previous conclusions are confirmed. Furthermore, loan overhang effects are present 
and strongly significant in most specifications, which is in line with the findings of 
Deyoung et al. (2015). Large peripheral banks appear to be the only ones for which 
such effects are either mildly significant (subprime crisis) or not significant 
(sovereign debt crisis). This may be due to the fact that loan growth or contraction 
in these banks may be driven primarily by external factors, that is, the macro-
economic environment rather than balance sheet-specific factors. 
 
3.4.4. The effect of funding on peripheral banks’ balance sheets 
In the previous sections, I showed that balance sheet-based complementarity was 
strongly significant in small peripheral banks. The implication is that higher (lower) 
sovereign exposure leads to higher (lower) loan growth in those banks. In this 
section, I investigate how the expansion and contraction of these asset classes can 
be explained through short-term funding adjustments. For comparison, I extend the 
analysis to all size groups of peripheral banks and report my findings in Table 3.7. 
I can see that short-term funding and its constituents, deposits and short-term debt, 
do not seem to influence lending and securities investment decisions (government 
bonds, SOV, or other securities, SEC) in large banks. However, for medium-sized 
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banks, deposit growth was positively related to loan growth over the 2010–2015 
period of the sovereign debt crisis (Panel B). This is probably driven by risk 
aversion as deposits tend to be a more stable source of funding than are short-term 
liabilities. This trend is also observed in small banks (Panel C). However, for small 
banks, deposit growth also appears to have fuelled sovereign debt growth, as 
indicated by the high statistical significance of the deposit coefficient in Model 4. 
Interestingly, in small banks, deposit growth is negatively related to the growth of 
interbank loans (Model 3). Indeed, if deposit growth were a general trend across all 
small banks, as one can infer from the mean and median growth levels reported in 
Table 3.1 Panel F, then small banks as a group would have less need to fund 
themselves by means of the interbank market.  
 
3.4.5. Domestic vs. foreign sovereign debt holdings in large banks 
As reported in an earlier analysis (Table 3.2), I do not observe balance sheet-
driven substitution effects in large banks when total sovereign exposures are 
considered. I now test the robustness of this finding by studying the effects of 
sovereign–bank relationship on sub-portfolios of sovereign debt holdings. As 
shown in figures 7 and 8, the evolution of home vs. foreign debt and safe vs. risky 
debt in banks’ balance sheets exhibits different patterns in each group of countries. 
For instance, it is evident that large banks from both core and peripheral countries 
developed a stronger home bias in their sovereign bond portfolio (Figure 3.7). Core 
banks showed fluctuating exposure to risky (the GIIPS) countries, while safer 
investments in German and French bonds steadily increased over time (Figure 3.8). 
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Hence, it is appropriate to test whether alternative types of government debt can 
have different impacts on bank lending. My analysis is limited to large banks and 
the 2010–2015 period because granular data on sovereign debt is only available for 
the large banks that participated in the EBA tests, which only started after the 
subprime crisis18. 
 
In Table 3.8, I explore the influence of home and foreign sovereign debt on loan 
growth separately. I find that the lack of statistical significance reported in Table 
3.2 for total sovereign exposure conceals much richer and statistically significant 
patterns for different debt types. Such patterns may then offset one another when 
combined into one variable. Indeed, the original lack of substitution and 
complementarity of total exposure turns into strong substitution effects for domestic 
debt exposure during heightened crunch periods (i.e. when institutions contract 
lending for more than 5%) in peripheral countries. This is evidenced by the 
statistically significant coefficient of the Wald test for SOV_HOME*(1+Crunch) 
in model 4. On the other hand, strong complementarity effects are detected for 
foreign debt exposure in peripheral banks  in both the crunch and lending expansion 
phases of the sovereign crisis. The behaviour of banks in core countries appears to 
be distinctly different. Complementarity for foreign debt is absent and is replaced 
by substitution in loan expansion periods. Domestic debt holdings do not appear to 
influence large core banks’ lending decisions. 
                                                          
18 As bond yields needed in later analysis are not consistently available for all EEA30 countries 
covered in the EBA sample, I only consider sovereign exposures to the 10 countries in my sample. 
Such restriction should not alter my findings, as the aggregated sovereign exposure held by my 
sample banks towards the included countries represents at least 85% of their total exposure to 
EEA30 countries.  
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As suggested by Ongena et al. (2016), De Marco and Machiavelli (2016), and 
Becker and Ivashina (2018) the substitution effect may be related to government 
pressure (the moral suasion channel) that is exerted to induce domestic banks to 
buy more government bonds. If the banks cannot raise external funds to meet these 
additional purchases, substitution of retail and corporate loans may follow. To test 
this channel, I extracted the ownership information for the large banks from 
Bankscope. Then, in my regressions, I include an extra interaction term, 
SOV_HOME*Public, where Public is a dummy that equals 1 if the bank is state-
owned (see Appendix A.3 for a list of state-owned banks) 19. The results in Table 
A1 support the contention that the moral suasion channel existed in peripheral 
countries during crunch periods, as confirmed by the statistical significance of 
HOME*(1+Crunch+Public).  
 
Furthermore, previous research suggests that banks may prefer risky government 
debt to loans because the former, though paying a high yield, may not attract any 
regulatory capital charge (Acharya and Steffen 2015; Acharya et al. 2016; Buch et 
al. 2016). On the other hand, as banks face liquidity shocks particularly during crisis 
periods, they may prefer to hold liquid assets in the form of safe sovereign bonds at 
the expense of other assets (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2012). In both 
cases, banks may have the incentive to substitute safe or risky government debt with 
loans. I test both hypotheses by further breaking down foreign sovereign exposure 
                                                          
19 In Bankscope, banks are defined as state-owned if the government holds more than 50% of the 
equity capital, I adopt the same definition. 
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into two parts: a safe portfolio, called DEFR, which includes German and French 
sovereign bond holdings, and a risky portfolio of GIIPS sovereign bond holdings20. 
As seen in Table 3.8, large banks’ foreign debt exposure in core countries in phases 
of lending expansion (during the sovereign debt crisis) lead to substitution. In Table 
A2, column 1, I can see that such substitution is driven by flight-to-safety 
considerations as it is present only in the safe foreign debt portfolio. By contrast, in 
large peripheral banks, it appears that the complementarity detected in Table 3.8 is 
mostly the result of GIIPS exposure. This suggests that large peripheral banks may 
engage in aggressive risk-taking behaviour, with investments in high-yield debt 
leading to higher loan growth, that is, more strongly positive in credit expansions 
or less negative in credit contraction phases of the sovereign debt crisis. The latter 
effect is statistically significant only with severe lending contractions below –5%, 
as shown by the coefficient of SOV_GIIPS(1+Crunch) in model 4.  
 
In Table A3 I report the profit and loss effects of sovereign debt holdings on loan 
growth when domestic and foreign debt are considered separately. I find that in core 
countries it is the losses in the foreign debt portfolio that cause a contraction in loan 
growth. This is evidenced by the statistically significant coefficient of 
LOSS(1+Crunch) in model 2 in the Wald test section. This applies to both panels 
A and B, where different bond maturity assumptions are employed. In Panel A (the 
5-year maturity assumption) I also see that gains (i.e. negative losses) in the home 
                                                          
20 As my focus is on foreign exposures, for banks headquartered in one of the safe or risky 
countries, the corresponding domestic debt exposure is not included when building the risky and 
safe portfolios. For instance, in Greek banks the risky foreign debt portfolio will only include 
exposures to the other GIIPS countries, namely Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
47 
 
debt holdings of large peripheral banks cause an increase in loan growth, as revealed 
by the negative and statistically significant coefficient of LOSS in model 4. 
 
As in De Marco (2017), GIIPS is used to test whether the negative relationship 
between portfolio losses and loan growth is indeed caused by supply shocks rather 
than by demand effects. Indeed, if a government is under distress, credit demand 
from individuals and corporations may fall. Hence, a lending contraction may be 
the result of demand-side effects rather than of supply-side effects. By considering 
the impact of portfolio holdings of GIIPS bonds in non-distressed (i.e. core) 
countries I could rule out demand effects in those countries due to their good 
economic conditions. The significant negative coefficient I find in credit 
contraction phases (reported in the Wald Tests for LOSS(1+Crunch) in model 3) 
reassures us that the profit-and-loss-effects for large banks are indeed the result of 
a credit supply shock.   
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Previous research has shown that the credit crunch observed in Europe during 
the sovereign debt crisis could be explained by, among other factors, banks 
reallocating assets to government debt and away from the private sector. This 
substitution effect is thought to have had pro-cyclical consequences that 
exacerbated the crisis. These findings are mostly based on evidence from large 
banks’ lending practices. In this chapter I focused on small banks. Surprisingly, I 
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observe that there is no evidence of substitution in their asset allocation strategy 
during the sovereign debt crisis. On the contrary, I find that sovereign exposure and 
bank loans are treated as complements rather than as substitutes by small banks on 
Europe’s periphery. I find that an expansion in sovereign debt holdings did not 
cause a contraction in loan growth in those banks that had higher capital ratios and 
lower leverage. This has important implications. First, the evidence from small 
peripheral banks suggests that new regulations that aims to increase banks’ capital 
ratios and to lower leverage should not necessarily cause a contraction in lending, 
as advocated by critics of the new rules. Second, provided there are no funding 
liquidity constraints, banks could be in a position to expand both their private 
lending and sovereign debt holdings in a crisis, thereby providing support to both 
the private and the public sectors, precisely when it is most acutely needed. 
However, a large expansion in sovereign debt holdings, as observed in small 
peripheral banks during the sovereign debt crisis, may reinforce the sovereign–bank 
doom loop in which government distress can easily cause instability in the banking 
system, and vice versa. Therefore, I conclude that a ‘smaller is better’ recipe for the 
banking system should be coupled with a framework to address the potentially 
critical interdependence between banks and sovereigns, which may prove 
politically challenging21.  
  
 
  
                                                          
21 See “Basel says sovereign debt bank capital change could take years”, Reuters May 17, 2016. 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-finance-summit-basel-idUKKCN0Y80KO   
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List of Figures 
Figure 3.1: Proportion of total government security exposure to total asset for the 
median bank. 
A bank is qualified as a large bank if it has participated in the EBA serial tests at least twice and has 
an average total asset higher than 20 billion Euro. Government security indicates a bank’s exposure 
to all governments. A bank is qualified as a small bank if its average total asset is smaller than 2 
billion Euro. Peripheral countries are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Core countries are 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Netherlands. Data source: BvD Bankscope.   
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Figure 3.2: Growth rate of loans to the non-financial private sector, median value. 
A bank is qualified as a large bank if it has participated in the EBA serial tests at least twice and has 
an average total asset higher than 20 billion Euro. A bank is qualified as a small bank if its average 
total asset is smaller than 2 billion Euro. Peripheral countries are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. Core countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Netherlands. Data source: BvD 
Bankscope.   
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Figure 3.3: Growth rate of retail deposits, median value. 
A bank is qualified as a large bank if it has participated in the EBA serial tests at least twice and has 
an average total asset higher than 20 billion Euro. A bank is qualified as a small bank if its average 
total asset is smaller than 2 billion Euro. Peripheral countries are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. Core countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Netherlands. Data source: BvD 
Bankscope.   
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Figure 3.4: Growth rate of retail deposits and short-term funds, median value. 
A bank is qualified as a large bank if it has participated in the EBA serial tests at least twice and has 
an average total asset higher than 20 billion Euro. A bank is qualified as a small bank if its average 
total asset is smaller than 2 billion Euro. Peripheral countries are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. Core countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Netherlands. Data source: BvD 
Bankscope.   
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Figure 3.5: Characteristics of ECB’s Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) 
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Figure 3.6: Bank loan demand index of core and peripheral countries. 
The Figures are based on the data provided in the Bank Lending Survey by the ECB. The procedure 
followed to build the demand index is described in Appendix A.1. Core countries include Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, France and Netherlands. Peripheral countries include Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. Data source: ECB data warehouse. 
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Figure 3.7: Average proportion of government security exposure to total asset – 
Home vs. Foreign. 
Large banks are those that participated in the EBA stress tests and risk assessments. Core countries 
include Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Netherlands. Peripheral countries include Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. HOME is a bank’s domestic sovereign bond exposure divided by 
total asset. FOREIGN is a bank’s total sovereign exposure across all the above core and peripheral 
countries, divided by total assets. Data source: EBA. 
A. Large banks in core countries. 
 
B. Large banks in peripheral countries. 
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Figure 3.8: Average proportion of government security exposure to total asset – 
Foreign Safe vs. Foreign Risky. 
Large banks are those that participated in the EBA stress tests and risk assessments. Core countries 
include Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Netherlands. Peripheral countries include Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. DEFR is a bank’s exposure to German and French sovereign 
bonds when, for that bank, they are not a domestic exposure (e.g. for a German bank DEFR only 
includes exposures to French sovereign bonds) divided by the bank’s total asset. GIIPS is a bank’s 
total exposure to peripheral countries when they are not domestic exposures (e.g. for an Italian bank 
GIIPS only includes exposures to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) divided by the bank’s total 
assets. Data source: EBA. 
A. Large banks in core countries 
 
B. Large banks in peripheral countries 
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List of Tables 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
A bank is qualified as a large bank if it has participated in the EBA serial tests at least twice and has 
an average total asset higher than 20 billion Euro. A bank is qualified as a small bank if its average 
total asset is smaller than 2 billion Euro. Peripheral countries are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. Core countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Netherlands. Variables are 
winsorized at 2th and 98th percentile within each of the four bank groups. The significance level of 
t-test on mean and Wilcoxon test on median are indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. Data source: BvD Bankscope.    
Panel A:                                                                   Loan Growth: Δln(loan) 
 Large Core Small Core Diff Large Peripheral Small Peripheral Diff 
Period: 2007 – 2009 
Mean 7.8% 3.7% 4.0%*** 8.3% 6.7% 1.6% 
Median 7.4% 2.8% 4.6%*** 7.3% 5.3% 2.0%** 
N 117 5,075  111 1,762  
Period: 2010 – 2015 
Mean 0.3% 4.7% -4.4%*** -0.7% 2.6% -3.3%*** 
Median 0.7% 4.0% -3.3%*** -2.1% 1.0% -3.1%*** 
N 241 10,231  229 3,524  
       
       
       
Panel B:                                                   Credit Risk: Loan Loss Provision / Total Equity 
Period: 2007 – 2009 
Mean 7.0% 6.1% 0.9% 11.0% 4.5% 6.6%*** 
Median 5.0% 5.5% -0.4%*** 6.9% 3.2% 3.7%*** 
N 117 5,075  111 1,762  
Period: 2010 – 2015 
Mean 4.5% 1.5% 3.0%*** 20.7% 9.1% 11.6%*** 
Median 3.4% 1.3% 2.1%*** 12.2% 6.2% 6.0%*** 
N 241 10,231  229 3,524  
       
       
       
Panel C:                                                         Leverage: Total Asset / Total Equity 
Period: 2007 – 2009 
Mean 39 15 24*** 18 10 8*** 
Median 32 15 17*** 16 9 7*** 
N 117 5,075  111 1,762  
Period: 2010 – 2015 
Mean 29 12 17*** 18 10 8*** 
Median 25 12 13*** 16 10 6*** 
N 241 10,231  229 3,524  
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Table 3.1 Continued 
Panel D:                                                        Sovereign Debt Securities / Total Asset  
 Large Core Small Core Diff 
Large 
Peripheral 
Small 
Peripheral 
Diff 
Period: 2007 – 2009 
Mean 4.9% 1.1% 3.7%*** 4.9% 11.4% -6.5%*** 
Median 3.6% 0.0% 3.6%*** 3.9% 9.1% -5.2%*** 
N 117 5,075  111 1,762  
Period: 2010 – 2015 
Mean 6.3% 1.8% 4.4%*** 11.7% 16.8% -5.1%*** 
Median 5.5% 0.8% 4.7%*** 11.2% 15.9% -4.8%*** 
N 241 10,231  229 3,524  
 
Panel E:                                               Deposit and Short Term Fund Growth: Δln(DEP&ST) 
Period: 2007 – 2009 
Mean 6.2% 4.9% 1.3% 9.3% 7.2% 2.1%* 
Median 5.8% 4.0% 1.9%** 6.9% 6.1% 0.9%** 
N 117 5,075  111 1,762  
Period: 2010 – 2015 
Mean -0.9% 3.3% -4.2%*** 3.5% 10.1% -6.6%*** 
Median 0.0% 2.7% -2.7%*** 1.2% 6.8% -5.6%*** 
N 241 10,231  229 3,524  
       
Panel F:                                                                  Deposit Growth: Δln(DEP)  
Period: 2007 – 2009 
Mean 7.2% 4.8% 2.4%* 9.4% 7.2% 2.1%* 
Median 6.7% 3.7% 2.9%*** 7.6% 5.8% 1.7%** 
N 117 50,02  111 1,750  
Period: 2010 – 2015 
Mean 1.4% 4.1% -2.8%*** 3.4% 5.8% -2.4%*** 
Median 2.6% 3.3% -0.7%*** 2.1% 4.5% -2.5%*** 
N 238 10,127  229 3,499  
       
Panel G:                                                                     SIZE: Million Euro 
Period: 2007 - 2009 
Mean 357,355 549 356,806*** 149,632 467 149,165*** 
Median 158,400 387 158,013*** 60,132 293 59,839*** 
N 117 5,075  111 1,762  
Period: 2010 - 2015 
Mean 350,196 610 349,586*** 162,641 513 162,128*** 
Median 149,500 421 149,079*** 69,859 334 69,526*** 
N 241 10,231  229 3,524  
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Table 3.1 Continued 
Panel H:                                                              Tier 1 ratio: tier1 capital / RWA 
 Large Core Small Core Diff 
Large 
Peripheral 
Small 
Peripheral 
Diff 
Period: 2007 - 2009 
Mean n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Median n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
N n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Period: 2010 - 2015 
Mean 14.5% 13.9% 0.5% 10.9% 18.0% -7.1%*** 
Median 13.0% 13.1% -0.1% 11.0% 15.9% -4.9%*** 
N 226 5,635  211 3,056  
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Table 3.2: Determinants of loan growth: large banks vs. medium banks vs. small 
banks. 
This table contains the results of fixed effects panel regressions of annual loan growth of banks on 
sovereign debt exposures and other control variables. Panel A, B and C show the results for large, 
medium and small banks respectively. Peripheral countries are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. Core countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Netherlands. The explanatory 
variables include, SOV_ALL: sovereign securities exposure / total asset; SIZE: log of total asset (in 
thousand Euros); LLP/TE: loan loss provision / total equity; Δln(DEP&ST): growth rate of total 
retail deposit and short-term funding; DEMD is a country-level variable that describes the changes 
of credit demand of domestic borrowers; Macro Controls include domestic GDP and CPI growth 
rates. SOV_ALL is interacted with a dummy variable Crunch which equals 1 if the dependent 
variable is negative and 0 otherwise. In addition, we include the result of Wald-tests that give the 
joint significance of linear combinations of the betas for SOV_ALL and SOV_ALL*Crunch. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by 1 year and bank level variables are winsorized at the 2nd and 
98th percentile within each of the six bank groups – large core, large peripheral, medium core, 
medium peripheral, small core and small peripheral. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust 
and clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. Data source: Bankscope. 
Panel A: Large Banks (EBA banks with total asset larger than 20 billion Euro) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Sample Country Core Core Peripheral Peripheral 
Sample Period 2007 - 2009 2010 - 2015  2007 - 2009 2010 - 2015 
SOV_ALLt-1 0.1991 0.0119 0.3114 -0.0356 
SOV_ALLt-1*Crunch 0.5783 0.1571 0.0768 0.0368 
Crunch -0.1937*** -0.1007*** -0.0806** -0.1412*** 
SIZEt-1 -0.4364** -0.0189 -0.5577*** -0.0786 
LLPt-1/TEt-1 0.0196 0.1069 0.0103 -0.0251 
Δln(DEP&ST)t-1 0.1494** -0.0182 0.0667 -0.0366 
DEMDt-1 -0.0022 0.0001 0.0006* -0.0005 
     
Macro Controls YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
N 105 237 104 218 
Adj. R-Squared 0.71 0.42 0.68 0.45 
     
Wald-tests     
SOV_ALL 0.1991 0.0119 0.3114 -0.0356 
SOV_ALL (1+Crunch) 0.7774 0.169 0.3882 0.0012 
 
 
 
61 
 
Table 3.2 Continued 
Panel B: Medium Banks (total asset between 2 to 20 billion Euro) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Sample Country Core Core Peripheral Peripheral 
Sample Period 2007 - 2009 2010 - 2015  2007 - 2009 2010 - 2015 
SOV_ALLt-1 0.1466 -0.1200 0.5168 0.1696 
SOV_ALLt-1*Crunch -0.1095 -0.0895 -0.5085 -0.0914 
Crunch -0.1260*** -0.1168*** -0.1553*** -0.1629*** 
SIZEt-1 -0.3178*** -0.1382*** -0.1543*** -0.0605** 
LLPt-1/TEt-1 -0.0466 -0.0222 -0.2058*** -0.0533 
Δln(DEP&ST)t-1 0.0086 0.0286 0.0509 -0.0064 
DEMDt-1 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0001 
     
Macro Controls YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
N 1253 2643 541 766 
Adj. R-Squared 0.40 0.33 0.50 0.40 
     
Wald-tests     
SOV_ALL 0.1466 -0.1200 0.5168 0.1696 
SOV_ALL (1+Crunch) 0.0371 -0.2095 0.0083 0.0782 
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Table 3.2 Continued 
Panel C: Small Banks (total asset smaller than 2 billion Euro) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Sample Country  Core  Core Peripheral Peripheral 
Sample Period 2007 - 2009 2010 - 2015  2007 - 2009 2010 - 2015 
SOV_ALLt-1 0.4879*** 0.0281 0.1637*** 0.1343*** 
SOV_ALLt-1*Crunch -0.4687** -0.1003 0.0614 -0.0130 
Crunch -0.0912*** -0.1080*** -0.1136*** -0.0908*** 
SIZEt-1 -0.1785*** -0.1246*** -0.3327*** -0.0929*** 
LLPt-1/TEt-1 -0.0301 -0.0253** -0.2883*** -0.0486** 
Δln(DEP&ST)t-1 0.0063 0.0348** 0.0619** 0.0143 
DEMDt-1 0.0013** 0.0001 0.0003** 0.0002** 
     
Macro Controls YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
N 4863 9734 1673 3312 
Adj. R-Squared 0.31 0.31 0.51 0.42 
     
Wald-tests     
SOV_ALL 0.4879*** 0.0281 0.1637*** 0.1343*** 
SOV_ALL (1+Crunch) 0.0192 -0.0722 0.2251*** 0.1213*** 
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Table 3.3: Complementarity effect in small peripheral banks 
In this Table we look at the top and bottom quartiles of small peripheral banks ranked by their 
sovereign debt exposure during the period 2010 – 2015. Δln(loan1015) is the total loan growth in 
the period 2010 -2015; Δln(loan) is the annual loan growth; SIZE is the log of total asset (in thousand 
Euros); LLP/TE denotes loan loss provision / total equity; TA/TE equals total asset / total equity; 
SOV/TA is the ratio of sovereign securities exposure / total asset. Δln(DEP&ST) is the growth rate 
of total retail deposit and short-term funding; Δln(DEP) is the growth rate of retail deposit; Tier1 
ratio is tier 1 capital / risk weighted asset. The significance level of t-tests on means and Wilcoxon 
test on medians are indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 Mean  Median  
Item High Low Diff High Low Diff 
SOV/TA 33.8% 6.8% 27.0%*** 33.7% 5.8% 27.9%*** 
Δln(loan1015) 24.5% 7.6% 16.9%*** 19.4% 2.7% 16.6%*** 
Δln(loan) 4.6% 1.6% 3.0%*** 2.9% 0.8% 2.1%*** 
SIZE 434 1046 -612*** 249 529 -281*** 
LLP/TE 7.7% 11.4% -3.7%*** 5.6% 6.4% -0.8%*** 
TA/TE 9.9 11.0 -1.1*** 9.2 10.3 -1.1*** 
Δln(DEP&ST) 12.0% 8.5% 3.5%*** 8.4% 6.2% 2.2%*** 
Δln(DEP) 6.2% 4.8% 1.4% 4.9% 3.9% 1.0% 
Tier1 ratio 22.5% 15.5% 7.0%*** 20.8% 13.3% 7.5%*** 
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Table 3.4: Effect of marked-to-market bond portfolio losses on loan growth 
In this table we present panel regressions of loan growth on marked-to-market bond portfolio losses 
and bank specific and macro controls. Large banks are those that participated in the EBA serial tests 
at least twice and have average assets higher than 20 billion Euro. Medium banks have average total 
assets between 2 billion to 20 billion Euro. Small banks have average total assets below 2 billion 
Euro. Peripheral countries are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Core countries are Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, France and Netherlands LOSS_ALL is the marked to market loss on the total 
government bond portfolio of a bank. Crunch equals 1 if the dependent variable is negative and 0 
otherwise. Panel A (B) shows the result for large banks under the assumption that all sovereign 
bonds have a 5-year (10-year) maturity, Panel C (D) shows the results for medium and small banks 
under the assumption that all sovereign bonds have a 5-year (10-year) maturity. Controls include: 
bank-level controls (the same bank level variables as in the baseline model in Table 2, except SOV 
and SOV*Crunch), demand control (a country-level variable which describes the changes in credit 
demand of domestic borrowers), macro controls (include domestic GDP and CPI growth rates), bank 
fixed effect, and year fixed effect. All the other regression settings regarding winsorization, error-
clustering and coefficient significance levels are the same as in previous tables. 
Panel A: Large Banks, 5-year bond maturity 
 [1] [2] 
Sample country Core Peripheral 
Sample period 2010-2015 2010-2015 
LOSS_ALL -0.2953 -1.7593 
LOSS_ALL * CRUNCH -2.0162** 1.5096* 
CRUNCH -0.0900*** -0.1265*** 
   
Controls YES YES 
N 164 158 
Adj. R-squared 0.48 0.59 
   
Wald Test   
LOSS -0.2953 -1.7593 
LOSS (1+CRUNCH) -2.3115 -0.2497 
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Table 3.4 Continued 
Panel B: Large Banks, 10-year bond maturity 
 [1] [2] 
Sample country Core Peripheral 
Sample period 2010-2015 2010-2015 
LOSS_ALL -1.0857 -2.9798* 
LOSS_ALL * CRUNCH -1.9431 2.5957* 
CRUNCH -0.0864*** -0.1265*** 
   
Controls YES YES 
N 164 158 
Adj. R-squared 0.47 0.60 
   
Wald Test   
LOSS -1.0857 -2.9798* 
LOSS (1+CRUNCH) -3.0288 -0.3841 
 
 
 
Panel C: Medium and Small Banks, 5-year bond maturity  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Sample country Medium Core Small Core 
Medium 
Peripheral 
Small 
Peripheral 
Sample period 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 
LOSS_ALL -2.619 0.2965 0.9134 -0.3868* 
LOSS_ALL * 
CRUNCH 
3.7521 0.3040 1.4586 -0.0134 
CRUNCH -0.1344*** -0.1794*** -0.1259*** -0.1051*** 
     
Controls YES YES YES YES 
N 2643 766 9734 3312 
Adj. R-squared 0.33 0.44 0.29 0.37 
     
Wald Test     
LOSS -2.619 0.2965 0.9134 -0.3868* 
LOSS (1+CRUNCH) 1.1331 0.6005 2.3720 -0.4002 
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Table 3.4 Continued 
Panel D: Medium and Small Banks, 10-year bond maturity 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Sample country Medium Core Small Core 
Medium 
Peripheral 
Small 
Peripheral 
Sample period 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 
LOSS_ALL -0.9668 0.0444 0.0478 -0.2730* 
LOSS_ALL * 
CRUNCH 
1.1025 0.1568 0.7884 -0.0008 
CRUNCH -0.1351*** -0.1792*** -0.1259*** -0.1049*** 
     
Controls YES YES YES YES 
N 2643 766 9734 3312 
Adj. R-squared 0.33 0.44 0.29 0.37 
     
Wald Test     
LOSS -0.9668 0.0444 0.0478 -0.2730* 
LOSS (1+CRUNCH) 0.1357 0.2012 0.8362 -0.2738* 
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Table 3.5: Correlation between loans and sovereign exposures. 
This table shows the pairwise correlation between loans to total assets and sovereign exposure to 
total assets. Large banks are those that participated in the EBA serial tests at least twice and have 
average assets higher than 20 billion Euro. Medium banks have average total assets between 2 billion 
to 20 billion Euro. Small banks have average total assets below 2 billion Euro. Peripheral countries 
are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Core countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, France 
and Netherlands. * indicate significance at the 1 percent levels. 
 
Period 
Large 
Core 
Large 
Peripher
al 
Medium 
Core 
Medium 
Peripher
al 
Small 
Core 
Small 
Peripher
al 
2007 – 2009 -0.16 -0.35* -0.31* -0.38* -0.27* -0.55* 
2010 – 2015 0.03 -0.40* -0.36* -0.43* -0.27* -0.44* 
 
  
68 
 
Table 3.6: Loan overhang effect 
In this table we employ panel regressions of loan growth on LOAN/TA which denotes lagged loan 
levels to total assets (loan overhang effect), and other bank specific and macro controls. LOAN/TA 
is orthogonalized with respect all the other explanatory variables. Panel A, B and C show the results 
for large banks, medium banks and small banks. Large banks are those that participated in the EBA 
serial tests at least twice and have average assets higher than 20 billion Euro. Medium banks have 
average total assets between 2 billion to 20 billion Euro. Small banks have average total assets below 
2 billion Euro. Peripheral countries are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Core countries 
are Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Netherlands. Explanatory variables include, SIZE: log 
of total asset (in thousand Euros); LLP/TE: loan loss provision / total equity; SOV_ALL: sovereign 
securities exposure / total asset. Δln(DEP&ST): growth rate of total retail deposit and short-term 
funding; DEMD is a country-level variable that describes the changes in credit demand of domestic 
borrowers; Controls include domestic GDP and CPI growth rates; Bank fixed effect and Year fixed 
effects. Crunch equals 1 if the dependent variable is negative and 0 otherwise. In addition, we 
include the result of Wald-tests that give the joint significance of linear combinations of betas of 
SOV_ALL and SOV_ALL*Crunch. All the other regression settings regarding winsorization, error-
clustering and coefficient significance levels are the same as in Table 2. 
Panel A: Large Banks (EBA banks with total asset larger than 20 billion Euro) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Sample Country Core Core Peripheral Peripheral 
Sample Period 2007 - 2009 2010 - 2015  2007 - 2009 2010 - 2015 
LOAN/TAt-1 -1.4036*** -0.3221*** -0.6005* -0.1987 
SOV_ALLt-1 0.1991 0.0119 0.3114 -0.0356 
SOV_ALLt-1*Crunch 0.5783 0.1571 0.0768 0.0368 
Crunch -0.1937*** -0.1007*** -0.0806** -0.1412*** 
SIZEt-1 -0.4364*** -0.0189 -0.5577*** -0.0786 
LLPt-1/TEt-1 0.0196 0.1069 0.0103 -0.0251 
Δln(DEP&ST)t-1 0.1494** -0.0182 0.0667 -0.0366 
DEMDt-1 -0.0022 0.0001 0.0006 -0.0005 
     
Controls YES YES YES YES 
N 105 237 104 218 
Adj. R-Squared 0.78 0.45 0.70 0.45 
     
Wald-tests     
SOV_ALL 0.1991 0.0119 0.3114 -0.0356 
SOV_ALL (1+Crunch) 0.7774* 0.1690 0.3882 0.0012 
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Table 3.6 Continued 
Panel B: Medium Banks (total asset between 2 to 20 billion Euro) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Sample Country Core Core Peripheral Peripheral 
Sample Period 2007 - 2009 2010 - 2015  2007 - 2009 2010 - 2015 
LOAN/TAt-1 -1.0873*** -0.3849*** -0.5675*** -0.3037*** 
SOV_ALLt-1 0.1466 -0.1200 0.5168 0.1696 
SOV_ALLt-1*Crunch -0.1095 -0.0895 -0.5085 -0.0914 
Crunch -0.1260*** -0.1168*** -0.1553*** -0.1629*** 
SIZEt-1 -0.3178*** -0.1382*** -0.1543*** -0.0605** 
LLPt-1/TEt-1 -0.0466 -0.0222 -0.2058*** -0.0533 
Δln(DEP&ST)t-1 0.0086 0.0286 0.0509 -0.0064 
DEMDt-1 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0001 
     
Controls YES YES YES YES 
N 1253 2643 541 766 
Adj. R-Squared 0.49 0.37 0.53 0.41 
     
Wald-tests     
SOV_ALL 0.1466 -0.1200 0.5168 0.1696 
SOV_ALL (1+Crunch) 0.0371 -0.2095 0.0083 0.0782 
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Table 3.6 Continued 
Panel C: Small Banks (total asset smaller than 2 billion Euro) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Sample Country  Core  Core Peripheral Peripheral 
Sample Period 2007 - 2009 2010 - 2015  2007 - 2009 2010 - 2015 
LOAN/TAt-1 -0.6506*** -0.2558*** -0.5621*** -0.3595*** 
SOV_ALLt-1 0.4879*** 0.0281 0.1637*** 0.1343*** 
SOV_ALLt-1*Crunch -0.4687** -0.1003 0.0614 -0.0130 
Crunch -0.0912*** -0.1080*** -0.1136*** -0.0908*** 
SIZEt-1 -0.1785*** -0.1246*** -0.3327*** -0.0929*** 
LLPt-1/TEt-1 -0.0301 -0.0253** -0.2883*** -0.0486** 
Δln(DEP&ST)t-1 0.0063 0.0348** 0.0619** 0.0143 
DEMDt-1 0.0013** 0.0001 0.0003** 0.0002* 
     
Controls YES YES YES YES 
N 4863 9734 1673 3312 
Adj. R-Squared 0.35 0.32 0.55 0.46 
     
Wald-tests     
SOV_ALL 0.4879*** 0.0281 0.1637*** 0.1343*** 
SOV_ALL (1+Crunch) 0.0192 -0.0722 0.2251*** 0.1213*** 
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Table 3.7: Funding Effects on Peripheral Banks  
In this Table we employ panel regressions to study the effects of funding on average loan growth 
Δln(loan), growth in interbank loans Δln(loan_bank), and the ratio of sovereign exposures (SOV) 
and non-sovereign securities (SEC) to total assets. Controls include: bank-level controls (the same 
bank level variables as in the baseline model in Table 2), demand control (a country-level variable 
which describes the changes in credit demand of domestic borrowers), macro controls (include 
domestic GDP and CPI growth rates), bank fixed effect, and year fixed effect. The settings of 
regressions are the same as in Table 2. 
 
Panel A: Large Peripheral Banks (EBA banks with total asset larger than 20 billion Euro)  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Dependent Variable Δln(loan) Δln(loan) Δln(loan_bank) SOV SEC 
Sample Period 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 
Δln(DEP&ST)t-1 -0.0366     
Δln(DEP)t-1  -0.0114 0.203 0.0178 -0.0222 
Δ(ST)t-1  -0.0006 -0.0365 0.0119 0.0008 
      
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
N 218 218 218 218 218 
Adj. R-squared 0.45 0.44 0.21 0.56 0.16 
 
Panel B: Medium Peripheral Banks (total asset between 2 to 20 billion Euro) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Dependent Variable Δln(loan) Δln(loan) Δln(loan_bank) SOV SEC 
Sample Period 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 
Δln(DEP&ST)t-1 -0.0052     
Δln(DEP)t-1  0.0642** 0.0456 -0.0095 -0.0062 
Δ(ST)t-1  -0.0026 0.0205 -0.0007 -0.0003 
      
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
N 766 751 748 751 751 
Adj. R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.05 0.56 0.04 
 
Panel C: Small Peripheral Banks (total asset smaller than 2 billion Euro) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Dependent Variable Δln(loan) Δln(loan) Δln(loan_bank) SOV SEC 
Sample Period 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 
Δln(DEP&ST)t-1 0.0219**     
Δln(DEP)t-1  0.0259* -0.4969*** 0.0317*** -0.0045 
Δ(ST)t-1  0.0004 0.0054 -0.0002 0.0002 
      
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
N 3312 3288 3275 3288 3269 
Adj. R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.10 0.56 0.05 
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Table 3.8: Impact of sovereign debt on loan growth, domestic vs foreign. 
This table shows the impact of a specific sub-portfolio of sovereign exposures (domestic or foreign) 
on loan growth for large banks. A bank is qualified as a large bank if it has participated in the EBA 
serial tests at least twice and with an average total asset larger than 20 billion Euro. Peripheral 
countries are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Core countries are Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, France and Netherlands. SOV_HOME (SOV_FOREIGN) is the domestic (foreign) 
sovereign exposure (to the other nine countries) divided by total asset. SOV_ is interacted with the 
dummy variable Crunch which equals 1 if the dependent variable is smaller than a certain level (0% 
and -5% respectively) and 0 otherwise. Controls include: bank-level controls (the same bank level 
variables as in the baseline model in Table 2), demand control (a country-level variable which 
describes the changes in credit demand of domestic borrowers), macro controls (include domestic 
GDP and CPI growth rates), bank fixed effect, and year fixed effect. All the other regression settings 
regarding winsorization, error-clustering and coefficient significance levels are the same as in 
previous tables. Data source: EBA. 
Large Banks (EBA banks with total asset larger than 20 billion Euro) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Threshold for Crunch 0% -5% 0% -5% 
Sample Country Core Core Peripheral Peripheral 
Sample Period 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 
SOV_HOMEt-1 -0.3406 -0.1284 0.2263 0.1393 
SOV_HOMEt-1*Crunch 0.0892 -0.1393 -0.4135 -0.5104** 
     
SOV_Foreignt-1 -0.9954** -0.5368 3.5310** 5.2857*** 
SOV_Foreignt-1*Crunch 0.6473 0.1548 -1.5695 -0.8259 
     
Crunch -0.1012*** -0.0991*** -0.0766*** -0.0610** 
     
Controls YES YES YES YES 
N 164 164 158 158 
Adj. R-squared 0.51 0.53 0.60 0.51 
     
Wald tests     
SOV_HOME -0.3406 -0.1284 0.2263 0.1393 
SOV_HOME (1+Crunch) -0.2514 -0.2677 -0.1872 -0.3711** 
     
SOV_FOREIGN -0.9954** -0.5368 3.5310** 5.2857*** 
SOV_FOREIGN (1+Crunch) -0.3481 -0.3820 1.9615** 4.4598*** 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Effect of public ownership on loan growth for large banks (EBA 
Sample, 2010 -2015) 
In this Table we employ panel regressions of loan growth of large banks on their sovereign debt 
exposures, other bank level and macro variables, while controlling for the banks’ public ownership. 
A bank is qualified as a large bank if it has participated in the EBA serial tests at least twice and has 
average total assets larger than 20 billion Euro. Peripheral countries are Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. Core countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Netherlands. 
SOV_HOME (SOV_FOREIGN) is the domestic (foreign) sovereign exposure divided by total asset. 
Crunch equals 1 if the dependent variable is negative and 0 otherwise. Public equals 1 if the owner 
of the bank is the domestic government (see Appendix C for a list of state owned banks). Controls 
and all regression settings regarding winsorization, error-clustering and coefficient significance 
levels are the same as in Table 2. 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Threshold for Crunch 0% -5% 0% -5% 
Sample Banks Large Core Large Core Large Peri. Large Peri. 
Sample Period 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 
SOV_HOMEt-1 -0.2121 -0.0137 0.2366 0.1530 
SOV_HOMEt-1*Crunch 0.0503 -0.1148 -0.4028 -0.4836* 
SOV_HOMEt-1*Public -0.1990 -0.376 -0.4561 -0.6879 
     
SOV_FOREIGNt-1 -0.6012 -0.3876 3.8787*** 5.4850*** 
SOV_FOREIGNt-1*Crunch 0.7655 0.2310 -1.2698 -0.6350 
SOV_FOREIGNt-1*Public -0.7966 -0.2186 -3.0198* -1.8159* 
     
Crunch -0.1021*** -0.1013*** -0.0765*** -0.0615** 
     
Controls YES YES YES YES 
N 164 164 158 158 
Adj. R-squared 0.51 0.53 0.60 0.51 
     
Wald tests     
HOME -0.2121 -0.0137 0.2366 0.1530 
HOME*(1+Crunch) -0.1618 -0.1285 -0.1662 -0.3306* 
HOME*(1+Public) -0.4111 -0.3897 -0.2195 -0.5349 
HOME*(1+Crunch+Public) -0.3608 -0.5045 -0.6223 -1.0185** 
     
FOREIGN -0.6012 -0.3876 3.8787*** 5.4850*** 
FOREIGN*(1+Crunch) 0.1643 -0.1566 2.6089** 4.8500*** 
FOREIGN*(1+Public) -1.3978 -0.6062 0.8589 3.6691*** 
FOREIGN*(1+Crunch+Public) -0.6323 -0.3752 -0.4109 3.0341*** 
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Table A2: Risk-shifting and flight-to-safety in large banks (EBA sample, 2010 -
2015) 
In this Table we employ panel regressions of loan growth of large banks on domestic (HOME), 
foreign safe (DEFR) and foreign risky (GIIPS) sub-portfolios of their sovereign debt exposures and 
other bank level and macro controls. SOV_HOME is the domestic sovereign exposure divided by 
total assets. SOV_DEFR is the total sovereign exposure to Germany and France (except when any 
of the two countries is the home country) divided by total assets. SOV_GIIPS is the total sovereign 
exposure to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (except when any of the five countries is the 
home country) divided by total assets. A bank is qualified as a large bank if it has participated in the 
EBA serial tests at least twice and has average total assets larger than 20 billion Euro. Peripheral 
countries are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Core countries are Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, France and Netherlands. Crunch equals 1 if the dependent variable is negative and 0 
otherwise. Controls and all regression settings regarding winsorization, error-clustering and 
coefficient significance levels are the same as in Table 2. 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Threshold for Crunch 0% -5% 0% -5% 
Sample Banks Large Core Large Core Large Peri. Large Peri. 
Sample Period 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 
SOV_HOMEt-1 -0.3357 -0.2198 0.1884 0.1213 
SOV_HOMEt-1*Crunch 0.1701 0.0089 -0.3437 -0.5475* 
     
SOV_DEFRt-1 -2.7505*** -1.3151 0.3069 4.9911* 
SOV_DEFRt-1*Crunch 1.3313 2.0357 1.0411 -0.3650 
     
SOV_GIIPSt-1 0.1682 -1.0835 7.0103*** 5.9674*** 
SOV_GIIPSt-1*Crunch 0.6267 0.6910 -6.9233*** -1.5587 
     
Crunch -0.1080*** -0.1276*** -0.0761*** -0.0566** 
     
Controls YES YES YES YES 
N 164 164 158 158 
Adj. R-squared 0.51 0.54 0.61 0.49 
     
Wald tests     
SOV_HOME -0.3357 -0.2198 0.1884 0.1213 
SOV_HOME (1+Crunch) -0.1656 -0.2109 -0.1553 -0.4262** 
      
SOV_DEFR -2.7505*** -1.3151 0.3069 4.9911* 
SOV_DEFR (1+Crunch) -1.4192 0.7206 1.3480 4.6261 
      
SOV_GIIPS 0.1682 -1.0835 7.0103*** 5.9674*** 
SOV_GIIPS (1+Crunch) 0.7949 -0.3925 0.0870 4.4087** 
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Table A3: Effect of marked-to-market bond portfolio losses on loan growth 
In this table we present panel regressions of loan growth on marked-to-market bond portfolio losses 
and bank specific and macro controls. Large banks are those that participated in the EBA serial tests 
at least twice and have average assets higher than 20 billion Euro. Peripheral countries are Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Core countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and 
Netherlands LOSS_HOME is the marked to market loss on the domestic government bond portfolio 
of a bank. LOSS_FOREIGN and LOSS_GIIPS denote losses on foreign (all) and foreign peripheral 
sovereign exposures respectively. Crunch equals 1 if the dependent variable is negative and 0 
otherwise. Panel A (B) shows the result for large banks under the assumption that all sovereign 
bonds have a 10-year (5-year) maturity, Panel C (D) shows the results for medium and small banks 
under the assumption that all sovereign bonds have a 10-year (5-year) maturity. Controls include: 
bank-level controls (the same bank level variables as in the baseline model in Table 2, except SOV 
and SOV*Crunch), demand control (a country-level variable which describes the changes in credit 
demand of domestic borrowers), macro controls (include domestic GDP and CPI growth rates), bank 
fixed effect, and year fixed effect. All the other regression settings regarding winsorization, error-
clustering and coefficient significance levels are the same as in previous tables. 
Panel A: Large Bank, 5-year bond maturity 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Sample country Core Core Core Peripheral Peripheral Peripheral 
Sample period 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 
LOSS_HOME 4.1945   -2.7412*   
LOSS_HOME 
*CRUNCH -1.8383   2.4372*   
LOSS_FOREIGN  -7.3490*   -32.3808*  
LOSS_FOREIGN 
*CRUNCH  -2.8799   28.8994*  
LOSS_GIIPS   -3.9665   -3.1088* 
LOSS_GIIPS 
*CRUNCH   -2.7387   2.7623** 
CRUNCH -0.0871*** -0.0848*** -0.0834*** -0.1276*** -0.1347*** -0.1254*** 
       
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 164 164 164 158 158 158 
Adj. R-squared 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.59 0.58 0.60 
       
Wald Test       
LOSS 4.1945 -7.3490* -3.9665 -2.7412* -32.3808* -3.1088* 
LOSS 
(1+CRUNCH) 2.3562 -10.2289** -6.7052*** -0.3040 -3.4814 -0.3465 
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Table A3 Continued 
Panel A: Large Bank, 5-year bond maturity 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Sample country Core Core Core Peripheral Peripheral Peripheral 
Sample period 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 
LOSS_HOME 1.3281   -1.6653   
LOSS_HOME 
*CRUNCH -2.5856   1.4653*   
LOSS_FOREIGN  -2.7459   -24.3192  
LOSS_FOREIGN 
*CRUNCH  -2.8639   20.5996  
LOSS_GIIPS   -2.6582   -1.7797* 
LOSS_GIIPS 
*CRUNCH   -1.0644   1.6100** 
CRUNCH -0.0903*** -0.0862*** -0.0846*** -0.1271*** -0.1326*** -0.1238*** 
       
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 164 164 164 158 158 158 
Adj. R-squared 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.59 0.58 0.60 
       
Wald Test       
LOSS 1.3281 -2.7459 -2.6582 -1.6653 -24.3192 -1.7797* 
LOSS 
(1+CRUNCH) -1.2575 -5.6098** -3.7226** -0.2000 -3.7196 -0.1697 
 
 
 
77 
 
Appendix A.1: Bank Lending Survey and Demand/Supply Indexes 
 
The ECB’s Bank Lending Survey, which has been running since 2003, is 
compiled quarterly and gathers information from senior loan officers of a 
representative sample of 140 Euro area banks. I consider specific survey questions 
– Q6 and Q18 that ask banks to assess how loan demand has changed across 
different lending sectors. The demand index refers to the difference between the 
share of banks reporting a (weighted) increase in loan demand and the share of 
banks reporting a (weighted) decline. The index will then be positive (negative) if 
a larger proportion of banks have reported an increase (decline) in loan demand. 
The survey distinguishes between demand being “somewhat” or “considerably” 
changed giving different weights to the two responses (1 and 2 respectively). The 
ECB aggregates these responses in each country for each of the following lending 
sectors: enterprises, house purchases and consumer credit, which cover all loans to 
the non-public sector excluding monetary financial institutions. We combine the 
three sectors into one demand index by computing a weighted average demand 
where the weights are the sectors’ outstanding loan amount.  
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Appendix A.2: Distribution of the “Crunch” dummy 
 
year Large Core Large Peripheral Small Core Small Peripheral 
2007 13% 0% 25% 12% 
2008 8% 8% 21% 33% 
2009 48% 49% 29% 17% 
2010 15% 36% 24% 12% 
2011 25% 63% 18% 21% 
2012 43% 61% 13% 48% 
2013 69% 77% 16% 62% 
2014 42% 80% 19% 56% 
2015 47% 60% 15% 44% 
2007 - 2009 23% 19% 25% 21% 
2010 - 2015 42% 63% 17% 40% 
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Appendix A.3: List of state-owned banks 
 Bank Name 
Bankscope 
ID 
Countr
y 
 ABN AMRO Bank NV 11581 NL 
 BPI France Financement SA 12990 FR 
 Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale NORD/LB 13584 DE 
 Portigon AG 14021 DE 
 Hypo Real Estate Holding AG 16697 DE 
 NRW.BANK 19856 DE 
 Allied Irish Banks plc 20103 IE 
 SNS Bank N.V. 22324 NL 
 Caixa Geral de Depositos 22529 PT 
 La Banque Postale 29070 FR 
 Dexia SA 45621 BE 
 Permanent TSB Plc 48505 IE 
 
Landeskreditbank Baden-Wuerttemberg - 
Förderbank-L-Bank 48901 DE 
 Belfius Banque SA/NV-Belfius Bank SA/NV 48939 BE 
 SFIL 51740 FR 
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Appendix A.4: Definition of sovereign portfolio losses. 
 
Similar to De Marco (2017), we construct a bank-specific (unrealised) loss variable 
for bank i’s sovereign bond portfolio at time t:  
  
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠,𝑚,𝑡 × ∆𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠,𝑚,𝑡  ×  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑠,𝑚,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆
𝑠=1                                   (2) 
where s is the specific sovereign country that bank i is exposed to, t refers to end-
of-year observations 2010 to 2015, and m is the original time to maturity of each 
exposure in years. We focus on exposures to the 10 countries in our sample. As in 
Altavilla et al (2017) we assume two alternative debt maturities: 5 years or 10 years.  
One of the components of the loss measure is each exposure’s modified duration 
(Durations,m,t). For its calculation we need the exposure’s coupon value. As this is 
not available, we assume that all sovereign bonds are par value bonds (i.e. the 
coupon equals the yield) and pay coupons semi-annually. Then, Durations,m,t is 
calculated as follows : 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠,𝑚,𝑡 =
1
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠,𝑚,𝑡
∗ (1 − 
1
(1+𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠,𝑚,𝑡)
2𝑚)                                               (3) 
Given the semi-annual coupon assumption, yields,m,t is a semi-annual yield. 
Accordingly, maturity is multiplied by 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A.5: Distribution of marked-to-market sovereign portfolio losses (based 
on the 5-year maturity assumption). LOSS_ALL is the marked to market loss on 
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the total government bond portfolio of a bank. LOSS_HOME and 
LOSS_FOREIGN denote losses on domestic and foreign sovereign exposures 
respectively.  
  LOSS_ALL LOSS_HOME LOSS_FOREIGN 
year percentile Core Peri. Core Peri. Core Peri. 
2010 10% perc 0.01% 0.06% -0.09% 0.06% 0.03% -0.01% 
 25% perc 0.02% 0.19% -0.07% 0.16% 0.07% 0.00% 
 50% perc 0.13% 0.32% -0.02% 0.30% 0.15% 0.01% 
 75% perc 0.16% 1.09% -0.01% 0.90% 0.24% 0.06% 
 90% perc 0.43% 7.44% 0.03% 7.44% 0.35% 0.26% 
           
2011 10% perc -0.24% 0.01% -0.39% 0.01% 0.03% -0.03% 
 25% perc -0.03% 0.07% -0.20% 0.05% 0.10% 0.00% 
 50% perc 0.09% 0.17% -0.05% 0.09% 0.16% 0.01% 
 75% perc 0.27% 2.51% 0.00% 1.96% 0.33% 0.09% 
 90% perc 0.50% 9.28% 0.01% 9.28% 0.57% 0.49% 
        
2012 10% perc -1.27% -3.29% -0.40% -2.06% -0.89% -1.23% 
 25% perc -0.62% -1.59% -0.28% -1.54% -0.45% -0.18% 
 50% perc -0.41% -0.78% -0.12% -0.61% -0.27% -0.08% 
 75% perc -0.24% -0.24% -0.06% -0.10% -0.11% -0.02% 
 90% perc -0.15% -0.06% -0.04% -0.05% -0.07% -0.01% 
        
2013 10% perc -0.02% -1.67% 0.01% -1.67% -0.12% -0.11% 
 25% perc 0.02% -0.94% 0.03% -0.93% -0.06% -0.01% 
 50% perc 0.07% -0.35% 0.07% -0.36% 0.00% 0.00% 
 75% perc 0.12% -0.22% 0.16% -0.22% 0.01% 0.01% 
 90% perc 0.19% -0.08% 0.24% -0.13% 0.04% 0.05% 
        
2014 10% perc -1.32% -2.28% -0.69% -2.28% -0.60% -0.16% 
 25% perc -0.70% -1.33% -0.37% -1.33% -0.24% -0.06% 
 50% perc -0.31% -0.83% -0.16% -0.80% -0.13% -0.01% 
 75% perc -0.21% -0.32% -0.07% -0.32% -0.06% 0.00% 
 90% perc -0.12% 0.05% -0.03% 0.07% -0.03% 0.00% 
        
2015 10% perc -0.25% -0.46% -0.14% -0.46% -0.11% -0.05% 
 25% perc -0.11% -0.29% -0.06% -0.28% -0.06% -0.02% 
 50% perc -0.07% -0.20% -0.03% -0.17% -0.03% 0.00% 
 75% perc -0.04% -0.10% -0.01% -0.08% -0.02% 0.00% 
 90% perc -0.03% -0.05% -0.01% -0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 
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Chapter 4 The IRB Model, Bank Regulatory 
Arbitrage, and the Eurozone Crisis 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In order to increase the stability of the financial system, policymakers have been 
improving the regulatory framework, with particular attention given to the design 
of bank’s capital charge. In this regard, the most important innovation is model-
based capital regulation, which was introduced around the new millennium. 
Regulations under Basel II allow banks to choose between two different approaches 
to assess the credit risk associated with their assets and to evaluate capital adequacy, 
namely the IRB approach and the standardised approach (SA). Specifically, the IRB 
approach enables banks to design and calibrate their own risk models, subject to 
approval from the supervisors. Thus, it ties the capital charge to the actual risk 
associated with specific assets. Regulators believe that capital requirements based 
on such an approach can be more sensitive to the drivers of risk, and that an 
appropriately structured framework can motivate banks to improve their internal 
risk management (BCBS 2001).  
 
However, critics point out that complex and opaque rules can create high 
compliance costs and barriers to entry (BCBS 2004). More importantly, by applying 
internal models, banks have considerable autonomy in terms of risk assessment, 
which can provide extensive incentive for regulatory arbitrage. Mariathasan and 
Merrouche (2014) find that the risk-weight density of the bank becomes lower once 
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regulatory approval for the adoption of the IRB approach is granted and suggest 
that part of the decline in reported riskiness with the IRB approach is due to strategic 
risk modelling. Ferri and Pesic (2017) provide evidence of regulatory arbitrage and 
show that such an effect is stronger in banks that adopt the Advanced IRB than in 
those that employ only the Foundation IRB. Analysing the German banking sector 
using loan-level data, Behn et al (2016) show that the IRB approach underpredicts 
actual default rates by 0.5%–1%. They also show that loans that originated with the 
IRB approach have higher default rates and higher interest rates than those 
originated with the SA. This suggests that banks were aware of the higher risk 
associated with these loans and priced them accordingly but reduced the capital 
charge by underestimating the corresponding risks using the IRB models. 
 
This chapter contributes to the literature in two ways principally. First, I explore 
regulatory arbitrage using IRB models in the context of the Eurozone crisis. A few 
papers with a similar objective have found evidence of regulatory arbitrage 
(Vallascas and Hagendorff 2013; Beltratti and Paladino 2016; Ferri and Pesic 2017). 
However, due to a lack of available data, they were not able to clearly exploit the 
effect of the Eurozone crisis on regulatory arbitrage. In this chapter, the data from 
the EBA allows me to conduct an analysis at the country exposure level rather than 
merely at the bank level. I find that regulatory arbitrage by means of strategic risk 
modelling is primarily related to banks from Eurozone peripheral countries, 
especially those with less than adequate tier 1 capital. In contrast, banks from 
Eurozone core countries are more cautions when applying the IRB approach. This 
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may explain why the peripheral banks were more vulnerable during the European 
sovereign debt crisis. 
 
Second, I show that peripheral banks may game regulatory capital by avoiding 
the IRB approach for certain exposures, that is, so-called cherry-picking. The Basel 
Committee requires that, as indicated above, once a bank uses the IRB approach for 
some of its assets, it must take steps to implement the IRB approach across all 
significant portfolios and business lines (BCBS 2001). In this chapter, I show that 
some banks from peripheral countries barely apply the IRB approach to their 
exposure to the public sector, which, in terms of size and risk, can be quite material. 
Meanwhile, the IRB approach is widely used for their private sector exposure. 
Furthermore, I show that cherry-picking can be facilitated by the widely criticised 
zero-risk-weight for investment in sovereign debt, which supports the criticism 
regarding the ‘IRB permanent partial use’ mentioned by Hannoun (2011) 22, 23.  
 
In addition, this chapter relates more broadly to the literature on the sovereign–
bank doom loop, that is, the destabilising link generated by potential default risk 
spillovers between banks and sovereigns through banks’ government bond holdings 
(Cooper and Nikolov 2013; Farhi and Tirole 2014; Acharya et al. 2014; 
                                                          
22 The European CRDs have introduced a generalised zero risk weight which is not in line with the 
spirit of Basel II. Article 89(1)(d) of the CRD (amended by Directive 2009/111/EC or “CRD II”), and 
Annex VI Part 1 paragraph 4 assign a risk weight of 0% for “exposures to Member States’ central 
government … denominated and funded in the domestic currency of that central government.” 
23 Hannoun (2011) claims that “According to the European directive, a bank can apply the IRB 
approach to corporate, mortgage or retail exposures, while applying a one-size-fits all zero risk 
weight to the sovereign debt of EU member states. This is equivalent to a mutual and unqualified 
exemption of certain sovereign risks from capital charges, an exemption inconsistent with Basel 
II’s risk-sensitive framework.” 
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Brunnermeier et al. 2016). I observe near-zero risk-weights assigned using the 
standardised approach by some peripheral banks, especially Greek banks, to their 
public-sector exposure, which can provide a great incentive for banks to ‘carry trade’ 
(Acharya and Steffen, 2015). In addition, the zero risk-weights may have facilitated 
the unexpected trend observed by Liu and Varotto (2017): that small local banks in 
peripheral countries have increased sovereign bond holdings dramatically in recent 
years.   
 
This chapter proceeds as indicated in what follows. In Section 4.2, I briefly 
introduce the development of the Basel accords. In Section 4.3, I discuss the related 
literature. In Section 4.4, I introduce the dataset and present some summary 
statistics. In Section 4.5, I explain the empirical model. In Section 4.6, I discuss the 
results regarding regulatory arbitrage by means of strategic IRB modelling. In 
section 4.7, I explore the cherry-picking issue resulting from the ‘permanent partial’ 
use of the IRB approach. Section 4.8 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
4.2 The Introduction of Model-Based Capital Regulation 
In order to establish a closer link between capital charges and the risk associated 
with banks’ assets, regulators have been promoting stronger risk management 
practices in recent decades. In 1988, the Basel I regulation accord introduced risk-
based capital charges. More specifically, different types of bank assets are assigned 
to different groups with preassigned risk-weights (BCBS 1988). Capital 
86 
 
requirements are defined in terms of risk-weighted assets (RWAs). A bank is 
considered ‘sufficiently capitalised’ if its regulatory capital is 8% (or more) of its 
RWAs. RWAs are calculated by multiplying certain risk-weights (one of the 
following: 0, 10, 20, 50, or 100%) with corresponding asset amounts. In 2007, the 
next version of this regulatory accord – Basel II – was introduced. This allows banks 
to choose between two broad methodologies for calculating capital charges for 
credit risk: The so-called SA, which is basically equivalent to the old Basel I 
framework, and the IRB approach. It is noteworthy that the IRB approach has two 
sub-versions: the Foundation IRB (F-IRB) and the Advanced IRB (A-IRB) 
approaches24. In terms of the IRB approach, loans receive individual risk-weights 
that fundamentally depend on the bank’s internal risk assessment. RWAs are still 
calculated by multiplying these risk-weights with actual asset values, and capital 
requirements are still defined in terms of risk-weighted assets, as with Basel I 
(BCBS 2006). 
 
While the Basel framework aims to harmonise international bank regulation, the 
implementation process of the new framework differed across countries. For 
example, in Germany, Basel II was implemented by revising the 
Solvabilitatsverordnung (2006). Basically, it provides the foundation for national 
bank regulation and specifies a set of prudential supervisory reviews, including on-
site audits, to ensure compliance with the regulatory accord (Deutsche Bundesbank 
2004). Banks have to validate their models at least annually and adjust them if the 
                                                          
24 F-IRB only allows banks to estimate the probability of default (PD) of their assets, while A-IRB 
allows banks to estimate not only PD but also a bunch of other credit risk factors such as loss-given-
default (LGD), exposure-at-default (EAD) and maturity (M). 
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estimates are inconsistent with realised default rates. Moreover, banks have to prove 
that a specific model has been used internally for at least three years; regulators 
may then approve its use for regulatory purposes. Obviously, the IRB approach 
involves considerable management effort and administrative expense. In addition, 
it requires a certain level of sophistication (BCBS 2004). Hence, it is only 
implemented by the largest banks. 
 
The banks that choose model-based regulation do not apply the new approach to 
all assets at once but agree on a gradual implementation plan with the banking 
authorities (the so-called partial use of the IRB approach). The plan provides the 
order in which different asset portfolios should be shifted from the SA to the IRB 
approach. In order to calibrate a meaningful risk model, a sufficient amount of data 
on past loan performance is required. Hence, banks tend to begin with loan 
portfolios in active business units with adequate historical data. The SA still applies 
to the other portfolios until banks can prove that the corresponding model has been 
used internally for at least three years and they do not over-or-under predict defaults. 
However, banks may explore arbitrage opportunities during the transition period. 
In particular, they can attempt to adhere to the SA if they find that the risk-weights 
in terms of the SA are even smaller than those of the IRB approach. In order to 
prevent this, as indicated above, the Basel Committee requires that once a bank uses 
the IRB approach for one part of its assets, it must take steps to implement it across 
all significant portfolios and business lines (BCBS 2001). However, as mentioned 
above, local competent authorities possess considerable flexibility  in authorising 
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‘Permanent Partial Use of the IRB’ (PPU), which leads to different practice 
regarding the PPU in different countries (EBA 2013b) 25.  
 
The financial crisis that arise in around 2008 and the European sovereign debt 
crisis that followed it have highlighted a number of shortcomings related to the use 
of internally modelled approaches for regulatory capital. These shortcomings 
include the excessive complexity of the IRB approaches, a lack of comparability of 
banks’ internally modelled IRB capital requirements, and a lack of robustness in 
modelling certain asset classes. The Basel Committee has been improving the 
framework. The Basel III framework was initiated in response to these 
shortcomings that were exposed during the crisis. For example, the latest revision 
of Basel III (BCBS, 2017) removes the option to use the A-IRB approach for certain 
asset classes; adopts ‘input’ floors (for metrics such as probabilities of default and 
loss-given-default) to ensure a minimum level of conservativism in model 
parameters for asset classes for which the IRB approaches remain available; and 
provides greater specification of parameter estimation practices to reduce RWA 
variability. 
 
 
                                                          
25 EBA, 2013. Report on the comparability of supervisory rules and practices. December. The report 
claims that “a majority of Competent Authorities (CAs) have no explicit qualitative or quantitative 
definition of ’material counterparty.’ The situations where the unduly burdensome condition is 
considered fulfilled diverge among CAs. Half of the CAs apply a quantitative definition of ’non-
significant business unit‘. Most of them refer to the definition of a global limit of the total RWA for 
credit risk. Very few CAs apply a qualitative definition, and one-third of the CAs have no explicit 
quantitative or qualitative definition. Half of the CAs apply a quantitative definition of ‘immaterial 
exposures in terms of size’. Most of them refer to the definition of a global limit of the total RWA 
for credit risk”. 
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4.3 Literature Review 
Some regulatory reports and academic papers find that the risk-sensitivity of 
Basel II risk-weights is limited. For example, BCBS (2009) suggests that some 
banks may present themselves as very well capitalised based on the regulatory 
capital, but in reality only hold low levels of high-quality capital (e.g. tangible 
common equity). Furthermore, BCBS (2013) shows that one of the principal factors 
that determines the risk-weights is heterogeneity across the banks’ modelling 
choices. According to the Financial Services Authority (2010), a sample of banks 
were asked to assess a common portfolio’s risk based on their own internal models, 
and the banks responded with very different implied amounts of the capital 
requirement. Other than variations between banks, Samuels et al. 
(2012) demonstrate that considerable variations occur within banks (up to 20% on 
a year-to-year basis) for RWAs from the same credit-risk bucket. This chapter 
supports this literature by showing that the risk-weights may largely diverge from 
the real risk (approximated by the default frequency).  
 
This chapter is closely related to the literature on strategic risk-modelling by 
means of risk-weight manipulation. For example, Mariathasan and Merrouche 
(2014) examined at the relationship between the approval of a bank’s IRB model 
and risk-weights based on a sample of 115 banks from 21 OECD countries. 
Consistent with risk-weight manipulation, they show that a bank’s overall risk-
weight drops following regulatory approval of the adoption of the IRB approach. 
Moreover, they find that such reduction in risk-weight is more pronounced (1) in 
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weakly capitalised banks; (2) in jurisdictions where the legal framework for 
supervision is weak; and (3) in countries where banking authorities oversee many 
IRB banks. Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013) tested whether movements in RWAs 
can be explained by market measures of portfolio risk and show that these two 
factors are irrelevant. Ferri and Pesic (2016) provide evidence of regulatory 
arbitrage and show that such an effect is stronger in banks that adopt the A-IRB 
than in those that only employ the F-IRB. Similar work has been undertaken by 
Cannata et al. (2012), Le Leslé and Avramova (2012), Bruno et al. (2014), and 
Beltratti and Paladino (2016). After carefully addressing the endogeneity issue, I 
analyse bank’s strategic risk-weight modelling in the context of European sovereign 
debt crisis. I contribute to this literature by showing that banks from European 
peripheral countries are much more involved in strategic modelling than are banks 
from European core countries.  
  
Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) argue that complex and sophisticated rules are often 
dominated by simpler regulation. Complex regulation imposes a significant 
enforcement cost on society and provides incentives to regulated entities to find 
ways around the regulation. Koijen and Yogo (2015; 2016) provide similar 
empirical evidence of the impact of complex regulation on the insurance sector. 
Similarly, the public economics literature has discussed the merits of a flat-tax 
schedule. For example, Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) show that a move towards a 
flat-tax regime in Russia reduces tax evasion and increases tax revenue. I relate my 
paper to this strand of literature by showing that the sophisticated IRB models may 
be subject to strategic modelling as well as cherry-picking, which may render them 
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less efficient than the much simpler SA in terms of credit risk management. 
Although the SA has been criticised as being too simple, in the recently proposed 
Basel III reforms (BCBS 2017), the granularity and risk sensitivity of the SA are 
significantly improved. For example, the Basel II SA assigns a flat risk-weight to 
all residential mortgages. In the revised SA of BCBS (2017), mortgage risk-weights 
depend on the loan-to-value ratio of the mortgage.  
 
In addition, this chapter relates more broadly to the literature on the sovereign–
bank doom loop. I observe near-zero risk-weight assigned by some banks from 
peripheral countries to their public sector exposure in terms of the SA. Such an 
observation is very likely to be facilitated by the heavily criticised one-fits-all zero-
risk-weight for investment in sovereign debt, which may have contributed greatly 
to the risk-taking behaviour of European banks during the crisis26.  
 
 
4.4 Data and Summary Statistics 
This section describes the dataset and illustrates the various features of banks 
from the country groups. The sample covers 50 banks from 10 major Eurozone 
countries, either core countries or peripheral countries (see Appendix B.1 for the 
list of banks). The sample period runs from December 2012 to June 2016 and 
includes European stress tests and risk assessments published on the following dates: 
                                                          
26 The European CRDs have introduced a generalised zero risk weight which is not in line with the 
spirit of Basel II. Article 89(1)(d) of the CRD (amended by Directive 2009/111/EC or “CRD II”), and 
Annex VI Part 1 paragraph 4 assign a risk weight of 0% for “exposures to Member States’ central 
government … denominated and funded in the domestic currency of that central government” 
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December 2012, June 2013, December 2013, December 2014, June 2015, 
December 2015, and June 2016.  
 
The main data source is the EBA, which discloses detailed credit portfolio 
compositions of banks that participated in the stress tests and risk assessments 
during the sample period27. The number of banks varies across the tests, but, as 
indicated, according to the EBA, each test covers at least 60% of total EU banking 
assets. In order to generate a consistent data sample, a bank is included if it is from 
any of the 10 countries mentioned above and participated at least twice in any of 
the EBA tests. Since I intend to capture strategic modelling through the IRB 
approach, I exclude banks that did not use the IRB approach during the period. 
Table 4.1 Panel A provides a summary description of the data from the EBA. The 
data include each bank’s exposure at default (EAD) and risk-weighted assets 
(RWA), which are broken down to the country level. I also compute risk-weight 
(RW), which simply equals RWA/EAD. It is noticeable that RWA/EAD can better 
approximate the true credit risk of the bank than can RWA/TA, as both the reported 
RWA and EAD consider off-balance sheet items, for example, credit lines, which 
may be a considerable component of a bank’s business, while total assets only 
capture on-balance sheet items. Since EAD and RWA can be divided further based 
on the default status of the exposure (i.e. defaulted and non-defaulted), I can derive 
the second main variable as the default frequency of a bank’s exposure (DF%), 
which equals default EAD / (default EAD + non-default EAD). Furthermore, EAD 
                                                          
27 Transparency Exercise 2013 (December 2012 and June 2013), Stress Test 2014 (December 2013), 
Transparency Exercise 2015 (December 2014 and June 2015) and  Transparency Exercise 2016 
(December 2015 and June 2016) 
93 
 
can be classified into two groups based on the regulatory approach the bank is 
following – the standardised approach (EAD_SA) or the internal rating-based 
(EAD_IRB) approach. Then, I can build the third main variable – the IRB approach 
coverage (IRB%), which is equal to EAD_IRB / (EAD_IRB + EAD_SA). The 
detailed structure of the data allows the analysis to be conducted at the country level 
for each bank rather than merely at the bank level. Appendix B.2 summarises the 
geographical breakdown of the data. In addition to the three main variables 
described above, there are other five banks exposure country-level variables, 
namely RETAIL%, CORP%, GOV%, BANKS%, and OTHER%, which indicate a 
bank’s exposure to a country’s retail (corporate, public, banking, other) sector 
divided by the bank’s total exposure to all five sectors in the same country28. See 
Table 4.1 Panel B for a summary description of all variables used in this chapter.  
 
Table 4.2 shows the summary statistics. Panel A compares banks from core 
countries and banks from peripheral countries. I can see that the RW and DF% of 
peripheral banks are significantly higher than those of core banks, while the IRB 
approach is more widely used by core banks. To some extent, such results are 
surprising as intuitively I may expect a lower RW given a higher IRB%. Thus, I 
intend to explore the relation between RW and IRB% and to compare such a relation 
in core banks and peripheral banks. In addition, peripheral banks focus more on 
retail clients than do core banks.  
 
                                                          
28 OTHER% is not included in the regression to avoid potential collinearity issues. 
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4.5 Empirical Method 
4.5.1 The roll-out effect vs. regulatory arbitrage 
Many papers in the literature have provided evidence that banks carry out 
regulatory arbitrage using IRB models (Le Lesle and Avramova 2012; BCBS 2013; 
Vallascas and Hagendoff 2013; Mariathasan and Merrouche 2014). Furthermore, 
extensive use of the IRB approach may considerably reduce risk weights (EBA 
2013a; Bruno et al. 2014; Montes et al. 2016; Ferri and Pesic 2017). However, as 
emphasised by Ferri and Pesic (2017), reduced risk-weight due to extensive use of 
the IRB approach may not necessarily indicate the existence of regulatory arbitrage. 
Instead, it could be the result of the roll-out effect (i.e. shifting EAD from the SA 
to the IRB approach), which is a fair use of the regulatory option. In other words, 
in the absence of incentives for arbitrage, the IRB approach can still lead to a lower 
risk-weight because it is supposed to be more efficient in capturing risk factors and 
more responsive to changes in risk factor. In contrast, reduced risk-weights due to 
unfair use of the IRB approach, for example, by intentionally underestimating the 
probability of default (Behn et al 2016), would indicate regulatory arbitrage.  
 
4.5.2 Regression model 
In order to identify banks’ regulatory arbitrage due to strategic IRB modelling, I 
propose the following regression: 
𝑅𝑊𝑙,𝑏,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐼𝑅𝐵%𝑙,𝑏,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐷𝐹%𝑙,𝑏,𝑐,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿 ∙ 𝑃𝑙,𝑏,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑏,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑙,𝑏,𝑐,𝑡                         (4.1) 
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Here (l) denotes the home country of the bank, (b) indicates the specific bank, (c) 
is the country of exposure and (t) identifies time. The dependent variable is the risk-
weight, which equals RWA/EAD. IRB% fully controls for the roll-out effect and 
may partially reflect regulatory arbitrage. In other words, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether the reduced risk-weight is purely driven by the roll-out effect or by 
regulatory arbitrage through manipulation, or a combination of both mechanisms. 
Based on the literature that suggests that greater use of the IRB approach may lead 
to reduced risk-weights (Mariathasan and Merrouche 2014; Ferri and Pesic 2017), 
I expect to see a negative sign for 𝛽1. In order to better distinguish regulatory 
arbitrage from the roll-out effect, DF%, the default frequency of exposure, is 
introduced to approximate the true risk of exposure. The estimations of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 
may indicate the existence of arbitrage. Specifically, 𝛽2  should be positive and 
significant in the absence of arbitrage. In contrast, if 𝛽1 is negative and statistically 
significant while 𝛽2 is not positively significant, that is, risk-weights can be reduced 
by applying the IRB approach to a greater extent and asset risk does not reflect the 
realised true risk, which can indicate regulatory arbitrage. There are other four bank 
exposure country-level variables (Pl,b,c,t), namely RETAIL%, CORP%, GOV%, and 
BANKS%, which indicate a bank’s exposure to a country’s retail (corporate, public, 
banking) sector divided by the bank’s total exposure to all sectors in the same 
country. 
 
       It is noticeable that there may be reverse causality of the two explanatory 
variables, IRB% and DF%. For example, banks may use the IRB approach to a 
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greater extent simply because they know that it will lead to lower risk-weights. To 
deal with the endogeneity issue, I use IRB% l, b, c_other, t (named Z1), which is the 
average IRB approach coverage of a given bank (b) from a given country (l) at a 
given time (t) though concerning all countries other than country c (i.e. c_other) as 
the instrument for IRB% l, b, c, t , since, for a particular bank, the use of the IRB 
approach for its exposure to one country can be related to that of the other countries 
because the IRB models of a bank are developed (and approved) sector by sector 
rather than country by country. Meanwhile, the risk-weight of the same exposure 
may not have any direct relation to the use of the IRB approach in the other 
countries, which makes the IRB% l, b, c_other, t  thoroughly exogenous to the dependent 
variable. Due to information asymmetry among a bank’s geographical portfolios, I 
expect a negative sign for Z1. In other words, a bank may apply more IRB approach 
to the assets of a country where they have more information advantage, while they 
are less confident to apply the IRB approach for the assets of an unfamiliar country 
where they have less knowledge. Similarly, I use DFl, b, c_other, t (named Z2) as the 
instrument for DFl, b, c, t. I also expect a negative sign for Z2 because of the 
diversification strategy among a bank’s geographical portfolios. All bank level 
characteristics, such as banks size, capital ratio, profitability etc., are captured by 
the Bank*Time fixed effect and all country level characteristics such as GDP and 
CPI are captured by Exposure-Country*Time fixed effects. (1) is estimated using 
separate observations of core countries’ banks and peripheral countries’ banks. All 
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variables are winsorised at 1% and 99%, and standard errors are clustered at the 
Bank*Time level29. 
 
 
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 The baseline model 
In this sub-section, I discuss the results of the analysis of banks’ regulatory 
arbitrage by means of strategic IRB risk-weight modelling. Table 4.3 shows the 
baseline results and I can observe distinct difference between core banks and 
peripheral banks. For core banks, IVIRB% is not statistically significant, which 
means the risk-weights of core banks cannot be reduced by greater use of the IRB 
approach. Meanwhile, IVDF% is significantly positive, meaning the asset risk very 
much reflect the true risk. In contrast, the IVIRB% estimation for peripheral banks 
is significantly negative. Noteworthy is that the magnitude of the coefficient is very 
large compared to that of the core banks (–0.3217 vs. –0.0579) while the standard 
deviation of the two variables are quite close (0.2661 vs. 0.2313). In other words, 
the asset risk of peripheral banks could be considerably reduced by applying the 
IRB approach to a greater extent, and such effect is more pronounced than that of 
the core banks both statistically and economically. Meanwhile, the IVDF% of 
peripheral banks is not statistically significant but is, surprisingly, negative, while 
the corresponding coefficient of core banks is significant at the 5% level. Therefore, 
                                                          
29 Such a clustering setting is mainly due to the fact that the observations are less likely to be 
clustered at bank level. For example, the observation of a bank’s exposure to Greece in 2013 may 
not have much relation with the observation of this same bank’s exposure to Germany in 2016. 
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the asset risk of peripheral countries may not be as sensitive to the true realised risk 
as that of core banks.   
 
From these baseline results, it appears that core banks are highly unlikely to be 
involved in regulatory arbitrage as they cannot reduce asset risk with greater use of 
the IRB approach and the asset risk reflects the true realised risk. Peripheral banks 
may present some indications of regulatory arbitrage; specifically, peripheral banks’ 
asset risk can be substantially reduced by greater use of the IRB approach, while it 
does not respond to the true realised risk even at a considerable confidence level30. 
However, I cannot yet draw a clear conclusion for these banks as one could argue 
for the statistical insignificance of IVDF% based on the possibility that there may 
be more friction (or a weaker correlation) between projected risk and the realised 
risk during crises due to technical rather than incentive issues.   
 
The estimation of the instrument variables are noticeably very significant for 
IRB% (Z1) in columns 1 and 4 and for DF% (Z2) in columns 2 and 5, which 
indicates a strong correlation between the instrument variables and the endogenous 
explanatory variables. The negative signs are as expected, which reflects the 
diversification effect of banks, that is, invest in different asset classes with different 
risk levels across countries. To further test the validity of the instrument, the bottom 
of Table 4.3 shows the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak ID test critical values for the 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics. In all the regressions, the F-statistics are much 
                                                          
30 P-Value of IVDF% estimation is 0.892, i.e. very far from significant. 
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larger than their Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values based on 2SLS regression 
size. Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak.    
 
4.6.2 Information Asymmetry 
It is possible that the insignificant estimation of the default frequency variable 
for peripheral banks is driven by the fact that peripheral banks are more likely to 
use the IRB approach on domestic exposure because they have more data on their 
own clients. In other words, the insignificant estimation of IVDF% reflects model 
frictions due to lack of data rather than strategic modelling for arbitrage purposes. 
 
To test this point, I include a dummy variable Foreign which equals to 1 if the 
exposed country is different from the bank’s home country, and I also interact it 
with IVIRB% and IVDF% separately in the second stage regression. The results are 
shown in Table 4.4. In column [2], the risk weights of peripheral banks’ foreign 
exposures reflect the corresponding default frequency but not for that of the 
domestic exposure. Meanwhile, the risk weights of peripheral banks’ domestic 
exposures can be greatly reduced by applying more IRB approach but not for that 
of the foreignexposures. Such results totally go against the hypothesis that it is lack 
of information which leads to the insignificant link between the realised risk (DF%) 
and the projected risk (the dependent), and it seems that peripheral banks are more 
likely to carry out strategic modelling in their domestic market where they may 
have a larger information advantage.  
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4.6.3 Exposure to GIIPS 
Regarding the result in the last section, it may be the case that peripheral banks 
are subject to regulatory arbitrage to a greater degree because they are more exposed 
to peripheral countries due to home bias. I may also identify regulatory arbitrage in 
core banks due to their exposure to peripheral countries. Summary statistics 
comparing exposure to peripheral countries (GIIPS) and other countries (NonGIIPS) 
are presented in Table 4.5. In Panel A, core banks’ NonGIIPS exposure is less risky 
than their GIIPS exposure in terms of both RW and DF. However, in Panel B, 
peripheral banks’ NonGIIPS exposure has a higher RW than does their GIIPS 
exposure. However, the default ratio of GIIPS exposure is much higher (four times) 
than that of NonGIIPS exposure. In addition, peripheral banks make greater use of 
the IRB approach in their GIIPS exposure than in NonGIIPS exposure – 
approximately twice as much. This may indicate that peripheral banks strategically 
manipulate the risk-weights of their GIIPS exposure by means of the IRB approach 
for capital saving purposes.  
 
Next, I formally test this point using the baseline model with the dummy variable 
GIIPS which equals 1 if the exposed country is Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, or 
Spain. GIIPS is also interacted with IVIRB and IVDF separately in the second stage 
of the 2SLS regression. According to the results in Table 4.6, column 1, core banks’ 
GIIPS exposure may have a quite different pattern compared to their NonGIIPS 
exposure. Although none of the results are statistically significant, there is a switch 
of signs for IVIRB% and IVIRB%*(1+GIIPS), from negative to positive. This 
indicates that core banks may be even more cautious when applying the IRB 
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approach to their GIIPS exposure as compared to their NonGIIPS exposures, and 
that they are highly unlikely to be involved in regulatory arbitrage because greater 
use of the IRB approach will not reduce risk-weights at all.  
 
In contrast, for peripheral banks in column 2, their NonGIIPS exposure and 
GIIPS exposure present similar results. Specifically, IVIRB% is statistically 
significant for both NonGIIPS and GIIPS exposure, that is, greater use of the IRB 
approach will reduce the risk-weight, and IVDF% is still not significant. Noticeably, 
the IVIRB% for GIIPS exposure is more significant than the NonGIIPS. This 
indicates that if peripheral banks were involved in regulatory arbitrage, they are 
more likely to carry out such behaviours in their exposure to risky countries. 
 
4.6.4 Regulatory arbitrage and macro shocks 
     When there is a macro shock to a particular country, banks may be required to 
hold excess capital for their exposure in that particular country. Regulatory 
arbitrage may arise if banks perceive the cost of raising extra capital as being too 
high. They may then deleverage themselves by strategically underestimating the 
riskiness of the corresponding exposure. Following Brutti and Saure (2016), a 
country is categorised as being ‘in crisis’ (CRISISc,t) if it is a Eurozone member and 
its average daily 10-year bond spreads (with respect to Germany) for the previous 
three months are above 400 basis points. I add CRISIS and the interaction 
IVIRB*CRISIS and IVDF*CRISIS to the baseline model. The results are reported 
in Table 4.7 column 1 for core banks and in column 2 for peripheral banks. For core 
countries’ banks, regardless of the exposed country, the risk-weight is never 
102 
 
significantly associated with the use of the IRB approach but always reflects the 
realised true risk. This confirms the previous results to the effect that core banks are 
very unlikely to be associated with regulatory arbitrage. For peripheral countries’ 
banks, in their exposure to distressed countries, I find further evidence of regulatory 
arbitrage. Specifically, the risk-weight of peripheral banks’ exposure to both normal 
countries and distressed countries can be significantly reduced (both statistically 
and economically) 31.  Most importantly, at the same time, the risk weight does not 
reflect true realised risk at all – although one may still argue that such an 
insignificant estimation of the default frequency variable is due to the fact that 
banks may be compensating for higher defaulted exposures by rebalancing their 
portfolio towards safer assets, which may also be required by the supervisors. 
However, core banks with exposure to those distressed countries may also be 
subject to the same need and/or requirement, though their default frequency 
variable in their exposure to the distressed country affects the risk-weight variable. 
Hence, I read the results for peripheral banks regarding their exposure to distressed 
countries as indications of regulatory arbitrage.   
 
4.6.5 Regulatory arbitrage in low-capital banks 
It is important to identify the impact of the level of capital on regulatory capital 
arbitrage. This is because a bank with limited capital may have more incentives to 
manipulate regulatory risk-weights. This may improve its tier 1 capital ratio in order 
                                                          
31 Noticeably, there may not be any significant difference of the level of such reduction effect 
between normal countries and distressed countries because the interaction term is not statistically 
significant, i.e., the strong significance in the Wald-Test is mainly driven by the stand-alone variable. 
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to meet capital requirements, as well as being more attractive to investors. 
Accordingly, I include a dummy variable LOWT1, which represents observations 
with a tier 1 capital ratio below the sample mean. Furthermore, the corresponding 
interaction terms with IVIRB% and IVDF% are included so that the marginal effect 
of low capital on regulatory arbitrage can be captured. According to the results in 
Table 4.8, for core banks, the results differ between high-capital and low-capital 
banks. However, they do not indicate regulatory arbitrage. Specifically, for well-
capitalised core banks, the risk-weight can be reduced by greater use of the IRB 
approach; however, it also reflects true realised risk. As for less capitalised core 
banks, the coefficient of IVIRB %*(1+LOWT1) is insignificant, meaning greater 
use of the IRB approach will not reduce risk-weights. This may imply that core 
banks become more cautious about using the IRB approach when they have less 
than adequate capital.  
 
In contrast, I may find a different trend among peripheral banks by comparing 
the estimations of IVIRB% and IVIRB%*(1+LOWT1). Specifically, the negative 
impact of using the IRB approach on risk-weights is more significant (both 
statistically and economically) for less capitalised peripheral banks than for well-
capitalised ones.  
 
 
4.7 Capital Saving by Avoiding the IRB approach 
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As mentioned above, banks may also try to reduce risk-weights by avoiding 
using the IRB approach for certain exposures (cherry-picking). Such strategy can 
be facilitated by the ‘IRB permanent partial use (PPU)’ rules, by means of which 
an EU bank may apply the IRB approach to corporate, mortgage, or retail exposures, 
while adopting a one-size-fits-all zero-risk-weight for the sovereign debt of EU 
member states (Hannoun 2011). Also, local competent authorities possess 
considerable flexibility when authorising PPU, which leads to high variability in 
the application of the PPU in different countries (EBA 2013b).  
 
I aggregated the data of all banks in my sample according to their country of 
origin. The proportion of the IRB exposures at the aggregated country level for 
different sectors is shown in Figure 4.1. Graph (A) shows the IRB coverage for 
exposure to all sectors, and clearly reveals variation in the use of the IRB approach 
across countries. Specifically, banks from southern Europe – Greece, Italy, and 
Spain – have the lowest level of IRB exposure. Graph (B) shows the proportion of 
IRB exposure for the private sector (retail and corporate) and the public sector 
(central and regional governments). Surprisingly, there are banks from many 
countries that barely use the IRB approach for government exposure, including 
southern European banks and Scandinavian banks. However, such partial use of the 
IRB may only indicate a cherry picking issue in the southern European banks. This 
is because, first, government exposure constitutes a less significant proportion in 
Scandinavian banks (Figure 4.2), which satisfies one of the main requirements of 
PPU, that it can be only applied in immaterial business segments; and because, 
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second, only Finland is in the Eurozone32. In contrast, the proportion of public 
sector exposure is a significant component for the south European banks. This 
exposure may possess considerable a level of risk due to high home bias in those 
banks’ portfolios and the high default risk of those sovereigns. 
 
Due to a lack of available data, it is difficult to perform formal empirical tests 
for cherry-picking. Instead, some simple evidence is provided in Table 4.9 to further 
support the claim that the issue occurs. Specifically, the proportion of IRB exposure 
to the public sector (shown in Graph (B) in Figure 4.1), is now split into three groups: 
domestic government exposure, non-US foreign government exposure, and US 
government exposure. The results are reported in Panel A, Table 4.9. In particular, 
banks from Austria and Italy barely apply the IRB approach to their domestic 
government exposure. In contrast, the IRB approach is widely used to assess risk 
regarding exposure to the US government, which is not related to the zero-risk-
weight in terms of the SA. Then, in Panel B, I observe very low risk-weights for 
some peripheral banks’ domestic exposure, especially for Greek banks, which may 
considerably deviate from the true risk level because the yields of Greek sovereign 
bonds was considerably higher than all others33. In addition, I use simple OLS 
univariate regressions to complement the stylised facts mentioned above and 
                                                          
32 The European Capital Requirements Directives only assigns zero-risk-weight to “exposures to 
Member States’ central governments … denominated and funded in the domestic currency of that 
central government”, which is not eligible for banks from Denmark, Norway and Sweden. On the 
other hand, Scandinavian governments have quite high credit in general, thus, the corresponding 
risk weight should always be very low if either IRB or SA is applied.   
33  The risk-weights for Italian banks’ domestic government exposure is around 14%, which is 
considerably higher than those of the other peripheral banks’ domestic government exposures. 
This is because the risk -weight became much higher in 2014 (from around 5% to 20%), probably 
due to policy changes introduced by local competent authorities. 
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determine the average impact of the IRB proportion on the risk-weight of the public 
and private sectors. The model is as follows:  
 
𝑅𝑊𝑙,𝑏,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐼𝑅𝐵%𝑙,𝑏,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀   (4.2) 
 
Here (l) denotes the home country of the bank, (b) indicates the specific bank, (c) 
is the country of exposure, (s) represents the sector of exposure, and (t) identifies 
time. The dependent variable is the overall risk-weight of exposures in terms of 
both the SA and the IRB approach. IRB% indicates the proportion of the IRB 
approach for a bank’s exposure to a certain sector of a country (due to a lack of data 
availability, IRB% is not instrumented here). Results are reported in Panel C, Table 
4.9, and show that the impact of IRB% on RW is opposite for public exposure and 
private exposure. Specifically, for private exposure, greater use of the IRB approach 
may reduce risk-weights, which is in line with the roll-out effect and/or regulatory 
arbitrage by means of strategic IRB modelling. In contrast, for public exposure, 
IRB% has a significantly positive coefficient, meaning that less use of the IRB 
approach for government exposure can save capital. This is in line with the evidence 
previously provided and supports cherry-picking being associated with PPU of IRB 
approach. 
 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
By exploiting the relationship between the use of the IRB approach and the risk-
weights of bank assets, I provide evidence that banks may reduce their capital 
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requirement by means of strategic manipulation of the IRB approach. This may be 
accomplished in the forms of regulatory arbitrage, and/or partial use of the IRB 
approach for certain business segments (cherry-picking). The former is a bank’s 
voluntary behaviour while the latter may be the result of moral suasion from 
governments and of yield-seeking from banks. In particular, the governments of 
financially distressed countries require domestic banks to absorb their new debt 
issuance, and those banks have incentives to improve their regulatory capital ratio 
and to seek yield. Thus, this phenomenon may greatly contribute to the sovereign–
bank doom loop that has caused serious financial stress in the recent years. 
Furthermore, I show that peripheral banks (especially less capitalised ones)are more 
likely to engage in regulatory arbitrage, while core banks are generally more 
cautious in applying the IRB approach. This may explain why the peripheral banks 
were more vulnerable during the European sovereign debt crisis. 
 
The main findings of this chapter have policy implications. First, they support 
the concerns raised in recent regulatory proposals (EBA, 2016). In particular, not 
only should the use of the IRB approach be carefully granted and closely supervised; 
in addition, its (permanent) partial use should be limited, so that both strategic IRB 
modelling and cherry-picking can be properly confined. More importantly, my 
findings are in line with the BCBS (2017) that aims to constrain the use of the IRB 
approach (e.g. input and output floors, an extra capital buffer on global systemically 
important banks, removing the advanced IRB for certain asset classes, etc.) and to 
promote the SA by improving its granularity.   
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List of Figures 
Figure 4.1. Use of IRB approach  
Each figure is based on the aggregated data of all banks from the same country. Finland and Norway 
only include one bank observation each (OP-Pohjola Group and DNB Bank Group respectively). 
A. Total Portfolio, IRB%. 
 
 
 
B. Private Sector vs. Public Sector, IRB%. 
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Figure 4.2. Proportion of public exposure 
Each figure is based on the aggregated data of all banks from the same country. Finland and Norway 
only include one bank observation each (OP-Pohjola Group and DNB Bank Group respectively). 
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Table 4.1. Variables and Definitions. 
Panel A. Description of credit risk items from EBA disclosure. 
EBA Item Explanation34 
RWA_SA_D 
Risk weighted assets under the standardized approach for 
defaulted exposures 
RWA_SA_ND 
Risk weighted assets under the standardized approach for 
non-defaulted exposures 
RWA_IRB_D 
Risk weighted assets under the IRB approach for defaulted 
exposures 
RWA_IRB_ND 
Risk weighted assets under the IRB approach for non-
defaulted exposures 
EAD_SA_D 
Exposure-at-default under the standardized approach for 
defaulted exposures 
EAD_SA_ND 
Exposure-at-default under the standardized approach for 
non-defaulted exposures 
EAD_IRB_D 
Exposure-at-default under the IRB approach for defaulted 
exposures 
EAD_IRB_ND 
Exposure-at-default under the IRB approach for non-
defaulted exposures 
  
                                                          
34 Some tests report figures for Default and “Default&Non-Default” instead. 
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35 Note: A country is defined “in crisis” - only if it is a Euro country and its bond spread (with 
respect to Germany) is above 400 basis points calculated as the average of daily bond spreads 
over the 3-month period preceding the observation date 
Table 4.1 Continued 
Panel B. Definition of Variables 
Name Definition 
Bank’s Country-Portfolio Level Variables 
RW (RWAIRB,D&ND + RWASA,D&ND) / (EADIRB,D&ND + EADSA,D&ND) 
IRB% EADIRB,D&ND / (EADIRB,D&ND + EADSA,D&ND) 
DF (EADIRB,D + EADSA,D) / (EADIRB,D&ND + EADSA,D&ND)  
RETAIL% 
A bank’s exposure to a country’s retail sector divided by this 
bank’s total exposure to the same country 
CORP% 
A bank’s exposure to a country’s corporate sector divided by this 
bank’s total exposure to the same country 
GOV% 
A bank’s exposure to a country’s public sector divided by this 
bank’s total exposure to the same country 
BANK% 
A bank’s exposure to a country’s banking sector divided by this 
bank’s total exposure to the same country 
OTHER% 
A bank’s exposure to a country’s other sectors divided by this 
bank’s total exposure to the same country 
Dummy Variables 
LOWT1 
Dummy Variable for banks with tier1 capital ratio lower than 
sample mean 
GIIPS Dummy Variable for exposure to a "peripheral country" 
CRISIS Dummy Variable for exposure to a country in crisis35 
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Table 4.2. Summary Statistics  
The sample covers 50 banks from 10 Eurozone countries for the period covering the following time 
points, December 2012, June 2013, December 2013, December 2014, June 2015, December 2015 
and June 2016. Core Bank are banks from Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Netherland. 
Peripheral Bank are banks from Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. RW: risk weight of a 
bank’s exposure to a country. IRB%: % of IRB methodology upon a bank’s exposure to a country. 
DF%: default frequency of a bank’s exposure to a country. RETAIL% (CORP%, GOV%, BANK%, 
OTHER%): A bank’s exposure to a country’s retail (corporate, public, banking, other) sector divided 
by this bank’s total exposure to the same country. The significance level of t-test on mean and 
Wilcoxon test on median are indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Variables are winsorized at 1th and 99th percentile. Data source: EBA. 
 
  Mean    Median  
 
Core 
Bank 
Peripheral 
Bank 
Diff.  
Core 
Bank 
Peripheral 
Bank 
Diff. 
RW 33.2% 46.8% -13.6%***  30.0% 43.1% -13.1%*** 
IRB% 73.7% 40.8% 32.9%***  82.0% 42.0% 40.0%*** 
DF% 2.5% 4.4% -1.8%***  1.2% 2.1% -0.9%*** 
RETAIL% 11.7% 22.4% -10.7%***  1.00% 22.0% -21.0%*** 
CORP% 38.7% 31.3% 7.37%***  36.0% 30.0% 6.00%*** 
GOV% 22.6% 20.4% 2.18%**  17.0% 18.0% -1.00% 
BANK% 21.3% 17.2% 4.14%***  14.0% 6.0% 8.0%*** 
OTHER% 5.65% 8.67% -3.02%**  3.97% 7.21% -3.24%* 
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Table 4.3. Baseline Results – Regulatory Arbitrage Core Banks VS. Peripheral 
Banks. 
The purpose of this table is to provide evidence of regulatory arbitrage via IRB approach while controlling the 
Roll-Out effect. The table summarizes the results of the equation (4.1) estimated over the period from end 2012 
to mid-2016 on a near biannual basis (with one gap in mid-2014). Core Banks are banks from Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, France and Netherland. Peripheral Banks are banks from Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
The dependent variable for the first stage regression is IRB% (DF%), which indicates the % of IRB 
methodology upon a bank’s exposure to a country (default frequency upon a bank’s exposure to a country). Z1 
(Z2) is the instrument variable for IRB% (DF%), which indicates the % of IRB methodology upon the same 
bank’s exposure to all other countries (default frequency upon the same bank’s exposure to all other countries). 
The dependent variable for the second stage regression is RW, risk weight of exposure to a country. IVIRB% 
(IVDF%) is the instrumented IRB% (DF%) from the first stage regression. RETAIL% (CORP%, GOV%, 
BANK%, OTHER%): A bank’s exposure to a country’s retail (corporate, public, banking, other) sector divided 
by this bank’s total exposure to the same country. Fixed effect controls are included at Bank*Time and 
Exposure-Country*Time (Time indicates the time of data observations). All variables are winsorized at 1st and 
99th percentile. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the Bank x Time level. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. All country-portfolio level data are 
from EBA. The Stock and Yogo (2005) weak ID test critical values are for the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics. 
A higher Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic than the corresponding critical value indicates a rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the instrument(s) are weak. 
 
 Core Banks  Peripheral Banks 
 First Stage  
Second  
Stage 
 First Stage  
Second 
Stage 
Dep. Variable IRB% DF  RW  IRB% DF  RW 
 [1] [2]  [3]  [4] [5]  [6] 
  IVIRB%    -0.0579     -0.3217** 
IVDF    0.6376**     -0.0841 
z1 -1.6159*** 0.0436***    -1.5308*** 0.0237   
z2 -0.8784 -1.7014***    -0.5509 -0.9782***   
RETAIL% 0.4873*** 0.0208*  -0.1019  1.3073*** -0.0391  -0.2435 
CORP% 0.6208*** 0.0223**  0.1339**  1.2802*** -0.0537**  0.3240 
GOV% 0.3492*** -0.0374***  -0.2906***  0.8350** -0.0934***  -0.7771*** 
BANK% 0.6068*** -0.0256***  -0.1292**  1.0492*** -0.0994***  -0.4520* 
          
Bank x Time 
FE  
YES YES  YES  YES YES  YES 
ExpoCountry 
x Time FE  
YES YES  YES  YES YES  YES 
N 1624 1624  1624  467 467  467 
Adj. R-
Squared 
0.65 0.53  0.61  0.70 0.86  0.78 
          
Cragg-
Donald (CD) 
Wald F-
statistic 
105.77    31.20   
          
Stock and 
Yogo (2005) 
Weak ID test  
Critical Value 
7.03    7.03   
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Table 4.4. Regulatory Arbitrage or Pure Information Asymmetry  
The purpose of this table is to test whether it is information asymmetry and lack of data that makes 
the insignificant relationship between the realised risk (IVDF%) and the projected risk (the 
dependent) for peripheral banks rather than due to regulatory arbitrage. Core Banks are banks from 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Netherland. Peripheral Banks are banks from Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The dependent variable for the first stage regression is IRB% (DF%), 
which indicates the % of IRB methodology upon a bank’s exposure to a country (default frequency 
upon a bank’s exposure to a country). Z1 (Z2) is the instrument variable for IRB% (DF%), which 
indicates the % of IRB methodology upon the same bank’s exposure to all other countries (default 
frequency upon the same bank’s exposure exposure to all other countries). The dependent variable 
for the second stage regression is RW, risk weight of exposure to a country. IVIRB% (IVDF) is the 
instrumented IRB% (DF%) from the first stage regression. Foreign is a dummy variable, which 
equals to 1 if the exposed country is different from the bank’s home country. Fixed effect controls 
are included at Bank*Time and Exposure-country*Time (Time indicates the time of data 
observations). Controls include: RETAIL% (CORP%, GOV%, BANK%, OTHER%): A bank’s 
exposure to a country’s retail (corporate, public, banking, other) sector divided by this bank’s total 
exposure to the same country. For simplicity only the results of the second stage regressions are 
shown. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-
robust and clustered at the Bank x Time level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels, respectively. All country-portfolio level data are from EBA and all bank level 
variables are from Bloomberg 
 
Sample Banks Core Banks Peripheral Banks 
 [1] [2] 
IVIRB% 0.0999* -0.3084** 
IVIRB%*Foreign -0.1883*** 0.1821 
   
IVDF% 0.1341 0.4356 
IVDF%*Foreign 1.4263 2.8051*** 
   
Controls YES YES 
Bank x Time FE  YES YES 
Exposure-Country x Time FE  YES YES 
N 1624 467 
Adj. R-Squared 0.49 0.36 
   
Wald Test   
IVIRB%*(1+Foreign) -0.0884* -0.1263 
   
IVDF%*(1+Foreign) 1.5604** 3.2407* 
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Table 4.5. Exposure to GIIPS and NonGIIPS Countries. 
Core Bank are banks from Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Netherland. Peripheral Bank are 
banks from Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. GIIPS indicates a bank’s exposures to Greece, 
Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. NonGIIPS indicates a bank’s exposure to countries other than 
GIIPS. RW: risk weight of exposure to a country. IRB%: % of IRB methodology upon a bank’s 
exposure to a country. DF%: default frequency of a bank’s exposure to a country. Panel A compares 
the NonGIIPS and GIIPS exposure of Core Banks, Panel B compares the same things but held by 
peripheral banks, and Panel C compares the GIIPS exposure held by Core Banks and Peripheral 
Banks. The significance level of t-test on mean and Wilcoxon test on median are indicated by ***, 
**, and * for 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Variables are winsorized at 1th and 99th percentile. 
Data source: EBA. 
 
Panel A: Core Banks’ Exposure - NonGIIPS VS. GIIPS  
  Mean    Median  
 NonGIIPS GIIPS Diff.  NonGIIPS GIIPS Diff. 
RW 31.8% 41.8% -10.0%***  29.0% 38.2% -9.3%*** 
IRB% 74.4% 69.6% 4.8%**  84.0% 75.0% 9.0%*** 
DF% 2.3% 4.1% -1.8%***  1.1% 2.5% -1.4%*** 
 
Panel B: Peripheral Banks’ Exposure - NonGIIPS VS. GIIPS 
  Mean    Median  
 NonGIIPS GIIPS Diff.  NonGIIPS GIIPS Diff. 
RW 49.5% 38.7% 10.8%***  49.3% 40.0% 9.3%*** 
IRB% 35.5% 56.6% -21.1%***  26.0% 61.0% -35.0%*** 
DF% 2.5% 9.8% -7.2%***  1.6% 9.4% -7.8%*** 
 
Panel C: Exposure to GIIPS – Core Banks VS. Peripheral Banks 
  Mean    Median  
 Core Peripheral Diff.  Core Peripheral Diff. 
RW 41.8% 38.7% 3.1%*  38.2% 40.0% -1.8% 
IRB% 69.6% 56.6% 13.0%***  75.0% 61.0% 14.0%*** 
DF% 4.1% 9.8% -5.7%***  2.5% 9.4% -7.0%*** 
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Table 4.6. Regulatory Arbitrage Regarding GIIPS Exposure: Core Banks VS. 
Peripheral Banks. 
The purpose of this table is to test whether regulatory arbitrage is stronger regarding exposures to 
peripheral countries. Core Banks are banks from Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Netherland. 
Peripheral Banks are banks from Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The dependent variable 
for the first stage regression is IRB% (DF%), which indicates the % of IRB methodology upon a 
bank’s exposure to a country (default frequency upon a bank’s exposure to a country). Z1 (Z2) is 
the instrument variable for IRB% (DF%), which indicates the % of IRB methodology upon the same 
bank’s exposure to all other countries (default frequency upon the same bank’s exposure exposure 
to all other countries). The dependent variable for the second stage regression is RW, risk weight of 
exposure to a country. IVIRB% (IVDF) is the instrumented IRB% (DF%) from the first stage 
regression. GIIPS is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the exposure is in one of the following 
countries: Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Fixed effect controls are included at 
Bank*Time and Exposure-country*Time (Time indicates the time of data observations). Controls 
include: RETAIL% (CORP%, GOV%, BANK%, OTHER%): A bank’s exposure to a country’s 
retail (corporate, public, banking, other) sector divided by this bank’s total exposure to the same 
country. For simplicity only the results of the second stage regressions are shown. All variables are 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at 
the Bank x Time level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. All country-portfolio level data are from EBA and all bank level variables are from 
Bloomberg 
 
Sample Banks Core Banks Peripheral Banks 
 [1] [2] 
IVIRB% -0.0613 -0.3944* 
IVIRB%*GIIPS 0.2244** 0.1395 
   
IVDF% 0.6068* 2.1971 
IVDF%*GIIPS -0.2374 -1.9545 
   
Controls YES YES 
Bank x Time FE  YES YES 
Exposure-Country x Time FE  YES YES 
N 1624 467 
Adj. R-Squared 0.62 0.78 
   
Wald Test   
IVIRB% -0.0613 -0.3944* 
IVIRB%*(1+GIIPS) 0.1631 -0.2549** 
   
IVDF% 0.6068* 2.1971 
IVDF%*(1+GIIPS) 0.3694 0.2426 
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Table 4.7. Regulatory Arbitrage under Macro Shocks. 
The purpose of this table is to identify regulatory arbitrage in the context of macro shocks. CRISIS 
is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the exposed country is “in crisis” - only if a Euro country’s 
bond spread (with respect to Germany) is above 400 basis points calculated as the average of daily 
bond spreads over the 3-month period preceding the observation date. The sample period is still the 
same as baseline - from end 2012 to mid-2016 on a near biannual basis (with one gap in mid-2014). 
The dependent variable and control variables are also the same as the baseline. All the other 
regression settings regarding, winsorization, error-clustering and coefficient significance are the 
same as previous table. For simplicity only the results of the second stage regressions are shown. 
All country-portfolio level data are from EBA and sovereign bond yields are from ECB. 
 
 
Sample Banks Core Banks Peripheral Banks 
 [1] [2] 
IVIRB% -0.0581 -0.3007** 
IVIRB%*CRISIS -0.0448 -0.1456 
   
IVDF% 0.6376** -0.1011 
IVDF%*CRISIS -0.2846 0.1700 
   
Controls YES YES 
Bank x Time FE  YES YES 
Exposure-Country x Time FE  YES YES 
N 1624 467 
Adj. R-Squared 0.62 0.78 
   
Wald Test   
IVIRB% -0.0581 -0.3007** 
IVIRB%*(1+CRISIS) -0.1029 -0.4463*** 
   
IVDF% 0.6376** -0.1011 
IVDF%*(1+CRISIS) 0.3530* 0.0689 
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Table 4.8. Regulatory Arbitrage Low Capital Banks. 
The purpose of this table is to identify regulatory arbitrage among banks with low tier1 capital. 
LOWT1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the tier 1 capital ratio is below the sample mean. The 
sample period is still the same as baseline - from end 2012 to mid-2016 on a near biannual basis 
(with one gap in mid-2014). The dependent variable and control variables are also the same as the 
baseline. All the other regression settings regarding, winsorization, error-clustering and coefficient 
significance are the same as previous table. For simplicity only part of the results are shown. All 
country-portfolio level data are from EBA and all bank level variable are from Bloomberg. 
 
Sample Banks Core Banks Peripheral Banks 
 [1] [2] 
IVIRB% -0.1152** -0.2145 
IVIRB%*LOWT1 0.1747*** -0.1189 
   
IVDF% 0.7229** 1.3959 
IVDF%*LOWT1 -0.1776 -1.3668 
   
Controls YES YES 
Bank x Time FE  YES YES 
Exposure-Country x Time FE  YES YES 
N 1624 467 
Adj. R-Squared 0.62 0.78 
   
Wald Test   
IVIRB% -0.1152** -0.2145 
IVIRB%*(1+LOWT1) 0.0595 -0.3334** 
   
IVDF% 0.7229** 1.3959 
IVDF%*(1+LOWT1) 0.5453 0.0291 
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Table 4.9. Evidence of Cherry-Picking. 
This table provide evidence that some banks may strategically limit the use of IRB on certain 
exposures for capital saving purpose. Panel A shows the proportion of IRB exposure based on 
aggregated data of banks from the same country. Panel B shows the risk-weights for public 
exposures under SA, based on aggregated data of banks from the same country. Panel C shows the 
result of simple OLS univariate regression of risk weights  of exposure to the public (private) sector 
on the proportion of IRB of exposure to that sector. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th 
percentile. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the Bank x Time level. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.   
Panel A: Proportion of IRB exposure 
Country of Exposure  Domestic  Non-US Foreign US 
Sector of Exposure Public Public Public 
Bank’s Home Country [1] [2] [3] 
Austria 3.4% 6.7% 99% 
Belgium 77% 60% 83% 
Germany 32% 56% 94% 
France 48% 79% 84% 
Netherland 92% 92% 92% 
Greece 0.0% 0.0% / 
Ireland 24% 48% 41% 
Italy 0.1% 5.9% 39% 
Portugal 0.0% 0.0% / 
Spain 2.3% 1.6% 4.8% 
Denmark 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Finland 0.0% 0.0% / 
Norway 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Sweden 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
UK 9.1% 67% 78% 
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Table 4.9 Continued 
Panel B: Risk-Weights under SA 
Country of Exposure  Domestic  Non-US Foreign US 
Sector of Exposure Public Public Public 
Bank’s Home Country [1] [2] [3] 
Austria 2.0% 2.9% 20.0% 
Belgium 1.7% 8.2% 29.6% 
Germany 1.0% 2.5% 17.6% 
France 9.4% 17.3% 12.0% 
Netherland 31.1% 15.1% 0.0% 
Greece 0.3% 16.6% / 
Ireland 0.4% 1.1% 11.4% 
Italy 13.9% 4.7% 2.1% 
Portugal 1.9% 22.9% / 
Spain 5.0% 10.3% 10.0% 
Denmark 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 
Finland 0.1% 0.0% / 
Norway 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Sweden 0.3% 0.4% 0.0% 
UK 1.1% 4.9% 12.3% 
 
 
Panel C: Univariate Regression 
Dep.Variable RW RW 
Sector of Exposure Public Private 
 [1] [2] 
IRB% 0.0792*** -0.4172*** 
   
Bank x Time FE YES YES 
Exposure-Country x Time FE YES YES 
N 2737 2737 
Adj. R-Squared 0.50 0.64 
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Appendix B.1  
List of Sample Banks 
Country 
Bankscope 
ID 
Bank Name 
AT 46146 Erste Group Bank AG 
AT 44096 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG - RZB 
AT 43719 
Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft und Österreichische Postsparkasse 
Aktiengesellschaft-BAWAG P.S.K. AG 
BE 45621 Dexia SA 
BE 46905 KBC Bank NV 
BE 48939 Belfius Banque SA/NV-Belfius Bank SA/NV 
DE 13216 Deutsche Bank AG 
DE 13190 Commerzbank AG 
DE 47734 Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg 
DE 17881 DZ Bank AG-Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank 
DE 13109  Bayerische Landesbank 
DE 13584 Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale NORD/LB 
DE 14021 Portigon AG 
DE 19978 HSH Nordbank AG 
DE 14104 Landesbank Berlin AG 
DE 13229 DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale AG 
DE 14019 WGZ-Bank AG Westdeutsche Genossenschafts-Zentralbank 
DE 13222 Aareal Bank AG 
DE 13213 Deutsche Apotheker- und Aerztebank eG 
DE 13568 Münchener Hypothekenbank eG 
ES 47560 Banco Santander SA 
ES 22628 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 
ES 11965 BFA Tenedora de Acciones SAU 
ES 11963 Caixabank, S.A. 
ES 22724 Banco Popular Espanol SA 
ES 23370 Banco de Sabadell SA 
ES 22713 Bankinter SA 
FR 10931 BNP Paribas 
FR 11948 Crédit Agricole S.A. 
FR 27918 BPCE SA 
FR 11150 Société Générale SA 
FR 27005 Fédération du Crédit Mutuel 
FR 12953 RCI Banque  
FR 51740 SFIL 
GR 49514 Eurobank Ergasias SA 
GR 43085 National Bank of Greece SA 
IE 20103 Allied Irish Banks plc 
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IE 20112 Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland 
IE 48505 Permanent TSB Plc 
IT 46616 Intesa Sanpaolo 
IT 47295 UniCredit SpA 
IT 21413 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA-Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena 
IT 21937 Banco Popolare - Società Cooperativa-Banco Popolare 
IT 16185 Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa-UBI Banca 
IT 45740 Credito Emiliano SpA-CREDEM 
NL 22417 ING Bank NV 
NL 22317 Cooperatieve Rabobank U.A. 
NL 11581 ABN AMRO Bank NV 
NL 22324 SNS Bank N.V. 
PT 22541 Banco Comercial Português, SA-Millennium bcp 
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Appendix B.2 
Geographical Breakdown of Banks’ Exposure 
Origin Country of Banks 
Country of Exposure AT BE DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT NL NO PT SE 
ALL 189 157 746 81 145 33 336 252 32 73 172 232 70 48 224 
Angola              5       
Australia  2      4    14         
Austria 19  54        7 2         
Belgium 2 15 6 1   18 2   2 16         
Bermuda   2                  
Brazil     7   7    7         
Bulgaria 2        6            
Canada  1 4   2  7     2        
Cayman Islands   7 2    4             
Channel Islands        2             
Chile     14                
China   3     10   4 1         
Colombia     3                
Cook Islands   7                  
CROATIA 12          10          
Cyprus         3            
Czech Republic 14 7     7    7          
Denmark    15         7  21 
Estonia               14 
Finland    7  6      2 5  28 
France 9 17 76 3 9 5 38 25  11 19 25 4 5 1 
Germany 17 14 79 8 6 5 37 18  3 12 24 7  12 
Greece         6     2       
GUERNSEY    2                 
Hong Kong        7    8         
Hungary 14 7 3        3          
India   2     1             
Int. organisations       3 3             
Ireland 4 7 7 7    14  19  3  3       
Isle of Man          1           
Italy 5 10 44  6  33 7   30 3         
Japan  5     16 2             
Korea        4              
Latvia             3  14 
Lithuania             7  14 
Luxembourg  6 60 5 1 4 30 12 4 2 3 3 2 5 4 
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Macedonia          1            
Marshall Islands   13                  
Mexico     14   2             
Mozambique              7       
Netherlands 5 4 71    16 19  4 6 28   4 
New Zealand            7         
Norway  2 1 9  1      2 7  28 
Other     2  2              
Other Countries 2 6 14    1 4  2           
Peru     7                
Poland 14  12        7 10 5 7 5 
Portugal  5 2  8         7       
Romania 14  2    1  6            
Russian 7  2    7    7    5 
Saudi Arabia        6             
Serbia         2  1          
Singapore   2     7    7         
Slovakia 14 5         7          
Slovenia 3                    
South Africa        7             
Spain 5 10 57  25  25 8  4 6 7  2       
Sweden   12 7  5       7  28 
Switzerland 1  50 5   22 16    15         
Turkey   2  7  7  3  7 4         
Ukraine 5                    
United Kingdom 14 17 77 8 13 5 36 28 1 15 16 21 7 5 23 
United States 7 17 75 2 18  33 28  12 18 19 7  23 
Venezuela     5                
VIRGIN ISLANDS        2    4         
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Chapter 5 ‘Home Sweet Home’: Asset Re-
allocation During the European Debt Crisis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The doom-loop between European peripheral sovereigns and banks has been 
widely discussed (Cooper and Nikolov 2013; Acharya et al. 2014; Brunnermeier et 
al. 2016; Farhi and Tirole 2018). A distressed banking sector may increase the 
solvency problem of the public sector because governments will face higher 
potential bailout costs and lower taxation income due to reduced bank lending to 
the real economy. In turn, increased sovereign credit risk weakens the banking 
sector, as banks will suffer losses in their government bond portfolios and future 
government support, if any, would be less credible (Acharya et al 2014; 
Brunnermeier et al. 2016). Figure 5.1 clearly shows that Eurozone banks have 
greatly increased their home bias for sovereign debt, especially in distressed 
countries. Specifically, as the sovereign default risk rises, banks from peripheral 
countries begin to increase holdings of domestic government bonds, and then this 
trend begins to reverse as sovereign bond spreads decrease. In comparison, the trend 
is much less significant for core country banks. The aim of this chapter is to discover 
why the home bias in banks’ sovereign portfolios is highly associated with 
sovereign risk.  
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On this matter, a few major hypotheses have been developed. First, there is the 
secondary market theory that is based on the assumption that governments would 
be less willing to default on their debt if it were held mostly by domestic agents 
rather than foreign ones. This is because the harm to the domestic economy may 
overwhelm the benefit (Broner et al. 2014; Gennaioli et al. 2014). Therefore, if local 
agents have such an expectation, in active secondary markets, sovereign bonds 
should naturally flow back to domestic owners during periods of high sovereign 
risk, since they are more highly valued by domestic agents than foreign ones. Brutti 
and Saure (2016) provide empirical evidence to support this secondary market 
hypothesis. Regarding this argument, Figure 5.2 shows the progression of home 
bias for different types of creditors in peripheral and core countries. In peripheral 
countries, resident banks accumulated a large share of domestic sovereign debt 
however, non-bank residents barely increased their portion. Such trends go against 
the secondary market theory, which predicts the same trend for resident banks and 
non-bank residents.  
 
A recent paper by Saka (2017) explains the repatriation of sovereign debt by 
means of informational friction theory (Brennan and Cao 1997; Van Nieuwerburgh 
and Veldkamp 2009; Dziuda and Mondria 2012). He argues that it is important to 
have soft information on the repayment intentions of the government during crisis 
periods. Uninformed foreign banks may naturally sell their exposure to domestic 
banks at very low prices. However, this theory may not explain well the trend for 
peripheral countries in Figure 5.3 Panel B. Basically, domestic non-bank investors 
should have a similar information advantage to that of domestic banks (when 
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compared to foreign investors) in peripheral countries, and they held a similar 
amount of domestic government bonds at the beginning of the period reviewed. 
However, I observe a much stronger increase in domestic sovereign bond holdings 
only among domestic banks. In other words, I observe that the sovereign bonds of 
peripheral countries have been relocated only from foreign investors to domestic 
banks, not to both domestic banks and domestic non-bank investors.   
 
Another strand of the literature focuses on the risk-shifting behaviour of banks 
with inadequate capital (Acharya and Steffen 2015; Horvath et al. 2015; Acharya 
et al. 2016; Buch et al. 2016). Specifically, these papers suggest that banks with low 
capital ratios prefer high-risk assets, for example, the sovereign bonds of distressed 
governments, so that the shareholders may benefit considerably if the government 
recovers, while potential losses would be absorbed mainly by the bank’s 
debtholders. However, this argument does not necessarily explain why 
undercapitalised banks would risk-shift by increasing only their holdings of stressed 
domestic government bonds instead of the bonds of all stressed governments. In a 
manner similar to Crosignani (2017), I show that (potentially weak) banks in crisis 
countries shift their sovereign bond portfolios to other countries in crisis. However, 
such behaviour is much less remarkable compared to how they shift their sovereign 
portfolios to the domestic government that is also in crisis.  
 
Then there is the moral suasion channel. Becker and Ivashina (2018) show that 
the crowding out of corporate lending and increased domestic government bond 
holdings by European banks during the crisis were the result of moral suasion, 
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which is carried out through direct government ownership and by higher number of 
government-affiliated board members. De Marco and Macchiavelli (2016) follow 
a similar path and show that upon receiving liquidity injections, only politically 
related European banks increased their exposure to domestic sovereign debt. 
Ongena et al. (2016) demonstrate that, compared to foreign ones, domestic banks 
were more inclined to increase their exposure when governments had to rollover 
large chunks of outstanding public debt. This chapter provides strong evidence to 
support the existence of moral suasion and argues that this channel had a dominant 
effect on the repatriation of sovereign debt during the European sovereign debt 
crisis. 
 
This chapter contributes to the literature in two ways primarily. First, in contrast 
to the recent literature focusing only on sovereign debt (Acharya and Steffen 2015; 
De Marco and Macchiavelli 2016; Ongena et al. 2016; Becker and Ivashina 2018), 
I show that banks’ private sector exposure was at least equally affected by an 
increase in home bias. Furthermore, by comparing the difference between the 
repatriation of sovereign debt and private debt, I show that the sovereign debt of a 
crisis country flows back to domestic state-owned banks more than to domestic 
private banks; while private forms of debt (retail and corporate) flow back to 
domestic private banks more than state-owned banks. Based on these new tests, I 
argue that the repatriation of sovereign debt  is best explained by the moral suasion 
theory.  
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This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the related literature. 
Section 5.3 presents the data and some stylised facts. The empirical methodology 
and results are discussed in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
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5.2 Literature Review  
5.2.1. Recent home bias in the Eurozone 
There is growing interest among academics and policymakers in the causes of 
the increasing fragmentation (i.e. home bias) in Eurozone sovereign debt markets. 
As documented by Becker and Ivashina (2018), there is a positive relationship 
between government ownership in the banking sector (at the country-level) and 
banks’ exposure of domestic government bonds. Moreover, they extend such 
findings by showing that banks from distressed countries will hold more 
government bonds if they have more government-aﬃliated board members. 
Following a similar path, De Marco and Macchiavelli (2016) show that upon 
receiving equity injections (bailouts), only politically related European banks 
increased their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds. With unique bank-level data 
from ECB, Ongena et al. (2016) show that when a government have to rollover a 
considerable amount of outstanding debt, compared to foreign ones, domestic banks 
are more likely to increase the corresponding exposure. Other recent papers, 
including Horvath et al. (2015) and Altavilla et al. (2017), support these 
observations and conclude that the moral suasion channel existed during the 
European sovereign debt crisis. However, none of these studies considers banks’ 
exposure of the private sector. I contribute to this literature and show that state-
owned banks and private banks exhibit very different patterns for managing 
sovereign debt portfolios and private debt portfolios. In other words, moral suasion 
may have differential impacts on a bank’s exposure to sovereign debt and to private 
debt.  
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Another stream of the literature on the home bias in sovereign debt investment 
is based on the secondary market theory developed by Broner et al., (2014). 
According to this theory, governments would be less willing to default on their debt 
when most of the debt is held domestically. Governments would rather choose not 
to default as the harm caused to the domestic economy may outrun the benefit. 
Therefore, if local agents have such an expectation, in active secondary markets, 
sovereign bonds should naturally flow back to domestic investors during periods of 
high sovereign risk, since these have a higher value for domestic agents than for 
foreign agents. Based on a massive dataset covering 20,000 banks from 191 
countries, Gennaioli et al. (2014) reveal empirical patterns consistent with 
secondary market theory. However, they are unable to distinguish between the 
domestic and foreign bonds held by each bank. In addition, Brutti and Saure (2016) 
support this theory by presenting corresponding evidence in the context of the 
Eurozone crisis. Specifically, they show that reallocation (from foreign to domestic) 
is more intense for sovereign debt than for private debt. Moreover, the debt of the 
crisis governments that does not flow back to domestic investors is relocated to 
banks in large and influential countries in the Eurozone. This implies that debt 
reallocation was principally driven by investors that could potentially discourage 
the troubled governments from declaring bankruptcy. Using a dataset covering the 
entire European sovereign debt crisis and the recovery period that followed, I 
complement and challenge these ﬁndings. First, I show that reallocation of 
sovereign debt did indeed occur during the crisis. However, the trend holds only for 
domestic banks as opposed to other domestic agents. Such a result goes against the 
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secondary market theory of Broner et al. (2014), which predicts the same trend for 
all domestic investors. Furthermore, I show that, compared to sovereign debt, 
private sector debt held by banks experienced a higher (if not equal) increase in 
home bias during the crisis. This trend is not entirely in line with the ﬁndings of 
Brutti and Saure (2016), and a possible explanation is that they focus only on the 
ﬁrst part of the European sovereign debt crisis (2007–2011), and have limited 
coverage of European countries (they also include some non-European countries, 
such as Brazil and Mexico).  
 
Another strand of related literature focuses on the risk-shifting behaviour of 
banks with inadequate capital. According to this argument, banks with low capital 
ratios may tend to increase holdings of high-risk assets, such as sovereign bonds of 
distressed governments. Thus, shareholders could benefit substantially if the 
government were to recover while potential losses would be absorbed mainly by 
the bank’s debtholders (Acharya and Steﬀen 2015; Horvath et al., 2015). However, 
this argument does not necessarily explain why undercapitalised banks would risk-
shift by increasing only stressed domestic government bonds instead of the bonds 
of all stressed governments. In a manner similar to that of Crosignani (2017), I show 
that (potentially weak) banks of crisis countries shift their sovereign bond portfolios 
to other countries during crisis; however, such behaviour is much less remarkable 
than how they shift their sovereign portfolios to the domestic government that is 
also in crisis. Similarly, banks may engage in carry trades – that is, buy risky 
sovereign debt and ﬁnance those purchases with short-term wholesale funds 
(Acharya and Steﬀen 2015). This would naturally lead to greater home bias for 
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banks from countries with risky and high-yielding sovereign debt. I deal with such 
variations by controlling for country-time ﬁxed eﬀects that absorb country-level 
risk indicators, for example, sovereign bond yields. 
 
5.2.2 Home bias in other markets 
Other than home bias in sovereign debt investment, there are also many studies 
that explore home bias in portfolios of other asset types. Most of these papers focus 
on equity investment (French and Poterba 1991), while others examine home 
(regional) biases in bond portfolios (Lane 2005). The explanations for home bias in 
investment can be generally placed in three groups: exchange rate risk, transaction 
costs, and information asymmetry (Coeurdacier and Rey 2013). The European 
market has experienced increased ﬁnancial integration and the exchange rate has 
been comparably stable over the years. Thus, it is more likely that information 
asymmetry may contribute to home bias in the European market. Some theoretical 
work regarding the information asymmetry channel has been developed. For 
example, Brennan and Cao (1997) model the sensitivity of equity investment 
decisions to asset-related news based on diﬀerences between the informational 
endowments of domestic and foreign agents. They illustrate that, when domestic 
investors have an informational advantage over foreign investors regarding the 
domestic market, investors tend to buy foreign assets when the return is high and to 
sell when the return is low. In other words, home bias would be positively 
associated with negative news as foreign investors would flee from the local market. 
Similarly, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) show that, for the existence of 
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(initially small) informational diﬀerences, investors with rational expectations 
reinforce informational asymmetries by learning more about risks in which they 
have an advantage as they desire their information to be very different from that of 
others. From the perspective of performance evaluation, home bias may be 
attributed to the fact that investors are better at evaluating the performance of fund 
managers when the fund invests primarily in local assets rather than in foreign ones 
(Dziuda and Mondria 2012).  
 
Following the intuition that information asymmetry may cause home bias in the 
investment of different asset types, many papers have empirically tested the eﬀects 
informational distance on portfolio compositions. Coval and Moskowitz (1999; 
2001) examined the US stock market and ﬁnd that geographical proximity is critical 
for investors’ portfolio composition as well as for returns. Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001) show that investors can be biased towards ﬁrms that are located close to the 
investor, that communicate in the investor’s native language, and that have CEOs 
of the same cultural background. It is possible that the private debt market may 
subject to more information asymmetry than the sovereign debt market. I show that 
home bias in banks’ private debt portfolios is not driven by any channels, whether 
they be moral suasion, risk-shifting, secondary market theory, or exchange rate risk. 
Hence, I conjecture that it may be driven by information asymmetries, and I would 
explore this channel in further research. 
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5.2.3 State-owned banks 
This chapter relates broadly to the literature on the performance and behaviour 
of state-owned banks and the role of political connections at the corporate level 
(Barth et al. 2001; Faccio 2006; Faccio et al. 2006). Sapienza (2004) shows that 
Italian state-owned banks provided cheaper loans to ﬁrms from areas where the 
aﬃliated political party is more powerful. La Porta et al. (2003) ﬁnd evidence in 
Mexico that loans provided to ‘related parties’, either family members or bank-
controlled ﬁrms, have lower interest rates and require lower collateral but have 
higher default rates than unrelated ones. Illueca et al. (2013) and Cunat and 
Garicano (2010) show that political inﬂuence in Spanish savings banks is related to 
greater risk-taking behaviour and worse performance. Finally, Englmaier and 
Stowasser (2016) show that German savings banks negatively adjust lending pro-
cyclically in response to local electoral cycles.  
 
 
5.3 Data and Stylised Facts 
The core of my data comes from various stress tests, and transparency and 
recapitalisation exercises conducted by the EBA over a period of seven years for a 
set of major European banks, covering 30 members of the European Economic Area 
(EEA). Table 5.1 shows the names of EBA tests and the corresponding information 
dates. Thirteen data time-points begin in the first quarter of 2010 and finish in the 
middle of 2017, which covers the start, rise, and fall of the European debt crisis. 
Sovereign bond exposure at bank-level is reported for all 13 time-points, while 
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private sector exposure (corporate, retail, etc.) can only be found in nine out of the 
13 time-points. In most disclosures, each bank’s debt portfolio is fully broken down 
to the exposed-country-level for up to 200 countries. However, I only include 
exposure to the 30 EEA countries so that I can focus on debt reallocation across 
Europe. Noticeably, the country-breakdown of each bank’s private sector exposure 
is reported based on a minimum of i) 95% of total exposure, and ii) the top 10 
countries in terms of exposure. However, EBA always discloses the full country-
breakdown for sovereign debt exposure. In other words, such treatment will result 
in the number of observations for private sector exposure being significantly less 
than that of the sovereign sector.  
 
The major banks that participated in the EBA serial tests mostly remained the 
same. Only smaller banks are added or deducted between one test to another. 
According to the EBA, all exposure is consolidated to the parent bank-level and 
each test covers at least 65% of the total banking assets in Europe. Compared to 
other studies using proprietary datasets from the ECB (Ongena et al. 2016; Altavilla 
et al. 2017), the EBA data covers banks from more countries (including non-
Eurozone countries) and has better exposure-country granularity. 
 
In taking a global portfolio approach, the key variable of my analysis is the 
portion of a sovereign’s total debt held by a specific bank. Thus, I name this variable 
SovPortionb,c,t , which equals a specific bank’s (b) nominal exposure to a specific 
country (c) at a specific time (t) divided by the total nominal exposure of all banks 
to that country at that time: 
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𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑏,𝑐,𝑡 =  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑏,𝑐,𝑡
∑ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑏,𝑐,𝑡𝑏
 
To make ensure that this measure is valid, the valuation method used for bank-
level sovereign exposure must be the same at a given time point for all banks. This 
is exactly the case for my sample as the EBA has homogenised the disclosures of 
banks for all the tests. More importantly, I define SovPortion as the share of a 
sovereign’s debt held by a specific bank rather than as the share of a sovereign’s 
debt in a specific bank’s sovereign portfolio. Therefore, SovPortion will not be 
affected by price changes of sovereign bonds as these are automatically reflected in 
all banks’ nominal exposures to that specific sovereign. 
 
In a manner similar to the mainstream literature on home bias (Ahearne, Griever, 
and Warnock 2004; Coeurdacier and Rey 2013), I also use an alternative measure 
that considers the optimal portion of sovereign debt that should be held by a specific 
bank according to the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM). According to 
CAPM, the optimal proportion that a bank holds should depend on the size of the 
bank’s sovereign portfolio and the size of the global sovereign portfolio. This 
alternative measure, SovBiasb,c,t, is equivalent to the difference between 
SovPortionb,c,t and the proportion suggested by the CAPM (SovCAPMb,c,t). As in 
the literature, this difference is standardized by (1 – SovCAPMb,c,t), so that the 
maximum bias (for SovPortion = 1) is 1. That is:  
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑏,𝑐,𝑡 =  
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑏,𝑐,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑜𝑣𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑏,𝑡
1 − 𝑆𝑜𝑣𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑏,𝑡
 
where  
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𝑆𝑜𝑣𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑏,𝑡 =  
∑ 𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑏,𝑐,𝑡𝑐
∑ 𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑏,𝑐,𝑡𝑏,𝑐
 
If SovBiasb,c,t equals 1, this means all of a sovereign’s debt is held by a specific 
bank, that is, perfect bias occurs. If SovBiasb,c,t equals 0, this means the bank holds 
exactly the share suggested by CAPM model, that is, there is no bias at all. For the 
later sections of this study, I build the corresponding variable for private sector 
exposure (retail, corporate), PrivatePortionb,c,t, in exactly the same way as above, 
while DebtPortiond,b,c,t is the variable that combines SovPortionb,c,t and 
PrivatePortionb,c,t where d denotes the type of debt. 
 
In order to capture stressed scenarios during the sample period, I build the 
dummy variable Crisisc,t. First, I obtained the monthly average of daily yields of 
10-year bonds of almost all 30 EEA countries from ECB database36. Following 
Brutti and Saure (2016), a country is regarded as being ‘in crisis’ if it is a Eurozone 
member and its average daily bond spreads (compared to Germany), for the 
previous three months’ average, is above 400 basis points. The summary of 
sovereign spreads for each time-point in the sample is presented in Table C.1.  
 
In order to distinguish different types of creditors, I also need the amount of the 
sovereign bond held by non-bank agents. Unfortunately, the EBA dataset only 
includes the sovereign bond holdings of banks. Hence, I resort to a country-level 
dataset compiled from different national sources by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) 
                                                          
36 The data for Estonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are not available, but it will not have 
any material impact on the analysis. Not only because the size of sovereign debt of those countries 
are quite small, but also the way I define “crisis” – only consider whether a country is “in crisis” if 
it is a member of Eurozone countries. 
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which shows the share of a sovereign’s total debt held by its resident banks and 
non-bank residents37. Observations are disclosed quarterly and cover 11 European 
countries38. I choose the same period covered by the EBA dataset, 2010Q1 to 
2017Q2. For the panel regression, I create a dependent variable DomesticPortionc,k,t, 
which indicates the share of a country’s (c) sovereign debt held by a certain 
domestic creditor (k: resident banks or non-bank residents) at a given time-point (t). 
 
Finally, in order to capture the effect of government pressure, I distinguish state-
owned banks from private banks by using ownership data from Orbis Bank Focus. 
I create a dummy variable Publicb, which equals 1 if the global ultimate owner (i.e. 
that holds more that 50% of the equity capital of the bank) is the domestic 
government. See Table C.2 for a list of state-owned banks. 
 
The summary statistics are shown in Table 5.2. Noticeably, for SovPortion, more 
than half of the observations are zero. However, these are meaningful zeros 
indicating that the bank does not have exposure to that sovereign at that time point. 
If the average levels of the overall and domestic samples are compared, I can see a 
clear home bias for sovereign debt and private debt.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 “Non-bank residents” exclude central banks and public agencies, so I can assume that these are 
private non-bank parties and/or institutions. 
38 Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
United Kingdom.  
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5.4 Methodology and Results 
5.4.1 Sovereign home bias during the crisis 
First, I aim to capture home bias in sovereign debt portfolios of European banks 
during the crisis. Hence, I apply a simple difference-in-difference method that 
assumes that a bank’s home bias should evidence a common trend in the absence 
of a crisis. The model is as follows: 
 
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑙,𝑏,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽0𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙,𝑐 + 𝛽1(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙,𝑐) +  𝜃𝑏,𝑡 +
 𝛾𝑐,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑙,𝑏,𝑐,𝑡                                                                                                                                      (5.1) 
Here (l) indicates the home country of the bank, (b) denotes the bank, (c) 
identifies the country of exposure, and (t) is time. Controls include a large set of 
fixed effects at the level of Bank*Time and ExposureCountry*Time. Variables are 
winsorised at 1% and 99% level, and standard errors are clustered at Bank*Time 
level. Thus, this model controls for the overall effects of the crisis both at the home 
country (banks never change home country) and exposure country levels, and the 
Crisis dummy (which is country-time specific) only needs to enter the regression 
as an interaction term. In addition, Domesticl,c is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the bank’s home country is the same as the exposure country (i.e. l = c). Based on 
this setup, β0 should reflect the general level of home bias in European banks’ 
sovereign debt portfolios, and β1 should reflect the marginal effect of the crisis on 
this home bias. Regarding the alternative dependent variable, SovBiasl,b,c,t, the same 
model is estimated. 
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Results are shown in Table 5.3. In tranquil times (columns 1 and 3), banks have 
some home bias in the sovereign debt portfolio, which is economically significant 
at a level of approximately 13%; in comparison, the average sovereign holding in 
my sample is around 0.01 (i.e. an average bank only holds 1% of the sovereign debt 
issued by a specific country). This result surely indicates that a bank holds much 
more of the sovereign debt of its home country. In stressed scenarios (columns 2 
and 4), I can clearly see a significant rise in home bias. In addition, such effect is of 
great economic significance as the portion of a sovereign’s debt held by an average 
domestic bank almost doubles when the country is in crisis. Therefore, I can 
confirm that home bias in sovereign debt portfolios greatly increased during the 
crisis. This is compatible with the findings of Giannetti and Laeven (2012) to the 
effect that international banks demonstrate a stronger home bias for syndicated loan 
issuance. However, with this observation, it is not yet possible to tell which channel 
has the principal impact on home bias.  
 
5.4.2 Sovereign vs. private debt home bias 
Most of the literature on European banks’ home bias during  the crisis focuses 
only on the sovereign debt portfolio (De Marco and Macchiavelli 2016; Ongena et 
al. 2016; Becker and Ivashina 2018). However, this trend may merely be an 
observation of a more general trend, that is, of home bias in all investments. Thus, 
I intend to compare the effect of crisis on home bias for the different types of assets 
of European banks, and I employ a more generalised model as follows:  
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𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑,𝑙,𝑏,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽0(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙,𝑐 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑑) +  𝛽1(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙,𝑐 ∗
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑑) + 𝛽2(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙,𝑐 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑐,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙,𝑐 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑐,𝑡 ∗
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑑)  +  𝜃𝑏,𝑡 +  𝛾𝑐,𝑡 +  𝛿𝑑 +  𝜀𝑙,𝑏,𝑐,𝑡                                                                                                                            
(5.2) 
Here Sovereignd and Retaild are dummy variables denoting the corresponding asset 
types. All other variables are built as previously explained39. The coefficients β0 
and β1 indicate home bias in these two different asset types in general. β2 shows the 
overall effect of the crisis on home bias for both asset types and β3 should indicate 
whether there is a stronger home bias for sovereign debt. 
 
The results are shown in Table 5.4. In columns 1 and 4, the results confirm that 
both sovereign debt private debt are subject to significant home bias. Then, columns 
2 and 5 show that the crisis has a positive impact on home bias for both asset types. 
Columns 3 and 6 consider the additional impact of the crisis on sovereign debt, 
which is insignificant. Moreover, such an additional effect is negative (–0.04) even 
if it were significant; that is, during the crisis, private debt may have displayed 
stronger home bias than sovereign debt. Thus, the next step is to find the 
mechanisms behind the repatriation of both asset types during the crisis, and 
discover whether they share common channels. 
 
                                                          
39 Domestic is excluded because its perfect collinearity with Domestic * Retail and Domestic * 
Sovereign. Also, for conciseness, the two-way interaction of Sovereign*Crisis is excluded, and its 
inclusion does not change the results anyways. 
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5.4.3 The effect of moral suasion 
As suggested by De Marco and Macchiavelli (2016), Ongena et al. (2016), and 
Becker and Ivashina (2018), banks with a greater ‘domestic government-relation’ 
held more domestic governments bond during the crisis 40 . Furthermore, it is 
possible that domestic governments may implicitly ask domestic banks, especially 
those within their jurisdiction, to increase lending to domestic firms to stimulate the 
domestic economy. First, I compare the levels of home bias of state-owned banks 
and private banks in Table 5.5. Overall, private banks have stronger home bias in 
their private sector exposure; however, there is no significant difference between 
state-owned banks and private banks in terms of home bias in the sovereign debt 
portfolio. If I look at GIIPS banks41 only, that is, focus on cases in which sovereigns 
face greater funding pressure42, compared to private banks, state-owned banks have 
much stronger home bias in sovereign debt portfolios though they have less in 
private debt portfolios. These observations are in line with the moral suasion view 
of home bias (De Marco and Macchiavelli 2016; Ongena et al. 2016; Becker and 
Ivashina 2018), which would predict that, in general, state-owned banks in crisis 
countries would suffer more home bias in sovereign debt portfolios than their 
private counterparts; While in private debt portfolios, where domestic government 
                                                          
40 Measured by either direct government ownership of the bank and/or political links on the board 
of directors. 
41 Banks from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
42 Because the GIIPS sovereigns are often “in crisis” (i.e. high sovereign bond yield) during the 
sample period 
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pressure is much less influential, state-owned banks will not show higher home bias 
than private banks43.   
 
       To test this, I employ the following model:   
 
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑙,𝑏,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽0𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙,𝑐 + 𝛽1(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙,𝑐 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑐,𝑡) +
𝛽2(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙,𝑐 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑏)  +  𝜃𝑏,𝑡 +  𝛾𝑐,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑙,𝑏,𝑐,𝑡                                                                   
(5.3) 
 
Here Publicb is a dummy variable that indicates state-owned banks. A bank is 
defined as a state-owned bank if the global ultimate owner of the bank is the 
domestic government (see Table C.2 for a list of state-owned banks); otherwise it 
is a private bank. The ownership information of banks is sourced from Orbis Banks 
Focus, and is only available to the end of 2017. Thus, I assume that the controlling 
shareholder remains unchanged throughout the whole period. All other variables 
are built as previously explained. β0 shows home bias in general for both types of 
banks, β1 shows the additional effect of the crisis on home bias for both types of 
banks, and β2 shows the additional effect of crisis on home bias for state-owned 
banks. 
 
The results are shown in Table 5.6. In columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4), the dependent 
variable is SovPortion (PrivatePortion). According to the results in 1, overall, state-
                                                          
43  Unless one assumes that domestic government also ask domestic banks to absorb debt of 
domestic firms/residents. 
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owned banks and private banks appear to have a similar level of home bias in 
sovereign debt portfolios. In other words, the domestic distribution of a country’s 
sovereign debt is not biased to either state-owned banks or private banks. Then, I 
consider the scenarios in which sovereigns face significant funding pressures, 
approximated by the dummy variable “Crisis”, the story might be different. In 
column 2, the result of a Wald Test on (β1 + β2) is very significant, both statistically 
and economically. However, it is very likely to be driven by the fact that β1 is highly 
significant while β2 is not significant. In other words, under such a crisis scenario, 
state-owned banks do not have a stronger home bias in the sovereign debt portfolio 
than private banks. However, if I relax the definition of crisis: bond spread > 200bps 
in Panel C44. Then, in column 1, β2 is quite significant, so is (β1 + β2) in the joint 
test. Therefore, the results suggest that under a less-intense-crisis scenario, state-
owned banks have higher home bias in sovereign debt portfolios during stressed 
scenarios than do private banks, while during extremely stressed periods, the 
domestic distribution of a country’s sovereign debt is indifferent between state-
owned banks and private banks.  
 
In contrast, if I look at home bias in private sector portfolios (in columns 3 and 
4), it appears that state-owned banks always have a lower, if not the same, level of 
home bias as private banks in both crisis and tranquil periods. Thus, such results 
confirm the trend observed in Table 5.5: that state-owned banks have stronger home 
bias in sovereign debt portfolios than do private banks mainly when their domestic 
                                                          
44 So that there are more observations of public banks of countries in crisis.   
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sovereign faces funding pressure (such a difference may disappear as the funding 
pressure grows); and that private banks always have stronger home bias than state-
owned banks in private sector portfolios. This suggests that the moral suasion 
channel may explain the repatriation of sovereign debt, but not private debt, during 
the crisis. 
 
5.4.4 The effect of risk-shifting 
As suggested by Crosignani (2017), banks from countries in crisis are 
particularly weakly capitalised: they tilt their government bond portfolios toward 
domestic securities, and link their fate to that of the sovereign. Thus, the risks are 
shifted to other stakeholders of the bank, while the shareholders can benefit from 
large profit if the sovereign recovers. However, if this theory works, one would also 
expect those banks to hold more sovereign bonds of other crisis countries. I employ 
the following model to capture the risk-shifting channel:  
 
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑙,𝑏,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽0𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙,𝑐 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑙,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑐,𝑡) +
𝛽2(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙,𝑐 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑙,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑐,𝑡)  +  𝜃𝑏,𝑡 +  𝛾𝑐,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑙,𝑏,𝑐,𝑡 
                                                                                                                           (5.4) 
Here StressedBankl,t is a dummy variable representing observations where the home 
country of the bank is ‘in crisis’45 . All other variables are built as previously 
                                                          
45  Noticeably, the StressedBank dummy is a country level variable rather than banks level. 
Therefore, the focus of such setting is to test the impact of a domestic shock of a country, e.g. 
domestic government funding pressure, rather than that of an individual bank’s character. 
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explained. Due to the fixed effects at Bank*Time and ExposureCountry*Time levels, 
Crisis and StressedBank dummies only enter the regression as interaction terms. 
The two-way interactions, Domestic*Crisis and Domestic*StressedBank, are 
dropped from the estimation since they are perfectly collinear with 
Domestic*StressedBank*Crisis (they essentially indicate the same thing). If the 
risk-shifting channel can explain increasing home bias for banks in crisis countries, 
I should expect a similar trend of crisis countries’ banks shifting their portfolios 
towards all countries in crisis – both domestic and foreign – which should be 
reflected in β1. On the other hand, β2 captures the marginal effect of the crisis on 
home bias that risk-shifting theory could not explain.  
 
The results for sovereign debt portfolios are presented in Table 5.7 Panel A. 
Columns 1 and 3 confirm the existence of the risk-shifting channel, since banks in 
crisis countries would reallocate their sovereign investment to all other crisis 
countries. However, in 2 and 4, when the triple interaction is added, the coefficient 
of Crisis*StressedBank is still quite statistically significant, but its magnitude is 
much smaller than that of Crisis*StressedBank *Domestic. Therefore, general risk-
shifting theory cannot well explain why banks from distressed countries have a 
strong preference for their own government bonds. According to the results in Panel 
B, general risk-shifting appears to be totally irrelevant to the reallocation of banks’ 
private debt portfolios.  
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5.4.5 Secondary market theory  
As discussed above, the secondary market theory is based on the assumption that 
a government will be less willing to default if its debt is mostly held domestically; 
thus, it suggests that government bonds are more valuable to domestic investors. 
Accordingly, sovereign debt will naturally flow back to domestic investors during 
crisis. However, this theory is not only limited to the asset management of banks. 
In other words, if the secondary market channel is prominent, I should expect that 
both banks and other types of financial institutions would increase home bias in 
their sovereign debt portfolio during the crisis. I use the Bruegel dataset at country-
level to differentiate the effect of the crisis on the home bias of banks and other 
non-bank agents in the same country, and I employ the following model:  
 
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑘,𝑡 = 𝛽1(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑐,𝑡) +  𝜔𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐,𝑡 +
 𝜀𝑐,𝑘,𝑡           
                                                                                                                        (5.5) 
Here (c) is the country, (k) is the creditor type and (t) refers to a specific quarter. 
ResidentBanks is a dummy variable that is 1 if the creditor of the sovereign debt is 
its resident bank, and 0 if it is other private non-bank residents. All other variables 
are built as previously explained. Fixed effects are included at Creditor*Time and 
Country*Time levels, and that is why ResidentBank and Crisis enter the regression 
only in interaction form. β1 indicates whether or not domestic banks behave 
differently compared to other domestic agents.  
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According to the results in Table 5.8, resident banks are more likely to increase 
home bias in their sovereign debt portfolios, while other non-bank agents appear to 
move in the opposite direction. Thus, such findings go against the secondary market 
theory which predicts that sovereign debt should flow back to all domestic investors 
indiscriminately. One may argue that governments care more about the well-being 
of domestic banking sector than other domestic sectors. In other words, 
governments are much less likely to default if most of the debt were held by 
domestic banks rather than other domestic investors. However, if secondary market 
theory is applicable, one would still expect a similar trend for domestic non-bank 
agents as compared to domestic banks. This is not observable in my analysis.    
 
5.4.6 Exchange rate risk 
One possible motivation for home bias in portfolio management may be hedging 
of exchange rate risk. As suggested by Stockman and Dellas (1989), investors are 
more willing to invest at home than abroad because they prefer to keep asset returns 
aligned with local currency denominated expenditure. To test the possible impact 
of this theory, I exclude non-Eurozone country banks from my sample (e.g. HSBC 
from the UK) 46. Thus all banks in the sub-sample use the euro as the main currency. 
Table 5.9 updates all the major results for this sub-sample, and there is no 
                                                          
46 Only keep banks that are from the baseline sample and headquartered in Eurozone countries 
including: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta. The banks (very few) from Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania are excluded because these countries joined the Eurozone during the sample period.  
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significant change from previous findings. Hence, exchange rate risk is not a 
primary determinant for rising home bias among European banks. 
 
5.4.7 Redenomination risk 
Apart from exchange rate risk, there is another potential issue faced by Eurozone 
banks: the risk that some countries may leave the monetary union. With such a 
concern, banks may sell government bonds to hedge against such countries. 
However, it is not easy to list the exact countries that plan to leave the union. As 
suggested by Lane (2012), Greece is the country that suffered the most during the 
Eurozone crisis, so it is easy to argue that Greece is more likely to leave the union 
than any other member country. I follow a strategy similar to that of Brutti and 
Saurre (2016) and drop all the bank exposure to Greece from my sample. Table 5.10 
updates all the major results for this sub-sample – and there is no significant changes. 
That is, the results are not driven by redenomination risk. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
According to the Eurosystem’s mission statement, it has a keen interest in the 
integration of the financial system in Europe, particularly in the euro area 47 . 
However, the repatriation of both sovereign debt and private forms of debt during 
the crisis contributed to the fragmentation of the European financial market. By 
                                                          
47  For more details https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/escb/eurosystem-
mission/html/index.en.html 
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using detailed datasets compiled from various tests conducted by the EBA, I find 
some empirical evidence that may explain the fragmentation of the European 
financial market. First, the home bias of banks’ portfolios increased and sovereign 
debt (of financially distressed countries) was reallocated from foreign investors to 
domestic banks, but not to other domestic agents. Second, the home bias of banks’ 
portfolios for private forms of debt (corporate and retail) also experienced a 
significant increase, which was at least equally as large as that for sovereign debt 
portfolios. Third, state-owned banks and private banks have different focuses 
regarding home bias. State-owned banks have stronger home bias in sovereign debt 
portfolios than do private banks, while private banks have stronger home bias in 
private debt portfolios. I have discussed these findings in light of different theories, 
and I argue that the repatriation of sovereign debt can be best explained by the moral 
suasion theory, while further investigation is required regarding the repatriation of 
private forms of debt.  
 
      My results have certain policy implications. Governments may influence the 
investment decisions of domestic banks through direct ownership, which may 
essentially impede the integration of European financial market. This is because 
one of the fundamental conditions for a fully integrated market is that all potential 
market participants should be treated equally when they are active in the market 
(ECB 2017) 48. Moreover, many papers argue that banks’ excessive holdings of 
sovereign debt is a key ingredient in forming the sovereign–bank diabolic loop 
                                                          
48  Financial Integration in Europe. 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.financialintegrationineurope201705.en.pdf 
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(Cooper and Nikolov 2013; Acharya et al. 2014; Brunnermeier et al. 2016; Farhi 
and Tirole 2018). This chapter has identified a crucial factor, moral suasion, that 
significantly contributes to banks’ excessive holdings of sovereign debt. This 
implies that minimising the chances of moral suasion may be particularly important 
in solving the deadly loop between sovereigns and banks. 
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Figure 5.1. Home bias in domestic banks and government bond spreads.  
Home Bias is defined as the portion of the total sovereign debt of a country held by its domestic 
banks, and it is calculated as the simple average for countries of a country group (Core vs. Peripheral). 
Bond Spread for a country’s 10-year government bond (with respect to Germany) is averaged over 
three-month daily values before each observation date. Then, it is calculated as the simple average 
for all countries of a country group (Core vs. Peripheral). Peripheral countries are Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain. Core countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Netherlands. 
Data of banks’ sovereign bond exposure is from EBA. 
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Figure 5.2. Domestic Debt Ownership: Bank Resident, Non-Bank Resident and 
Non-Resident 
Home Bias is defined as the portion of the total sovereign debt of a country held by a particular 
domestic creditor group (bank resident or non-bank resident) or foreign creditor (Non-Resident), 
and it is calculated as the simple average for countries of a country group (Core vs. Peripheral). Data 
for domestic sovereign holding by Resident Banks and Other Resident comes from the dataset 
compiled by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012). Core countries include Belgium, France, Germany and 
Netherlands. Peripheral countries include Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.  
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Table 5.1. Data disclosure details from European Banking Authority (EBA) 
  
Disclosure Name Information Date 
No. of 
Banks 
Type of Debt 
2010 EU-wide stress testing 
exercise 
2010-Q1 91 Sovereign 
2011 EU-wide stress testing 
exercise 
2010-Q4 90 Sovereign&Private 
EU Capital exercise 2012 2011-Q4&2012-Q2 62 Sovereign 
2013 EU-wide transparency 
exercise 
2012-Q4&2013-Q2 64 Sovereign&Private 
2014 EU-wide stress testing 
exercise 
2013-Q4 123 Sovereign&Private 
2015 EU-wide transparency 
exercise 
2014-Q4&2015-Q2 105 Sovereign&Private 
2016 EU-wide transparency 
exercise 
2015-Q4&2016-Q2 131 Sovereign&Private 
2017 EU-wide transparency 
exercise 
2016-Q4&2017-Q2 132 Sovereign&Private 
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Table 5.2. Summary Statistics 
SovPortion (PrivatePortion) is the ratio of a specific bank’s exposure of the sovereign (private) 
debt of a specific country divided by the same exposure of the same country held by all banks in 
the sample. SovBias (PrivateBias) is the ratio of a specific bank’s exposure of the sovereign 
(private) debt of a specific country divided by the same exposure of the same country held by all 
banks in the sample, adjusted by a CAPM model. Domestic in parentheses refers to the same 
variable but held by a specific domestic bank. Domestic Portion is the portion of the total 
sovereign debt of a country held by all domestic banks (Resident Banks) or by all domestic non-
bank residents (Other Residents). Bond Spreads are the spreads between each country’s 10-year 
government bond and German 10-year bond, averaged over three-month daily values before each 
observation date. Panel A shows the summary statistics for all variables used in the regressions. 
The significance level of t-test on mean are indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Median Std.  Min Max N Source 
SovPortion 0.012 0.000 0.051 0 1 31470 EBA 
SovBias 0 -0.004 0.052 -0.088 1 31470 EBA 
PrivatePortion 0.045 0.001 0.109 0 1 5764 EBA 
PrivateBias 0.030 -0.003 0.109 -0.073 1 5764 EBA 
        
SovPortion (Domestic) 0.131 0.094 0.132 0 0.841 1056 EBA 
SovBias (Domestic) 0.121 0.076 0.132 -0.027 0.840 1056 EBA 
PrivatePortion 
(Domestic) 
0.177 0.151 0.148 0 1 608 EBA 
PrivateBias (Domestic) 0.163 0.129 0.145 -0.002 1 608 EBA 
        
Domestic Portion        
Resident Banks 0.179 0.186 0.099 0.008 0.451 302 Bruegel 
Other Resident 0.195 0.206 0.129 0.002 0.583 302 Bruegel 
        
Bond Spreads (basis 
point) 
203 116 260 -25 2398 338 ECB 
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Table 5.3. Home Bias in European Banks’ Sovereign Exposure during Crises.  
This table contains the results of panel regressions of equation (5.1) with dependent variables 
SovPortion (in [1] and [2]) and SovBias (in [3] and [4]). The sample period fully covers the Eurozone 
Crisis and the recovery phase from early 2010 to mid-2017 on a semi-annual basis. SovPortion is 
the ratio of a specific bank’s exposure of the sovereign debt of a specific country divided by the 
same exposure of the same country held by all banks in the sample. SovBias is the ratio of a specific 
bank’s exposure of the sovereign debt of a specific country divided by the same exposure of the 
same country held by all banks in the sample, adjusted by a CAPM model. Domestic is a dummy 
variable, which equals to 1 if the exposed country is also the home country of the bank. Crisis is a 
dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the exposed country is from Eurozone and its 10-year 
government bond spread (vs. German) is above 400 basis points, averaged over three-month daily 
values before each observation date. Fixed effects are included at Exposure-Country*Time and 
Bank*Time levels. In addition, I include the result of Wald-tests that give the joint significance of 
linear combinations of the betas for Domestic and Domestic*Crisis. Data of banks’ sovereign bond 
exposure is from EBA and country exposures include all 30 members of the European Economic 
Area (EEA). Bond yields for Crisis dummy are from ECB Database. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable: SovPortion  SovBias 
 [1] [2]  [3] [4] 
Domestic 0.1313*** 0.1199***  0.1331*** 0.1218*** 
Domestic*Crisis  0.1106***   0.1104*** 
      
Fixed Effects      
Exposure-Country*Time YES YES  YES YES 
Bank*Time YES YES  YES YES 
Clustering Bank Bank  Bank Bank 
N 31470 31470  31470 31470 
Adj. R-Squared 0.24 0.26  0.23 0.24 
      
Wald-tests      
Domestic*(1+Crisis)  0.2305***   0.2322*** 
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Table 5.4. Home Bias in European Banks’ Exposure during Crisis – Sovereign vs. 
Private Exposure. 
This table contains the results of panel regressions of equation (5.2) with dependent variables 
DebtPortion (Column [1]-[3]) and DebtBias (Column [4]-[6]). The sample period fully covers the 
Eurozone Crisis and the recovery phase from early 2010 to mid-2017 on a semi-annual basis. 
DebtPortion is the ratio of a specific bank’s exposure of a specific type of debt of a specific country 
divided by the same exposure of the same country held by all banks in the sample. DebtBias is the 
ratio of a specific bank’s exposure of a specific type of debt of a specific country divided by the 
same exposure of the same country held by all banks in the sample, adjusted by a CAPM model. 
Domestic is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the exposed country is also the home country of 
the bank. Crisis is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the exposed country is from Eurozone and 
its 10-year government bond spread (vs. German) is above 400 basis points, averaged over three-
month daily values before each observation date. Sovereign and Private are dummy variables 
indicating the respective debt types held by banks. Data of banks’ sovereign bond exposure is from 
EBA and country exposures include all 30 members of the European Economic Area (EEA). Bond 
yields for Crisis dummy are from ECB Database. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and 
clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable DebtPortion  DebtBias 
 [1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] [6] 
Domestic*Sovereign 0.1358*** 0.1243*** 0.1251***  0.1376*** 0.1261*** 0.1270*** 
Domestic*Private 0.1519*** 0.1463*** 0.1448***  0.1544*** 0.1488*** 0.1473*** 
Domestic*Crisis  0.1128*** 0.1442***   0.1127*** 0.1445*** 
Domestic*Crisis*Sovereign   -0.0401    -0.0407 
        
Fixed Effects        
Sector YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
ExpoCountry*Time YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Bank*Time YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Clustering Bank Bank Bank  Bank Bank Bank 
N 37234 37234 37234  37234 37234 37234 
Adj. R-Squared 0.30 0.31 0.31  0.28 0.29 0.29 
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Table 5.5. Summary Statistics State Owned Banks vs. Private Banks. 
SovPortion (PrivatePortion) is the ratio of a specific bank’s exposure of the sovereign (private) debt 
of a specific country divided by the same exposure of the same country held by all banks in the 
sample. SovBias (PrivateBias) is the ratio of a specific bank’s exposure of the sovereign (private) 
debt of a specific country divided by the same exposure of the same country held by all banks in the 
sample, adjusted by a CAPM model. Domestic in parentheses refers to the same variable but held 
by a specific domestic bank. The last column shows the results of t-test on the difference between 
state-owned banks and private banks. A bank is qualified as state-owned bank if its “global ultimate 
owner” is the domestic government (according to Orbis Bank Focus), otherwise the bank is a private 
bank. GIIPS banks include banks from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The significance 
level of t-test on mean are indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
All Banks State-Owned Bank Private Bank Diff. 
SovPortion (Domestic) 0.131 0.132 -0.001 
SovBias (Domestic) 0.119 0.121 -0.002 
PrivatePortion (Domestic) 0.106 0.195 -0.088*** 
PrivateBias (Domestic) 0.098 0.180 -0.082*** 
    
GIIPS Banks State-Owned Bank Private Bank Diff. 
SovPortion (Domestic) 0.208 0.106 0.103*** 
SovBias (Domestic) 0.203 0.097 0.107*** 
PrivatePortion (Domestic) 0.174 0.216 -0.042*** 
PrivateBias (Domestic) 0.169 0.205 -0.036*** 
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Table 5.6. Home Bias in European Banks’ Sovereign Exposure during Crisis – 
State Owned Banks. 
This table contains the results of panel regressions of equation (5.3) with dependent variables 
SovPortion, SovBias, PrivatePortion and PrivateBias in [1] – [4] respectively. The sample period 
fully covers the Eurozone Crisis and the recovery phase from early 2010 to mid-2017 on a semi-
annual basis. SovPortion (PrivatePortion) is the ratio of a specific bank’s exposure of the sovereign 
(private) debt of a specific country divided by the same exposure of the same country held by all 
banks in the sample. SovBias (PrivateBias) is the ratio of a specific bank’s exposure of the sovereign 
(private) debt of a specific country divided by the same exposure of the same country held by all 
banks in the sample, adjusted by a CAPM model. Domestic is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 
if the exposed country is also the home country of the bank. Crisis is a dummy variable, which 
equals to 1 if the exposed country is from Eurozone and its 10-year government bond spread (vs. 
German) is above 400 basis points, averaged over three-month daily values before each observation 
date. Public equals 1 if the global ultimate owner of the bank is the domestic government (see 
Appendix for a list of state owned banks). In addition, I include the result of Wald-tests that give the 
joint significance of linear combinations of the betas for Domestic and Domestic*Public, and 
Domestic*Crisis and Domestic*Crisis*Public. Data of banks’ sovereign bond exposure is from EBA 
and country exposures include all 30 members of the European Economic Area (EEA). Bond yields 
for Crisis dummy are from ECB Database. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and 
clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively 
Dependent Variable: SovPortion SovPortion  PrivatePortion PrivatePortion 
 [1] [2]  [3] [4] 
Domestic 0.1308*** 0.1199***  0.1682*** 0.1531*** 
Domestic*Public 0.0030   -0.0603**  
Domestic*Crisis  0.1048***   0.0956** 
Domestic*Crisis*Public  0.0371   -0.0744 
      
Fixed Effects      
ExpoCountry*Time YES YES  YES YES 
Bank*Time YES YES  YES YES 
Clustering Bank Bank  Bank Bank 
N 31470 31470  5764 5764 
Adj. R-Squared 0.24 0.26  0.72 0.72 
Wald-tests      
Domestic 0.1308***   0.1682***  
Domestic*(1+Public) 0.1338***   0.1079***  
Domestic*Crisis  0.1048***   0.0956** 
Domestic*Crisis*(1+Public)  0.1419***   0.0212 
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Table 5.6 Continued 
Panel B: Crisis if Bond Spread > 300bps 
Dependent Variable: SovPortion   PrivatePortion  
 [1]   [2]  
Domestic 0.1158***   0.1520***  
Domestic*Crisis 0.1010***   0.0741**  
Domestic*Crisis*Public 0.0437   -0.0388  
      
Fixed Effects      
ExpoCountry*Time YES   YES  
Bank*Time YES   YES  
Clustering Bank   Bank  
N 31470   5764  
Adj. R-Squared 0.26   0.72  
      
Wald-tests      
Domestic*Crisis*(1+Public) 0.1447***   0.0353  
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Table 5.6 Continued 
Panel C: Crisis if Bond Spread > 200bps 
Dependent Variable: SovPortion   PrivatePortion  
 [1]   [2]  
Domestic 0.1154***   0.1562***  
Domestic*Crisis 0.0678***   -0.0069  
Domestic*Crisis*Public 0.0573**   0.0326  
      
Fixed Effects      
ExpoCountry*Time YES   YES  
Bank*Time YES   YES  
Clustering Bank   Bank  
N 31470   5764  
Adj. R-Squared 0.26   0.72  
      
Wald-tests      
Domestic*Crisis*(1+Public) 0.1251***   0.0257  
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Table 5.7. Home Bias in European Banks’ Sovereign Exposure during Crisis – 
Banks from Stressed Countries. 
This table contains the results of panel regressions of equation (5.4) with dependent variables 
SovPortion (in [1] and [2]) and SovBias (in [3] and [4]) in Panel A and PrivatePortion (in [1] and 
[2]) and PrivateBias (in [3] and [4]) in Panel B. The sample period fully covers the Eurozone Crisis 
and the recovery phase from early 2010 to mid-2017 on a semi-annual basis. SovPortion 
(PrivatePortion) is the ratio of a specific bank’s exposure of the sovereign (private) debt of a specific 
country divided by the same exposure of the same country held by all banks in the sample. SovBias 
(PrivateBias) is the ratio of a specific bank’s exposure of the sovereign (private) debt of a specific 
country divided by the same exposure of the same country held by all banks in the sample, adjusted 
by a CAPM model. Domestic is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the exposed country is also 
the home country of the bank. Crisis is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the sovereign 
exposure is towards a country from Eurozone and its 10-year government bond spread (vs. German) 
is above 400 basis points, averaged over three-month daily values before each observation date. 
StressBank is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the home country of the bank is “in crisis” 
(400bps < Spread). In addition, I include the result of Wald-tests that give the joint significance of 
linear combinations of the betas for Crisis*StressBank and Domestic*Crisis*StressBank.  Data of 
banks’ sovereign bond exposure is from EBA and country exposures include all 30 members of the 
European Economic Area (EEA). Bond yields for Crisis dummy are from ECB Database. Standard 
errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Sovereign debt portfolio 
Dependent Variable: SovPortion  SovBias 
 [1] [2]  [3] [4] 
Domestic 0.1286*** 0.1199***  0.1303*** 0.1217*** 
Crisis*StressBank 0.0314*** 0.0081***  0.0314*** 0.0081*** 
Domestic*Crisis* StressBank  0.1045***   0.1043*** 
      
Fixed Effects      
ExpoCountry*Time YES YES  YES YES 
Bank*Time YES YES  YES YES 
Clustering Bank Bank  Bank Bank 
N 31470 31470  31470 31470 
Adj. R-Squared 0.25 0.26  0.23 0.24 
      
Wald-tests      
Crisis* StressBank *(1+Domestic)  0.1126***   0.1124*** 
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Table 5.7 Continued 
Panel B: Private debt portfolio 
Dependent Variable: PrivatePortion  PrivateBias 
 [1] [2]  [3] [4] 
Domestic 0.1553*** 0.1532***  0.1589*** 0.1568*** 
Crisis*StressedBank 0.0170 -0.0187*  0.0161 -0.0186* 
Domestic*Crisis* StressedBank  0.0991*   0.0962* 
      
Fixed Effects      
ExpoCountry*Time YES YES  YES YES 
Bank*Time YES YES  YES YES 
Clustering Bank Bank  Bank Bank 
N 5764 5764  5764 5764 
Adj. R-Squared 0.72 0.72  0.71 0.71 
      
Wald-tests      
Crisis* StressBank *(1+Domestic)  0.0804   0.0776 
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Table 5.8. Home Bias in European Banks’ Sovereign Exposure during Crisis – 
Resident Banks vs. Non-Bank Residents. 
This table contains the results of panel regressions of equation (5.5) with dependent variable 
Domestic Portion, which is the portion of the total sovereign debt of a country held by all domestic 
banks (Resident Banks) or by all domestic non-bank residents (Other Residents). The sample period 
fully covers the Eurozone Crisis and the recovery phase from early 2010 to end-2016 on a quarterly 
basis. ResidentBank is a Dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the creditor is the resident bank of 
the country. Crisis is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the exposed country is from Eurozone 
and its 10-year government bond spread (vs. German) is above 400 basis points, averaged over three-
month daily values before each observation date. Data for domestic sovereign holding by Resident 
Banks and Other Resident comes from the dataset compiled by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012). The 
sample country include Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and United Kindom. Bond yields for Crisis dummy are from ECB Database. 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Domestic Portion   
 [1] [2] [3] 
ResidentBank*Crisis 0.1246* 0.1391** 0.1391** 
Crisis -0.0739* -0.0812*  
    
Fixed Effects    
Country YES YES  
Time YES   
Creditor YES   
Time*Country   YES 
Time*Creditor  YES YES 
Clustering Country Country Country 
N 604 604 604 
Adj. R-Squared 0.39 0.37 0.37 
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Table 5.9. Main results with Eurozone Banks only.  
This table summarizes the results of previous regressions but using a sub-sample – including only 
Eurozone banks. All definitions of variables and regression settings remain the same, please see 
previous tables for details. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
  
Dependent Variable SovPortion DebtPortion SovPortion PrivatePortion DomesticPortion 
Table 3 4 6A 7A 6B 7B 8  
Domestic 0.1049***  0.1049*** 0.1048*** 0.1363*** 0.1364***   
Domestic*Crisis 0.1242*** 0.1585*** 0.1184***  0.1121*    
Domestic*Sovereign  0.1097***       
Domestic*Retail  0.1343***       
Domestic*Crisis*Sovereign  -0.0414       
Domestic*Crisis*Public   0.0377  -0.0738    
Crisis*StressedBank    0.0060**  -0.0145   
Domestic*Crisis*StressedBank    0.1198***  0.1123*   
ResidentBank*Crisis       0.1211*  
         
Fixed Effects         
ExpoCountry*Time 
YES YES YES YES YES YES   
Bank*Time 
YES YES YES YES YES YES   
Sector 
 YES       
Time*Country 
      YES  
Time*Creditor 
      YES  
Clustering Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Country  
N 25893 30587 25893 25893 4694 4694 548  
Adj. R-Squared 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.75 0.75 0.78  
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Table 5.10. Main results without Greek Exposures.  
This table summarizes the results of previous regressions but using a sub-sample – excluding all 
sample banks’ exposure to Greece. All definitions of variables and regression settings remain the 
same, please see previous tables for details. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable SovPortion DebtPortion SovPortion PrivatePortion DomesticPortion  
Table 3 4 6A 7A 6B 7B 8  
Domestic 0.1203***  0.1203*** 0.1203*** 0.1536*** 0.1536***   
Domestic*Crisis 0.1133*** 0.1582* 0.1049**  0.1608*    
Domestic*Sovereign  0.1253***       
Domestic*Retail  0.1458***       
Domestic*Crisis*Sovereign  -0.0500       
Domestic*Crisis*Public   0.0368  -0.1392    
Crisis*StressedBank    0.0079**  0.0030   
Domestic*Crisis*StressedBank    0.1077***  0.1093*   
ResidentBank*Crisis       0.1016  
         
Fixed Effects         
ExpoCountry*Time 
YES YES YES YES YES YES   
Bank*Time 
YES YES YES YES YES YES   
Sector 
 YES       
Time*Country 
      YES  
Time*Creditor 
      YES  
Clustering Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Country  
N 30276 35808 30276 30276 5532 5532 548  
Adj. R-Squared 0.25 0.30 0.25 0.25 0.70 0.70 0.81  
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Appendix C 
Table C.1 Summary of sovereign bond spreads. 
This table summarize the 10-year government bond spread (vs. Germany) of Eurozone countries for 
the 13 time-point covered by the EBA dataset. Each figure of bond spread is the average daily bond 
spreads for the previous three months and it is presented in basis point. 
 2010Q1 2010Q4 2011Q4 2012Q2 2012Q4 2013Q2 
Austria 47 49 119 112 51 47 
Belgium 53 96 253 191 91 84 
Cyprus 142 200 507 558 563 566 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 76 211 373 475 419 316 
Finland 20 28 59 49 31 32 
France 31 42 125 135 74 62 
Greece (GR) 306 844 1710 2398 1479 890 
Ireland 152 510 650 561 331 242 
Italy 85 160 468 437 341 287 
Lithuania 364 255 342 377 277 234 
Luxembourg 51 40 38 57 15 21 
Latvia 946 600 383 369 199 180 
Malta 126 155 241 282 257 200 
Netherlands 22 25 50 64 29 44 
Portugal 117 390 1030 997 654 463 
Slovenia 75 122 424 397 413 455 
Slovakia 89 125 282 338 272 132 
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Table C.1 Continued 
 2013Q4 2014Q4 2015Q2 2015Q4 2016Q2 2016Q4 2017Q2 
Austria 40 26 20 31 28 27 29 
Belgium 73 35 34 33 43 34 45 
Cyprus 425 530 413 331 382 332 276 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 240 129 128 118 145 117 127 
Finland 26 23 18 30 33 20 21 
France 58 41 35 36 39 44 51 
Greece (GR) 686 723 1097 728 812 739 584 
Ireland 181 84 72 59 74 58 54 
Italy 241 153 130 109 139 161 190 
Lithuania 215 141 50 104 93 16 4 
Luxembourg 34 6 -11 -25 20 10 26 
Latvia 196 116 36 58 45 40 61 
Malta 146 138 99 79 91 60 108 
Netherlands 39 21 21 20 26 18 26 
Portugal 437 235 191 196 308 338 307 
Slovenia 414 173 110 116 130 68 68 
Slovakia 125 63 52 20 44 57 71 
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Table C.2 List of State-Owned Banks 
 Bank Name 
Bankscope 
ID 
Countr
y 
 ABN AMRO Bank NV 11581 NL 
 
BPIFrance Financement SA 12990 FR 
 Bayerische Landesbank 13109 DE 
 Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale NORD/LB 13584 DE 
 Portigon AG 14021 DE 
 Hypo Real Estate Holding AG 16697 DE 
 NRW.BANK 19856 DE 
 Allied Irish Banks plc 20103 IE 
 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA-Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena 
21413 IT 
 Banque et Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat Luxembourg 22057 LU 
 SNS Bank N.V. 22324 NL 
 Caixa Geral de Depositos 22529 PT 
 Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (The) 24762 GB 
 KfW Ipex-Bank Gmbh 27782 DE 
 La Banque Postale 29070 FR 
 
Bank Ochrony Srodowiska SA - BOS SA-Bank Ochrony 
Srodowiska Capital Group 
42453 PL 
 
Co-operative Central Bank Limited 43424 CY 
 Dexia SA 45621 BE 
 Permanent TSB Plc 48505 IE 
 Landeskreditbank Baden-Wuerttemberg - Förderbank-L-Bank 48901 DE 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Further Research 
6.1 Concluding Remarks 
This dissertation contributes to the literature in the areas of financial stability 
and bank regulation, with particular attention to the impact of the European 
sovereign debt crisis. Specifically, I examined three related topics: (1) small banks’ 
resilience during the European debt crisis, which may provide a hint of how to 
reshape financial institutions to increase financial stability; (2) banks’ regulatory 
capital arbitrage behaviour during the crisis, which may explain why some banks 
were more vulnerable during the crisis; (3) and home bias in banks’ asset 
reallocation, which is closely related to the fragmentation of the European financial 
market. Although financial crises have repeated themselves throughout history and 
have been widely studied, the recent European sovereign debt crisis has many new 
features that stem from financial innovations, market developments, and the 
evolution of financial regulation. Research studies, including this dissertation, that 
incorporate new features of the recent crises, provide more informative insight to 
policymakers and contribute to financial stability. 
 
In Chapter 3, I explored the question of whether small banks were more resilient 
during the European sovereign debt crisis than large banks. The relationship 
between the size of banks and financial stability has also aroused decades of debate; 
I extended the study to the context of the European debt crisis. I studied this topic 
by focusing on one of the most important activities of banks, that is, lending to the 
real economy (the non-financial private sector), and explored how this was affected 
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by another crucial activity of European banks during the European sovereign debt 
crisis: their holdings of sovereign debt. In comparing the impact of banks’ sovereign 
exposure to lending to the private sector for large and small banks, I find that small 
banks do not substitute private loans with public debt, that is, they are not subject 
to the substitution effect, while large banks are. Noticeably, the absence of the 
substitution effect is not necessarily due to small banks’ low exposure to sovereign 
debt. I show that small banks from peripheral European countries have a much 
higher share of sovereign exposure in their portfolios compared to large banks. I 
show that small banks are less pro-cyclical in terms of lending, that is, they exhibit 
more stable lending behaviour during both good and bad times. Furthermore, small 
banks that have adequate capital and customers with high creditworthiness are more 
likely to increase both sovereign bond exposure and loans to the private sector. Such 
results suggest that new regulations that aims to increase banks’ capital ratios and 
to lower leverage should not necessarily cause a contraction in lending as is argued 
by critics of the new rules. 
 
In Chapter 4, I explored model-based capital regulation among European banks 
and attempted to find evidence of regulatory misconduct. Unlike previous studies, 
I explored related issues at the exposure-country level of each bank rather than 
merely at the bank level. Therefore, I am able not only to distinguish banks from 
core and peripheral European countries, but also to identify specific features of 
these banks’ exposure to financially distressed countries. I find that regulatory 
arbitrage by means of strategic risk modelling primarily concerns banks from 
Eurozone peripheral countries, especially those with less than adequate tier 1 capital. 
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In contrast, banks from Eurozone core countries are more cautious when applying 
the IRB approach. This may explain why the peripheral banks were more vulnerable 
during the European sovereign debt crisis. Apart from strategic risk modelling, I 
also show that peripheral banks may game regulatory capital by strategically 
choosing not to use the IRB approach for certain exposures, that is, so-called cherry-
picking. In particular, I show that peripheral banks make significantly less use of 
the model-based approach for exposure to the public sector because they may obtain 
a very low value for the risk calibration factor by adhering to the standardised 
approach. I read this behaviour as a combined result of moral suasion by 
governments and yield-seeking from banks. In particular, governments of 
financially distressed countries require domestic banks to absorb their new debt 
issuance, and these banks have the incentive to improve their regulatory capital ratio 
as well as seeking yield. Thus, this phenomenon may greatly contribute to the 
sovereign–bank diabolic loop that has caused serious financial stress in recent years. 
The principal findings of this chapter may have crucial policy implications. First, 
they support the concerns raised in recent regulatory proposals (EBA, 2016). In 
particular, the use of the IRB approach should be carefully granted and closely 
supervised. In addition, the (permanent) partial use of the IRB approach should be 
limited so that both strategic IRB modelling and cherry-picking can be properly 
confined. More importantly, this is in line with BCBS (2017), which aims to 
constrain the use of the IRB approach (e.g. input and output floors, an extra capital 
buffer on global systemically important banks, removing advanced IRB for certain 
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asset classes, etc.) and to promote the standardised approach by improving its 
granularity.   
 
In Chapter 5, I examined the causes of strong home bias in the sovereign debt 
portfolios of European banks during the Eurozone crisis. I find that for the 
sovereign debt of a particular country, the share of foreign creditors, non-bank 
domestic creditors, and domestic banks, decreased, was unchanged, and increased, 
respectively. Moreover, unlike previous studies that have focused only on sovereign 
debt portfolios, I also reviewed banks’ holdings of private sector debt. Interestingly, 
I find stronger home bias in bank’s private sector exposure than in their sovereign 
debt exposure. More importantly, I show that state-owned banks have stronger 
home bias in sovereign debt portfolios than do private banks, while private banks 
have stronger home bias in private debt portfolios. With these empirical findings, I 
argue that home bias in banks’ sovereign debt portfolios can be best explained by 
moral suasion theory; that is, financial distressed governments may (implicitly 
and/or explicitly) request domestic large banks over which they have the most 
jurisdiction, to absorb their new debt issuance to alleviate financing pressure. Such 
results also have important policy implications. Governments may influence the 
investment decisions of domestic banks through direct ownership, which may 
essentially impede the integration of European financial market. This is because 
one of the fundamental conditions for a fully integrated market is that all potential 
market participants should be treated equally when they are active in the market 
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(ECB 2017) 49. Moreover, many papers argue that banks’ excessive holdings of 
sovereign debt is a key ingredient in forming the sovereign–bank diabolic loop 
(Cooper and Nikolov 2013; Acharya et al. 2014; Brunnermeier et al. 2016; Farhi 
and Tirole 2018). This chapter identifies a crucial factor, moral suasion, that 
significantly contributes to banks’ excessive holdings of sovereign debt. This 
implies that minimising the chances for moral suasion can be particularly important 
in solving the deadly loop between sovereigns and banks. 
 
 
6.2 Suggestions for Future Research 
There are various ways to further develop the findings presented in this 
dissertation. I briefly mention some potentially interesting directions that could 
expand the study and provide additional contributions to the literature.  
 
In Chapter 3, I investigated the impact of banks’ sovereign debt exposure on 
banks’ aggregated lending to the non-financial private sector and compared the 
difference of such impact for large and small banks. An obvious extension may be 
breaking down bank lending into specific sectors, for example, large corporate 
lending versus small and medium enterprises. Thereby, one could further explore 
the potential comparative advantages or disadvantages for small banks for different 
lending activities in the context of European sovereign debt crisis. In Chapter 4, I 
attempted to identify regulatory capital arbitrage behaviour in European banks and 
                                                          
49 Financial Integration in Europe. 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.financialintegrationineurope201705.en.pdf 
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find that it more concerns banks from peripheral countries. As Basel III will be 
implemented soon, it would be interesting to test, using similar methods, whether 
regulatory capital arbitrage is better controlled under the new regulations. In 
addition, it may be interesting to explore regulatory arbitrage behaviour in emerging 
markets, including China and India, and to investigate whether they share common 
features with the developed economies or have distinct characteristics. In Chapter 
5, I argued that the banks’ home bias in their sovereign debt portfolios is mainly 
driven by moral suasion. However, I have not found a very clear explanation for 
banks’ home bias in their private sector exposure. This unexplained part of 
information friction theory may warrant further discussion as banks may have better 
knowledge of their local market. 
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